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Abstract
The thesis contains three chapters on environmental and natural resource economics
and focuses on situations where agents receive private or public information.
The first chapter analyses the problem of transboundary fisheries, where harvesting
countries behave non-cooperatively. In addition to biological uncertainty, countries
may face strategic uncertainty. A country that receives negative assessments about
the current level of the fish stock, may become “pessimistic” about the assessment
of the other harvesting country, which can ignite “panic-based” overfishing. In such
a coordination problem, multiplicity of equilibria is a generic characteristic of the
solution. Both strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection, relatively, have been
given less attention in the theoretical literature of common-property natural resources.
In this model, in the limit as the harvesting countries observe more and more precise
information, rationality ensures the unique “global game” equilibrium, a la Carlsson
and van Damme (1993). The improved predictive power of the model helps a potential
intergovernmental manager of the stock understand the threshold behaviour of harvesting
countries. The global game threshold coincides with the risk-dominance threshold of a
precise information model, as if there was no strategic uncertainty, and implies that
the countries select the corresponding risk-dominant action for any level of assessment
of the stock. Gaining from the risk-dominance equivalence, I derive policy suggestions
for the overfishing cost and the property rights in common-property fisheries.
The second chapter develops a theoretical framework to examine the role of public
information in dynamic self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs)
on climate change. The countries choose self-enforcing emission abatement strategies
vi
in an infinite-horizon repeated game. In a stochastic model, where the social cost of
greenhouse gasses (GHG) is a random variable, a central authority, as an information
sender, can control release of information about the unknown state to the countries. In
the literature on stochastic IEAs, it is shown that comparison of different scenarios of
learning by the countries, depends on ex-ante difference of true social cost of GHG from
the prior belief of countries. Here, I try to understand, in a signalling game between
the informed sender and the countries, whether the no-learning or imperfect-learning
scenarios, can be an equilibrium outcome. It is shown that the equilibrium strategy of
the sender, who is constrained to a specific randomisation device and tries to induce an
incentive-compatible abatement level which is Pareto superior, leads to full learning of
social cost of GHG of symmetric and asymmetric countries.
Finally, in the third chapter, I again examine a setting, where a central authority, as
an information sender, conducts research on the true social cost of climate change, and
releases information to the countries. However, in this chapter, instead of restricting
the sender to a specific signalling structure, the sender, who has commitment power, by
designing an information mechanism (a set of signals and a probability distribution
over them), maximises his payoff, which depends on the mitigation action of countries
and the social cost of green-house gases(GHG). The countries, given the information
policy (the probability distribution over signals) and the public signal, update their
beliefs about the social cost of GHG and take a mitigation action. I derive the optimal
information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in
coalition formation games. I show that the coalition size, as a function of beliefs, is an
endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. If the sender maximises the
expected payoff of either of non-signatories or signatories of the climate treaty, then
full revelation is the optimal information policy, while if the sender attempts to reduce
the global level of GHG, then optimal information policy leads to imperfect disclosure
of the social cost. Furthermore, given any of the specifications of the sender’s payoff,
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The thesis contains three essays on transboundary environmental and resource
economics and, using non-cooperative game theory frameworks, it attempts to shed
light on the significance of information on the interaction of countries facing the
problem of commons. The second chapter examines the role of private information on
harvesting actions of countries sharing common-pool fisheries. The third and fourth
chapters study climate change and transboundary emission games, where the source of
information is public. In these two chapters, in addition to the interaction of countries,
the possibility of affecting the countries’ mitigation actions by communication of public
information is investigated.
In the subsequent sections, each chapter is briefly reviewed, and in addition to
highlighting the research questions, I describe how they are tackled, and present the
main results and contributions.
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1.2 Second Chapter: Panic-Based Overfishing In
Transboundary Fisheries
In this chapter, I try to understand one of the underlying reasons for overfishing
in transboundary fisheries, which is overlooked in the theory of resource economics. I
suggest a new approach to study fisheries by including strategic risk in the analysis, as
a driving force of overfishing.
I examine a coordination resource game between two countries sharing a common-
pool fishery. The countries, by assessing the stock individually, obtain private informa-
tion about the level of fish stock. Realistically, their information is noisy (imprecise)
but correlated, so each country has beliefs (opinion) about both the stock and the
belief of the other country, which leads to strategic uncertainty.
As a coordination game, the model has a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. In
addition to addressing the interaction of countries under strategic uncertainty, the main
objective of this chapter is to drive unique prediction about the harvesting outcome of
countries for every level of assessment of the stock of fish.
More specifically, I focus on a two-period fishery, where, at the beginning of each
period, the stock is observed publicly. Then the fish stock reproduces and is subject to
biological shocks. As a result of biological uncertainty, the countries assess the stock
privately, and obtain their noisy private information. After updating their beliefs, they
simultaneously choose between two actions of sustainable fishing and overfishing. The
first is fishing a pre-committed share of the stock, which implies preserving the stock
for the next period, but overfishing leads to depletion of the stock. In the final period,
overfishing is dominant, and I focus on the equilibrium of the game in the first period,
when the countries, by overfishing, lose the continuation payoff of the second period.
The chapter shows that there are ranges of low and high levels of assessment of the
fish stock, where overfishing and sustainable fishing are respectively dominant actions.
However, there is an intermediate range of the stock, where beliefs about each other’s
assessment determine the equilibrium outcome, and negative beliefs can give rise to
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“panic-based” overfishing, while the stock is not at a low level and overfishing is not a
dominant action. Furthermore, in the absence of any equilibrium refinement, there is a
multiplicity of equilibria in the intermediate range of assessments, and no prediction
about the harvesting outcome can be derived.
The chapter suggests applying the global game equilibrium-selection of Carlsson
and Van Damme (1993), upon the possibility that the countries (in the limit) are
able to receive extremely precise private information. Therefore, given the binary-
action assumption, the equilibrium selection technique leads to a unique threshold of
assessments. Hence, for every level of assessment, it is possible to uniquely predict
the harvesting action of countries. Furthermore, comparative-static analysis on the
threshold provides insight into the effect of the underlying parameters of the model on
the harvesting outcome.
In addition, it is shown that in our resource game, the threshold of global-game
analysis coincides with the threshold of risk-dominance equilibrium-selection criterion
in a complete-information game. The property of global games provides tractability for
a potential (intergovernmental) manager of the stock in computing the threshold and
analysing the interaction of countries as if there was no strategic uncertainty. Given
the uniqueness results, some policy suggestions on the sustainable sharing rule and
cost of overfishing are presented.
1.3 Third Chapter: The Economics of Climate Change
and The Role of Public Information
This chapter develops a model about another renewable resource, which is global
green-house gases (GHG). Similar to the second chapter, the stock is assumed to accu-
mulate over time, and here, in the context of international environmental agreements
(IEA), a repeated game among countries is examined.
It is assumed that the countries minimise their loss of private abatements, in
addition to the social cost of GHG, and choose their emission abatement strategies.
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A set of self-enforceable abatements given punishment by reversion to the history-
independent strategy, is derived. The chapter offers equilibrium-selection analysis from
this set, if the countries target a level of abatement which minimises their joint loss.
The second aspect of this chapter is addressing equilibrium selection with respect
to uncertainty about the marginal social cost of GHG, which is a parameter in models
of the third and fourth chapters, about which the countries receive public information.
In the third chapter, the countries are either symmetric with respect to the social cost
(known as level uncertainty), or asymmetric (known as distributional uncertainty).
In the literature on stochastic IEAs, different scenarios of full-learning and no
learning about the marginal social cost of GHG with regards to social welfare, mitigation
actions, number of countries in coalitions, etc. are studied, and it is shown that the
results depend on the difference in the true realisation of social cost and its ex-
ante expectation. Relative to the theory of stochastic IEAs, where different public
information structures are compared, this chapter attempts to show which information
structure can be an equilibrium outcome of a game between the countries and a potential
information sender. Examples of information senders can be intergovernmental research
institutes into climate change. In other words, in this chapter, full learning and no
learning are possible equilibrium outcomes of a signalling game, where the sender is
informed, and accordingly, is aware of the difference of true social cost and the prior
expected value.
More specifically, the expected loss of the sender depends on abatement action of
the countries and the social cost of GHG. The sender, by releasing public information
on the social cost of GHG, tries to induce an abatement strategy which is closer
to the social-optimal level. In order to derive the equilibrium learning scenario, I
restrict attention to a specific signalling strategy, which includes full revelation and
no disclosure. In the resulted incomplete information game, the countries given the
publicly communicated information structure, update their beliefs about the social cost
of GHG and choose a self-enforceable abatement action. It is shown that the game has
a unique equilibrium which leads to full learning of the state.
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1.4 Fourth Chapter: Optimal Communication of
Climate Change With The Public
Similar to the third chapter, this chapter studies public information on the social
cost of GHG, and the possibility of affecting actions of the countries by communication
of this variable with the countries. However, instead of a repeated game, here the
countries are involved in a coalition game, and they maximise their expected payoff,
which depends on their (individual and collective) mitigation strategies, and the social
cost of GHG, which is a random variable in the model. The sender’s payoff also depends
on the mitigation action of countries and the social cost variable. Furthermore, the
payoffs of both sides of communication are common knowledge.
In contrast to the third chapter, the sender, at the time of announcing the informa-
tion strategy, is not informed about the state of social cost. Furthermore, relative to
the third chapter, instead of choosing an information strategy from a specific set, in
the fourth chapter, the sender designs an optimal information policy (a probability
distribution over signals) from the unrestricted set of public information policies, and
the sender commits to it. This is indeed a generalisation of the theory of information
design, introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), to coalition formation in the
context of climate change.
This chapter assumes that the sender, before observing the true social cost, com-
municates an information policy with the countries. After observing the state, the
sender sends a signal realisation according to the chosen information policy. Countries
given the information policy and the signal, update their beliefs and decide on joining
a coalition. Subsequently, the non-signatories and signatories of the coalition choose
their abatement or emission actions.
Therefore, the sender tries to induce a desirable mitigation and membership action,
by affecting the countries’ beliefs. It is shown that as the size of coalition is a function
of beliefs, and here beliefs are endogenous variables, the coalition size is an endogenous
variable, affected by the information policy of the sender.
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Compared to the third chapter, here, other payoffs for the sender are assumed. It
is shown that if the sender maximises an expected payoff which coincides with the
expected payoff of either or both signatories or non-signatories, the optimal information
policy leads to full revelation of the social cost. On the contrary, if the sender minimises
the total level of GHG, then imperfect disclosure is an optimal action for the sender.
However, under all of these payoff specifications, the communication of information
leads to the formation of a grand coalition, where all countries cooperate on the
social-optimal mitigation strategy.
1.5 Synthesis of The Research
The thesis is centred around information and learning by countries in transoundary
fisheries and climate change economics. In the various essays of the thesis, the source of
information is either private, or there is an active information sender, who communicates
publicly with the countries.
All chapters attempt to show how information can affect the interaction of countries.
In the third chapter, in addition to studying the role of information on equilibrium
selection, an information sender is introduced to the strategic interaction of countries,
who has limited signalling choices, and tries to affect the actions of countries. In
the final chapter, from an information design perspective, the sender, by choosing
the optimal game, induces the most desirable outcome of the interaction of countries.
In other words, in the last chapter, the information structure and the corresponding
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The improved predictive power of the model helps a potential intergovernmental
manager of the stock understand the threshold behaviour of harvesting countries.
The global game threshold coincides with the risk-dominance threshold of a precise
information model, as if there is no strategic uncertainty, and implies that the countries
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overfishing cost and the property rights in common-property fisheries.
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2.1 Introduction
Despite the fact that countries have access to more and more sophisticated
assessment technologies to estimate the fish population and are aware of the threatening
situation of marine fisheries, “the great fish war” is increasing worldwide. According to
FAO statistics1, from 1980 to 2012, the total marine catch has grown by 62%.
In this research, I develop a theoretical framework to understand the economic
forces behind the decision-making of harvesting countries in transboundary fisheries2,
where the harvesters receive information about the situation of the habitat. The results
of the theoretical model, help a potential (intergovernmental) manger of the stock to
explain the driving forces of overfishing, in addition to obtaining some policy solutions
to tackle it.
Here, I study the behaviour of two countries, which share a fishery and interact
non-cooperatively in a two-period model. After recruitment of the resource3, the stock
is publicly observed and then the appropriators face the biological shocks affecting
the stock of fish4. The main sources of biological uncertainty in the marine ecosystem,
as listed in the literature, are migration of the fish stock, predation by other animals,
changes of temperature etc.5
The model distinguishes between the effects of different sources of uncertainty on
the behaviour of fishing agents. In contrast to the biological uncertainty, the strategic
uncertainty, relatively, had been given less attention in the theoretical literature of
common-property natural resources. In the present research, after facing the biological
shocks, the harvesting agents are modelled to obtain private noisy information about
1Yearbook of fishery statistics 2013
2By transboundary fisheries I refer to the resources overlapping the 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zones of more than one country, which are shared as common-pool resources among some countries.
3Similar to the literature, recruitment of the fishery refers to it reproduction.
4As a result of the chosen sequence of events, the term biological uncertainty is chosen instead of
recruitment uncertainty. This is similar to Roughgarden and Smith (1996) and Sethi et al. (2005),
who distinguish between uncertainty due to the migration of the stock or recruitment uncertainty and
the measurement error in estimate of the stock.
5By the two-period setup, in fact I model a fishery which is destined to undergo a catastrophic
situation of depletion at a certain point in the future, as the result of an exogenous reason, such as
climate change. However, the countries may trigger the catastrophe at an earlier date, and I focus on
their harvesting decision-making before the destined catastrophe.
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the current stock. This private information may be a result of the individual research
of the countries. In reality, the private assessments6, although highly correlated among
countries, have an individual measurement error or noise. The noisy private information
leads to strategic uncertainty about the behaviour of the other harvesting country. In
fact, the countries form higher-order beliefs about information of the other country,
and second guess its harvesting decision. I am interested in the outcome of interaction
of countries in this resource game, where there is a strategic risk about their partners’
behaviour.
The uncertainties are introduced in two steps. In the first step, the model is
analysed under the assumption of complete information about the current state of the
fishery. However, there are random biological shocks that may affect the stock in the
future period7.
In this chapter, the interaction of harvesting countries is modelled in a coordination
setup, hence, the payoffs have strategic complementarities. Indeed, while coordination
and trust play a crucial role in the environmental economics, models of coordination
under the assumption of precise information have multiplicity of equilibria, which
reduces the predictive power of the model. The first equilibrium selection technique
which is suggested in the chapter, is the risk-dominance criterion of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), which leads to a unique pair of threshold-type equilibrium strategies
under precise information.
In the next step, I assume that the fishing countries do not observe the state of
the environment precisely in any period, but they receive noisy private signals about
it. Such a model helps us to understand how in a situation where overfishing is not a
dominant strategy and the fishery may even have the potential for preservation, the
pessimistic belief of the countries about each other’s beliefs, can lead to panic-based
overfishing. Indeed, higher-order beliefs can play a significant role in explaining the
6Throughout the chapter, assessment and signal are used as synonyms.
7This timing is similar to Clark and Kirkwood (1985), but here the non- regulated agents rather
than the manager face the uncertainty.
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observed overharvest of natural resources and here it is the result of noisy private
observation of the fish stock.
Here I analyse the model when both realistic underlying biological and strategic
uncertainties are present in the model. Furthermore, as the private information becomes
extremely precise (although the level of the stock will never be common knowledge),
the coordination game will naturally have the unique equilibrium of global games
of Carlsson and van Damme (1993), and Morris and Shin (1998). Since, the unique
equilibrium of global games is the only equilibrium strategy in the set of rationalisable
strategies, the beliefs of the harvesters are consistent with their rationality and common
knowledge of rationality. In other words, if private information is extremely precise,
there is no need to justify applying the global game equilibrium-selection technique
to this fishery game, but the rationality naturally enforces it. Obtaining very precise
information is not an abstract assumption in the renewable resources. For example,
see Costello et al. (1998), and Costello et al. (2001) for improvement in the accuracy
of forecast of the fish stocks.
Accordingly, it is shown that the results of Carlsson and van Damme (1993), and
Morris and Shin (1998) generalise to the case of renewable resources that the state
variable (here the fish stock) in the current period depends on its previous level. It
is discussed how reducing the noise of private information helps the researcher or the
potential manager of the resource in deriving a conclusion about the interaction of
the harvesting agents. The equilibrium takes a threshold form, and it is discussed
under which conditions the harvesters coordinate on preserving the stock, and when
their negative beliefs about the other country and the fishery, enforces depletion of the
resource. Indeed, the refined threshold-type strategies explain the flipping behaviour
of harvesting countries of the resource as the result of a change in their beliefs about
the other country and sustainablity of resource. It also sheds light on the economic
rationale of different harvesting levels by different countries in the same fishery. In
fact, the global game analysis can explain the real-world (on the equilibrium path)
chaotic mis-coordination behaviour around the threshold level.
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In addition, as the global game equilibrium threshold coincides with the risk-
dominant threshold in the precise-signal model8, it provides a tractable framework for
policy implications in common-property fisheries. Consequently, I present comparative-
static analysis on the critical level of habitat, also I derive policy suggestions for the
overfishing cost and the property rights of transboundary fisheries.
The structure of the chapter will be as follows: The related literature is reviewed
in section 4.2. Then, the model is introduced in section 4.3. First, it is analysed under
biological uncertainty in section 2.4. Then, in section 2.5, strategic uncertainty is
added to the setup, and the global game equilibrium-refinement is introduced. Section
4.6 concludes and finally extended proofs are provided in the appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
The literature on game theory and fisheries is better surveyed by Munro (2009),
Bailey et al. (2010), van Long (2011), Hannesson (2011) and Miller et al. (2013). This
chapter is related to two main strands of the literature of resource extraction: the
stochastic resource games and the literature on regime shifts (or catastrophe).
The pioneer in the area of the stochastic resource games is Reed (1978, 1979), who
introduced the stochastic fluctuations in the stock recruitment of a renewable resource.9
Since then the role of uncertainties and imperfect information has been extensively
studied. However, there are a few authors who examine the role of asymmetric
information. Laukkanen (2003,2005), Mckelvey et al. (2003) and Tarui et al. (2008),
investigate situations where the harvesting action or some share of the stock are not
observable by other players. In the model considered in this chapter, the source of
asymmetry of information is observing noisy private signals about the state of the
habitat by both harvesting countries. Golubtsov and McKelvey (2007) study an infinite-
8The risk-dominance equivalence of the global game equilibrium, was first proved by Carlsson and
van Damme (1993) for the class of static 2 × 2 games.
9For stochastic games of resource extraction with recruitment uncertainty, to name a few among
the pioneers, see Spulber (1982, 1985), Mirman and Spulber (1985), Clark and Kirkwood (1985),
Clemhout and Wan (1985), Clarke and Reed (1994), Roughgarden and Smith (1996).
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horizon fishery game, where the fishing fleets observe private noisy signals about the
stock growth and stock-split parameters. There results are based on simulations that
derive MPE and Nash bargaining solutions, and assign numeric precisions to signals of
harvesting fleets to represent the incomplete information. In contrast, I construct a
game which is simplified in many aspects, however, I derive analytical solutions to the
problem, and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium10.
The second strand is the extensive literature on the effect of risk of adverse events
which cause a regime shift. This literature, which includes either control theory or
coalition formation studies, is better reviewed by Crepin et al. (2012), Barrett (2013),
Ren and Polasky (2014) and van der Ploeg (2014). As classified by Polasky et al.
(2011), either system dynamics admits a fixed point or the underlying stock has an
exogenous threshold (or tipping point). However, this chapter is classified under a
third group of economic models of regime shifts, which is the global games. In fact,
in these models, the binary action of players leads to an equilibrium which takes a
threshold form with respect to (signals about) the underlying state variable. Hence,
the threshold in the model is endogenous, and enables us to derive comparative-static
analysis on the threshold.
As mentioned, the global-game analysis was first introduced by Carlsson and van
Damme (1993) and then Morris and Shin (1998, 2003) generalised the theory. Common
applications of global games are currency crises (Morris and Shin, 1998), bank runs
(Morris and Shin, 2001; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), foreign
direct investment (Dasgupta, 2007), political regime change (Angeletos et al. 2007;
Edmond, 2011) and debt-pricing (Morris and Shin, 2004; Corsetti, Guimaraes and
Roubini, 2006), which all refer to real-world situations where a small change in the
beliefs of agents can trigger a sudden change in their economic behaviour and lead to
a regime shift.11
10The main simplification in the present setup is the two-period assumption. Handling the strategic
uncertainty implies a great deal of complication, and a two-period model is sufficient to capture the
idea of regime shift to depletion, in addition to the stock recruitment.
11As an experimental study supporting the theory see Heinemann et al. (2004).
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Therefore, the present chapter also contributes to the strand of equilibrium refine-
ment. The multiplicity of equilibria has been intensively investigated in the literature
of common property resources. Among all, Dutta (1995) generalised the Folk Theorem
of Aumann and Shapley (1994) to the stochastic games, also Benhabib and Radner
(1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1993), Dockner and Sorger (1996) and Sorger (1998)
show multiplicity of perfect equilibria in deterministic dynamic games. Although
equilibrium selection has been one of the main challenges of game theory since the
1980s, to the best of my knowledge, equilibrium refinement in coordination games has
not been addressed explicitly in the applications of natural resources and environmental
economics. Here, I construct a resource game, where the uniqueness of equilibrium is
owed to the risk-dominance and global-game equilibrium-selection methods.
Most of the literature on global games is about static settings. The growing
literature of dynamic global games can be classified into two main strands. In the first
strand, which was originally studied by Morris and Shin (1999,2001) and Chamley
(1999), fundamentals are the driving force of the dynamics. In such frameworks, in each
period the state variable, about which players obtain private information, is evolving
according to a one-step random-walk process. They show that each period of the
dynamic model can be considered an independent static game, with a unique threshold
equilibrium in the limit, which is a random variable itself. Morris and Shin (2003) call
this type of dynamic settings “Recurring Incomplete Information” global games. As
Steiner (2008b) and Chassang (2010) have pointed out, the dynamics of outcomes in
the models of this generation are produced exogenously by the fundamentals.
The other strand in dynamic global game literature, includes models that endogenise
the underlying dynamics. This idea was first proposed by Angeletos, Hellwig and
Pavan (2007) who studied a multi-period regime-change game where the fundamentals
were i.i.d. Survival of the status quo in at least one period weakens the posterior
beliefs about the possibility of abandoning the regime. So players’ beliefs about the
fundamentals are the endogenous source of the dynamics. Similar to Morris and
Shin (1999), they also assume fundamental-independent payoffs for the safe action.
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Therefore, this type of endogeneity is completely related to the evolution of beliefs.
Steiner (2008a) captured the idea of endogeneity of dynamics by introducing another
state variable in the payoff functions. Chassang (2010) and Dasgupta et al. (2012)
study respectively, infinite and finite-horizon global games, in which all payoffs are
functions of an i.i.d. state variable and players’ incentives through the payoff structure
are the source of endogeneity of dynamics.12.
The present work is a combination of these two strands. First, as a renewable
resource, the state of a fishery depends on its previous value through the growth
function13. Beside the exogenous evolution of the fishery, all of the payoffs depend on
the state of the resource. Hence the players’ incentives are the other driving force of
the dynamics of outcomes.
2.3 The General Framework
In each period, a 2 × 2 game with stay-exit structure is played14. Two countries
share a stock of fish wt ∈ (0, 1), where subscript t refers to time. They choose
between two actions: sustainable-fishing, S, and overfishing, O. If the countries decide
to maintain the resource then the game will continue to the next period, but they
may choose to exhaust the stock in any period and end the game. If there is no
uncertainty in the environment, then the stock of fish grows according to the specific,
but commonly-used growth function of Levhari and Mirman (1980), as an increasing,
strictly concave and bounded growth function, wt = (w̄t−1)α, where 0 < α < 1, and
w̄t−1 ∈ (0, 1) is the escapement level of the stock at the end of period t − 1. Also w̄0 is
the initial stock which is chosen by nature. Furthermore, α and the growth function
are common knowledge among the harvesting countries.
12There is another strand in the dynamic global games, where two-period models are considered.
For example, see Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Heidhues and Melissas (2006), Dasgupta (2007), and
Kovac and Steiner (2012).
13Not completely similar to Morris and Shin(1999) and Chamley (1999), since the state variable
does not follow a random-walk process.
14This is similar to the theoretical global game paper of Chassang (2010). In contrast to his model,
where the sate variable is i.i.d. here the state grows over time.
2.3 The General Framework 16
However, in this model there are uncertainties about both the stock of fish and the
harvesting action of the other player. The timing of the game is as follows:
At the beginning of the game, nature chooses the state of the fishery, w̄0. Then
at the beginning of each period t, for t ∈ {1, 2}, the escapement level, w̄t−1, which
is the parent fish stock left from the previous period, reproduces and the countries
receive a public signal, yt ≡ (w̄t−1)α, about the state of the fishery, which is in fact
the population of fish in the stock.15 Then the fishery will be subject to biological
shocks, ξt, which I model as an additive shock to the stock of the transboundary fishery.
Therefore, wt = yt + ξt.16 Also, Ξ ∼ U [−c, c], where 0 < c < 1 and U [.] refers to the
uniform probability density function17. The biological shocks are serially uncorrelated
and independent of wt. It is assumed that if the stock is fully depleted, then there will
not be any immigration to the stock, and the fishery can never recover.
In every period t ∈ {1, 2} and after the biological shocks, country i as a result of
its own independent research, obtains a noisy private signal, xit, about the size of the
stock, where xit = wt + εit, also E ∼ U [−a, a]. The superscript i ∈ {1, 2} refers to
countries’ index, where i ∈ {1, 2}, and in future −i refers to the other country. Since
εit can be interpreted as the private measurement error in the assessment of the fish
stock, parameter a is referred as the precision of private information. These noises
are i.i.d. and independent of wt. Although the signals of the two countries are highly
correlated, they are private information. The structure of payoffs, the distributional
assumptions of the private signals and the noise technology of the state of the fishery
are common knowledge among the countries.
Finally, players choose between the two harvesting levels simultaneously, and at
the end of each period18, actions are observed and payoffs are determined. In period
t ∈ {1, 2}, when the countries are making decisions the true level of stock is wt. As
15It can be assumed that the public signal is communicated by benevolent (intergovernmental)
research institutes which conduct research about the fisheries and publish their results.
16Henceforth, upper case letters denote random variables, and lower case letters refer to the realised
values that the random variables map onto.
17In Appendix 2.7.3, the assumption of uniform distributions is relaxed.
18I refer to the described framework as a two-period model, as t = 0 is used for the sake of
completeness and defining the initial values. So, the first period is denoted by t = 1.
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mentioned earlier, if in the first period, the players coordinate on sustainable-fishing,
then the game continues to the next period, and if one or both countries overfish in
any period, the game ends, both players receive the termination payoffs of that period,
the habitat will be extinguished to a level below the minimum viable population, and
no further positive or negative shocks in subsequent period will affect the stock.
Table 2.1 depicts the payoffs of the first period (without continuation values). The
payoff of the sustainable harvesting is equal to the countries’ yield or the amount of
fish that they catch. Sustainable-fishing is harvesting according to a pre-committed
harvest fraction, r, for each country, where r ∈ (0, 12). At the moment this fraction
is exogenously fixed and if both counties choose the sustainable harvest, then indeed
they share the total catch, 2r, symmetrically.19 While, overfishing in the first period is
catching whatever is left in the stock and it leads to an extraction cost, κ
w1
, as well,
where κ is a positive constant. This cost captures extra costs of illegal harvesting or
the international pressure from breaching the agreement, and it is negatively related
to the size of population.
In fact, because of the growth function, existence of such an overfishing cost implies
that if the fishery is small in size, where reproduction rate is high, overfishing causes a
larger loss. For example, for a small stock which is mainly parental fish, there is more
public awareness and international pressure to protect it. Conversely, the richness of
the habitat reduces the overfishing cost, and decreases the conservation incentives.
Sensitivity of the results to the existence of this cost, and its specific functional form is
discussed for the model with biological uncertainty in section 2.4, and with biological
and strategic uncertainty in section 2.5. The payoff of (O,O) in the first period is
sharing the resource equally minus the overfishing cost.
It is implicitly assumed that the price of fish is normalised to one, and there is no
market externality. In addition, the cost of acquiring information is normalised to zero.
19Conventionally, sustainable yield refers to a level of catch such that the stock remains constant
over time, however here I define sustainable catch as harvesting in compliance with the agreed harvest
fraction and the sharing rule.
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These simplifying assumptions provide us with a tractable model to study the strategic
interaction of countries in the transboundary fisheries.




S rw1, rw1 rw1, (1 − r)w1 − κw1








In the last period, there is no continuation value, hence there is no overfishing cost
either. The strictly dominant strategy for both players is overfishing. Hence, given
the symmetry of the game, they share the stock equally in the last period. Appealing
to sequential rationality, by backward induction, the total payoff of country i in the
first period of a two-period game by playing (S, S) is rw1 + β2E[w2|y1, x
1
1, σ11 = σ21 = 1],
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, which is identical for both harvesting agents,
and σit is the strategy of country i in period t, such that σit : Xt × Yt → [0, 1], and
the range [0, 1] refers to the probability of sustainable fishing by country i given its
signals. The stay-exit structure implies that the other payoffs in the first period of a
two-period game, remain the same as table 2.1, i.e. there is no continuation value if at
least one of the countries chooses overfishing in the first period. The first period of the
two-period model is analysed as a one-shot game augmented with the continuation
payoff of a dominant action in the second period.
This setup fits into the literature of stochastic games, where the stage game
changes from period to period and the transition function, showing the evolution of
stock, depends on both the actions and the random biological shocks. The explained
stochastic resource game can be denoted by G(w̄0, a, c, r, α, β, κ), and henceforth I
suppress notation and express it as G.
Finally it is assumed that Xt and Wt map into (0, 1). This is because first, the stock
variable must be non-negative, and second the growth of the stock occurs only in the
range (0, 1). Since xit = wt + εit, restricting xit is sufficient and is achieved by assuming
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0 < xi1 < 1 and 0 < xi2 < 1. The first assumption implies 0 < (w̄0)α ±c±a < 1, and the
second implies 0 < b[(w̄0)α ± c]α ± c ± a < 1, where b ≡ (1 − 2r)α. Because depending
on r and α, the state variable in the first period, w1, can be both greater or less than
w2, both restrictions are needed and they can be rephrased to (w̄0)α − c − a > 0,
(w̄0)α + c + a < 1, b[(w̄0)α − c]α − c − a > 0 and b[(w̄0)α + c]α + c + a < 1. These indeed
mean that the maximum level of noise of each period, a + c, must be small enough
relative of the initial stock to guarantee that xit ∈ (0, 1).
As a definition, a strategy σit is a threshold strategy for player i, if there exists a
cutoff, below which the countries sustainably harvest, and above which they overfish.
Indeed, the reason for defining the threshold strategies with sustainable fishing for low
levels of the stock is concavity of the growth function and the existence of overfishing
cost, which lead to greater conservation incentive where the fishery, although small in
size, has a high reproduction rate. Finally, since the game is symmetric, the equilibrium
refers to a pair of equilibrium strategies.
The uncertainty is introduced in two steps in the analysis. In the first step, I focus
on precise private signals. Therefore, the countries can assess the current state of the
fishery perfectly, but the biological shocks in future period may still affect the fishery.
In the second step, where the general case with noisy private signals is studied, there
will be both biological and strategic uncertainties in the first period.
2.4 Biological Uncertainty
In this section I will examine the decision of countries in the first period, under
the assumption of a = 0. Hence, xi1 = w1 for both i. In other words, in equilibrium,
there is complete and perfect information about the action of the other country, and
the current state of the fishery, but there is biological uncertainty about the future
stock.
Given game G with payoffs depicted in Table 2.1 and taking into account the
continuation payoffs, the countries compare the expected payoff of sustainable fishing
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versus overfishing in the first period. Let us define two functions representing the
expected payoff differential of a country given that the other country chooses sustainable
harvesting and overfishing respectively:














where E[w2|w1,σ1t = σ2t = 1] = b(w1)α, and superscript 0 refers to the precise-signal
case.
2.4.1 Dominance and intermediate regions
There is a low level of fish population, w1, below which due to the high overfishing
cost also the high reproduction rate of the fishery, sustainable harvest is a dominant
action. I call (0, w1) the lower dominance region. In other words, for any w1 ∈ (0, w1),
independent of the action of the other country, the payoff of sustainable extraction is
strictly larger than overfishing, i.e. ∆0(w1) > 0 and ∆̄0(w1) > 0.
Similarly, there exists an upper dominance region, (w̄1, 1), where overfishing in the
first period is a dominant action. Indeed, in this region, if one of the players is going
to exit the game, there is a first-mover advantage to do so. In fact, for any w1 > w̄1,
∆0(w1) < 0 and ∆̄0(w1) < 0.
This leads to the existence of an intermediate region of fish population, [w1, w̄1],
in which there is no dominant action. The continuation payoff and the overfishing
cost are such that the game in the first period is a coordination game, i.e ∆0(w1) ≥ 0,
with equality at w̄1 and ∆̄0(w1) ≤ 0, with equality at w1. Therefore, in this region,
on which I will focus, the game has two pure Nash equilibrium actions of (S, S) and
(O, O).
To characterise this region, it is sufficient to solve for w1 and w̄1. Solving ∆̄0(w1) = 0
implies w1 =
√
κ/(12 − r). Likewise, w̄1 solves ∆
0(w̄1) = 0. There is no explicit solution
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for w̄1, but note that ∆0(w1) is continuous in w1, also limw1→0 ∆0(w1) = +∞. I impose
the following assumption to ensure strict monotonicity of ∆0(w1) and existence of its
unique real root in between (w1, 1).
Assumption 1. Game G is such that for all w1 ∈ (0, 1), ∂∆
0(w1)
∂w1
< 0, also ∆0(w1 =
1) < 0.













α w21 < κ.
Recall that ∆0(w1) is the expected payoff differential of a country where the other
country is harvesting sustainably, hence this assumption implies that, for all w1 ∈ (0, 1),
that the fish population is growing, if the other country harvests sustainably, then as the
stock increases, the overfishing cost parameter, κ, is large enough such that marginal
net benefit of overfishing is more than marginal net benefit of sustainable harvesting20.
Furthermore, if the LHS of the inequality is negative, then this assumption is reduced
to κ > 0. In addition, ∆0(w1 = 1) < 0 reassures the single crossing of ∆0(w1) in
between (w1, 1). Indeed ∆0(w1 = 1) = β2 b − (1 − 2r) + κ is negative if and only if
κ < (1 − 2r) − β2 b. This can be rewritten as
β
2 (1 − 2r)
α < (1 − 2r) − κ, which states
that κ should be small enough such that if the stock is not growing, i.e. w1 = 1,
then the payoff of catching the left share today, (1 − 2r) − κ, is greater than the





α w21 < κ < b
1
α − β2 b.
Given Assumption 1, there exist a unique real root, w̄1 ∈ (0, 1), solving ∆0(w̄1) = 0.
Finally, I need to assume ∆0(w1) > ∆̄0(w1), to guarantee that w1 < w̄1.
Assumption 2. Game G is such that ∆0(w1) > 0.
Intuitively, in the lower dominance region, sustainable harvest is a cooperative
action, and increases the conservative incentive of the other country. Comparison of





20 Note that as κ increases, marginal net benefit of overfishing, (1 − r) + κ
w21
, increases.
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Therefore, 0 < w1 < w̄1 < 1, and thus game G admits lower and upper dominance
regions, and an intermediate region of fish population in between.21
Thus, in the intermediate region, where there is no dominant action, although
there are only two periods in the model, because the fish stock is reproducing and the
considerable overfishing cost, depending on the current level of the stock, countries
may choose to wait in the first period, and in the most cooperative equilibrium, both
countries sustainably harvest up to w̄1. Despite the fact that in the dominance regions
there were unique outcomes, for any state of fishery (or precise signal) in between the
upper-bound and lower-bound thresholds there is multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
that players either play (O,O) or (S,S) or randomise (at the thresholds).
Therefore, if there is complete information about the current stock of fish, then the
theory cannot predict the action of harvesting agents. This multiplicity of equilibrium
outcome, which is the natural characteristic of coordination games under precise
information, in the absence of any equilibrium refinement, reduces the predictive power
of the model to zero for any value of the stock w1 ∈ [w1, w̄1].
2.4.2 Comparative statics on the upper-bound and lower-bound
thresholds
The discount factor, β, and the reproduction rate, α, through the channel of
continuation value of sustainable harvest, only affect ∆0(w1), but not ∆̄0(w1). Since
∆0(w1) is an increasing function of both of these parameters, if the countries become
more patient, i.e. the discount factor increases, or if the reproduction rate of the fishery
increases, i.e. α decreases, for any given level of fish population, ∆0(w1) shifts up, so
its crossing which is w̄1, moves to the right. Therefore, there would be a smaller upper
dominance region, while w1 is constant.
However, the overfishing cost parameter, κ, and the harvest fraction, r, affect both
w1 and w̄1, and indeed these two parameters are important for practice pathways.
21As a numeric example, if β = 0.9, κ = 0.01, r = 0.3, and α = 0.5, then w1 = 0.2 and w̄1 = 0.6.









increasing the cost parameter, shifts both w1 and w̄1 to the right. Hence, by expanding
the lower dominance region and shrinking the upper dominance region, a larger




= w1, if the countries agree on a larger harvest fraction
for sustainable catch, i.e. if r increases, w1 increases, so up to a larger level of fish
population, the sustainable extraction is a dominant action. However, because
∂∆0(w1)
∂r
= 2w1 − αβ(1 − 2r)α−1wα1
can be either positive or negative, also ∂
2∆0(w1)
∂r2
< 0, ∆0(w1) is not monotone in r,
and there is a trade off. Increasing the harvest fraction of sustainable catch, on one
hand reduces the continuation payoff, rw1 + β2 bw
α
1 , and on the other hand reduces
the temptation for unilateral deviation (1 − r)w1. Indeed, there is a critical harvest





2w1 , which solves
∂∆0(w1)
∂r
= 0, and below which increasing the
shares of sustainable fishing reduces the temptation for overfishing, so for any level of
fish stock, ∆0(w1) shifts up, pushing w̄1 to the right. Increasing the shares beyond the
critical r̄, decreases the upper-bound threshold as it reduces the continuation payoffs.
2.4.3 Equilibrium refinement with biological uncertainty
A relevant equilibrium-selection technique in this game with precise information is the
risk-dominance criterion of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In the first period of any game
G, sustainable-fishing weakly risk-dominates overfishing if the product of deviation



















22Despite the fact that there is no prediction about the equilibrium selection by the harvesting
agents in the intermediate region.
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Indeed, the terms inside the brackets are ∆0(w1) in (2.4.1) and negative of ∆̄0(w1)
in (2.4.2), respectively. As explained, in the dominance regions, there exists a unique
prediction, therefore, I focus on the intermediate region. Since for any w1 ∈ (w1, w̄1)
any game G is a coordination game, i.e. (S,S) and (O,O) are pure Nash equilibria
of the game, thus both expressions inside the brackets in (2.4.3) are positive in this
region. Furthermore, a fish population equal to the upper-bound threshold, w̄1, does
not satisfy the risk-dominance criterion in (2.4.3). Hence, for any w1 ∈ [w1, w̄1), the
inequality in (2.4.3) can be written as ∆RD(w1) ≥ 0, where
∆RD(w1) ≡ 2rw1 +
β
2 b(w1)




Proposition 1. In the first period of any game in G, under the precise signals, there
exists a unique symmetric risk-dominant threshold, wRD, below which sustainable
harvest is risk-dominant and above which overfishing is risk-dominant.
Proof. The first part of Assumption 1 is sufficient for ∂∆
RD(w1)
∂w1












1] < κ, and if the LHS of this inequality is negative,
then κ > 0 ensures strict monotonicity of ∆RD(w1). Recall that (2.4.4) is sum of ∆0(w1)
and ∆̄0(w1). Since ∆̄0(w1 = w̄1) < 0, also ∆0(w1 = w̄1) = 0, ∆RD(w1 = w̄1) < 0.
In addition, ∆0(w1) > 0, and ∆̄0(w1) = 0, imply that ∆RD(w1 = w1) > 0. Hence,
∆RD(w1) has a unique real root, say wRD ∈ (w1, w̄1) and the risk-dominant equilibrium
admits a threshold form, below wRD the countries fish sustainably and above it they
overfish.
In terms of comparative statics, the sensitivity of ∆RD(w1) and therefore wRD
to the discount factor and reproduction rate are similar to ∆0(w1) and w̄1. So as β
increases, or as α decreases, wRD shifts to the right, so in a larger set of fish population,






, relative to w1 and w̄1 thresholds, wRD is more
sensitive to the overfishing cost. So, when κ increases, all of these three thresholds
shift to the right, but wRD responds more, implying coordination on the conservative
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action for a larger range of fish population. Without the overfishing cost, i.e. if κ = 0,
there would be no lower dominance region, and ∆RD(w1) would be a hump-shape
function, but still it admits a single real root at wRD, and at any level of the stock
above wRD, ∆RD(w1) < 0, and below it, ∆RD(w1) > 0. Therefore, proposition 1 holds.
Furthermore, with any other functional form for the overfishing cost, as long as the
single-crossing property, and the mentioned signs of ∆RD(w1) hold, the risk-dominance
criterion leads to a unique threshold-form equilibrium. Clearly, a cost function which
is negatively related to the stock, provides monotonicity of ∆RD(w1) as well.
Finally, the risk-dominance threshold does not respond monotonically to the harvest
fraction, r, and indeed
∂∆RD(w1)
∂r
= 3w1 − αβ(1 − 2r)α−1wα1 = 0





2w1 . Note that
∂2∆RD(w1)
∂r2
< 0, hence, below rRD, increasing the harvest fraction increases ∆RD(w1) and
therefore wRD, and above the critical level, increasing r, decreases the risk-dominance
threshold. Furthermore, comparison of rRD with the critical harvest fraction in section
2.4.2, implies r̄ < rRD.
To sum up, according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), if the players coordinate on
the less risky action, then the risk-dominance equilibrium-selection criterion provides
a unique prediction. However, it is known that in a model with precise information,
selection of risk-dominance criterion is a matter of opinion, and in fact the global game
provides a justification for the risk-dominance selection. In addition, the assumption of
observing the state of the fishery precisely is very strong. In the next section, by allowing
for noisy private information acquisition, in addition to explaining the equilibrium
coordination failure, which is observed in reality, I derive a unique prediction about
the outcome of the countries’ interaction.
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2.5 Biological and Strategic Uncertainty
Under precise information, the fishing countries could perfectly anticipate the
harvesting decision of the other country in equilibrium. However, in reality the
harvesting countries do not share either precise or common information about the
stock of resource. In this section, the model is analysed under the more plausible
assumption that the fishing firms do not assess the state of the environment precisely
in any period, but they obtain the public signals, yt, before the biological shocks and
the noisy private signals, xit, after the shocks. In fact, since the private signals about
the stock of the fishery are highly correlated between the two countries, each signal
conveys some information about the signal and therefore the action of the other country.
On the other hand, this information is noisy and leads to strategic uncertainty and
possibility of coordination failure in equilibrium.
In such an environment, in which the countries face both biological and strategic
uncertainties, they form higher-order beliefs about each other’s beliefs about the
stock of fish. Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998) provide a
tractable method, which ends up with a simple monotone-strategy equilibrium, which
just depends on the countries’ private assessments. Their analysis is based on vanishing
noise of the private signals, although the state variable will never become common
knowledge. In the next subsections, the global game equilibrium is derived, then its
result is compared with the risk-dominance criterion of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for
the precise information game. Finally given these results, I derive the optimal harvest
fraction of sustainable yield and overfishing cost.
2.5.1 Equilibrium with biological and strategic uncertainty
Before characterising the global-game equilibrium strategies, let us examine the
probability of sustainable yield in the dominance regions given private and noisy
information. If country i observes a signal xi1 < w1 − a, then it believes that w1 < w1,
so regardless of its belief about the other country, as a dominant strategy, chooses
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sustainable harvest with probability one. If any country has a private assessment
xi1 < w1 − 2a, then it believes definitely that the other country is also receiving a signal
x−i1 < w1. Hence for any w1 < w1 − 2a, probability of (S, S) is one. By the same
argument, in the upper dominance region, for any w1 > w̄1 + 2a, the probability of
(S, S) is zero. I assume there exist levels of fish stock w1 − 2a > 0, also w̄1 + 2a < 1. If
w1 ≥ w1, no country has an assessment xi1 < w1 − a. Likewise, where w1 ≤ w̄1, neither
of them have a signal xi1 > w̄1 + a. Thus, for any w1 ∈ [w1, w̄1], there is no dominant
strategy and the countries’ beliefs about each other determine the probability of (S, S),
and it varies between its upper bound (one) and its lower bound (zero).
Hence, overfishing in the first period, may occur for two reasons. First, the private
noisy assessment of resource may provide some information that the population of fish
stock implies that overfishing is a dominant action. Therefore, for example, if the stock
of resource in the first period is above w̄1 +2a, as mentioned above, overfishing happens
because the countries observe high signals about the stock (where the fishery has a
low reproduction and overfishing cost is relatively low). In addition, the correlated
assessments convey noisy information regarding the assessment and therefore the belief
of the other country. Hence, overfishing may happen because a country believes that
the other country has observed a high signal, although the stock is not fragile, i.e.
where it is not dominant to overfish. Indeed, in the intermediate region of [w1, w̄1],
the fear of mis-coordination on the equilibrium path, which translates to “pessimism”
about the possibility of unilateral overfishing by the other country, is the result of
observing noisy private signals23. I refer to overfishing in the intermediate region as
“panic-based” overfishing, which is the result of pessimism about the belief of the other
harvesting country and it is not dominant to overfish24. Therefore, in the absence of any
equilibrium refinement, in the intermediate region, there is multiplicity of equilibria.
23The term “fear of mis-coordination” is borrowed from Chassang (2010), who explains that although
the probability of actual mis-coordination in the equilibrium of a global game is very small, the “fear”
of mis-coordination influences the equilibrium actions.
24The term “panic-based” action is also borrowed from the bank run paper of Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005) on the literature of Global games.
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Because the signals affect the countries’ beliefs about both the state of the fishery
and the action of the other country, the expected payoff of countries and therefore
their equilibrium actions depend on their private assessments. To find the equilibrium
strategies, again each country compares the expected payoff of sustainable fishing
and overfishing, which depend on its own belief about the stock of the fishery, in
addition to its belief about the belief of the other country about the state. Let
∆i(w1, x−i1 (xi1, y1) | xi1, y1) be the difference of expected payoff of sustainable fishing
versus overfishing for country i in period 1, given the observed signals and holding
belief x−i1 about the signal of the other country. Indeed,
∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1, y1) ≡
E

















I claim there exists a symmetric equilibrium threshold, w∗. If there exists such
a threshold perfect Bayes Nahs equilibrium (PBNE), then in equilibrium, country i
by observing a signal below w∗ − a (above w∗ + a), chooses sustainable fishing, i.e.
σi1 = 1, (overfishing, i.e. σi1 = 0), where ∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1, y1) is positive (negative)
for that country. Furthermore, if the country exactly receives the critical signal of
xi1 = w∗, then country i must be indifferent between sustainable fishing and overfishing
in equilibrium, i.e. 0 ≤ σi1 ≤ 1. Hence, given the properties of the indifference equation,
examined in Appendix 2.7.2, a sufficient condition for existence of a threshold PBNE
is ∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗, y1) = 0. In addition, in equilibrium both countries choose the
same level of harvest unless at least one country observes a signal which is very close
to the critical signal, where mis-coordination might happen.
Before formalising this result in the next proposition, in order to shed light on
the importance of global-game technique in analysing the behaviour of countries
encapsulated in (2.5.1), assume that country i could observe the stock precisely, but
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assumes that the other country has a private signal x−i1 . From the point of view of
such a country, equation (2.5.1) would be reduced to25
∆0(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1) ≡ rw1 +
β
2 w2 − (1 − r)w1 +
κ
w1
if x−i1 ≤ w∗
(r − 12)w1 +
κ
w1
if x−i1 ≥ w∗
(2.5.2)
and probability of sustainable fishing by the other country could be pinned down by
Pr(x−i < w∗ | w1) = Pr(w1 + ϵ−i1 < w∗ | w1) = F (w∗ − w1 | w1)
where F (.) is the uniform cumulative distribution function of ϵit. Therefore, if the
current level of stock was not a random variable for the countries, but they assume that
the other country has private information, it was possible to compute the probability
of sustainable fishing or overfishing for any level of the stock. So, ∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1, y1)
in (2.5.1) would be simply sum of the expected value of two parts of ∆0(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1)
over the support of x−i1 .
However, in an environment where the countries cannot assess the stock of the
fishery absolutely precisely, the expected payoffs in (2.5.1) and Pr(x−i1 < w∗ | xi1) are
difficult to compute. In Appendix 2.7.1, the conditional probability densities of the stock
and the belief of harvesting partner for a uniform (non-vanishing) noise and biological
shock, are derived. Here, I am interested in an equilibrium refinement, in order to
improve the predictive power of the model. Therefore, given the possibility of accessing
almost precise assessment technologies, I gain from the global-game analysis, which
by focusing on very precise private information (although never common knowledge),
indeed leads to analysing the model using Ex−i1 ∆
0(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1).
In global-game equilibrium it may happen that the two countries choose asymmetric
actions, because their signals are very close to the common threshold. This chaos is
25The implicitly assumed monotone strategy and the uniqueness of threshold are justified later.
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rare, but with noisy private information, it happens around the equilibrium threshold.
This helps to understand the observed heterogeneity of fishing activities in the same
fishery, for example, some countries impose targets to stop overfishing, but at the same
fishery some other countries have significantly more fishing fleets.
In equilibrium, both countries, which have private assessments about the state
of habitat from [w1, w̄1], solve the problem for a threshold-type player, for whom
∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗, y1) = 0, and after deriving the common threshold, w∗, each country
compares its signal with w∗ and chooses an action.
Assume the countries receive very precise signals, such that a is sufficiently small,
(but it is not equal to zero). Then from the point of view of the threshold-type country,
the stock of fishery in the first period is uniformly distributed over [w∗ − a, w∗ + a].
Furthermore, vanishing noise leads to a situation where not only the fundamental
uncertainty is vanishing, but also the strategic uncertainty is extremely large. Thus,
country i with xi1 = w∗, would assign uniform probability to the signal of the other
country, which is known as holding Laplacian belief. Given this insight, I summarise
the results of this equilibrium selection in the next proposition and the proof is provided
in Appendix 2.7.2.
Proposition 2. Under private information, there exists ā > 0, such that for all a < ā,
in the first period of any game in G, there exists a unique equilibrium which admits a
symmetric PBNE threshold, w∗, such that country i, for any signal xi1 < w∗ − a, fishes
sustainably and for xi1 > w∗ + a, chooses overfishing.
Given the unique threshold, for both countries, it is best response to follow the
described strategies for any level of the signals. More precisely, in the limit26, country
i which has a private assessment of the stock above w∗, inferring that the fishery is not
productive, also the overfishing cost is relatively low, has more incentive to overfish. In
addition to that, its highly correlated private information with the signal of the other
country implies that the other country is also likely to choose overfishing and given the
26Note that by the limit, I refer to the unique equilibrium for all a sufficiently small, and not to the
uniqueness of the limit of equilibrium strategies.
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strategic complementarity in the payoffs, overfishing is reinforced. Therefore, for any
xi1 > w
∗ + a, ∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1) is negative and overfishing is chosen in equilibrium27.
By a similar argument, for a country with an assessment below the critical level i.e.
xi1 < w
∗ − a, the expected payoff differential is positive, hence it chooses sustainable
fishing. The refined threshold-form strategy is consistent with the observed behaviour
of agents in many renewable resources, where a slight change in the beliefs about the
state of the resource and the belief of others can lead to a sudden flip in their decisions.
Indeed, apart from the region very close to the threshold, as the noise of private
signal converges to zero, the probability that the two countries obtain private signals
from the two sides of the threshold converges to zero, although they do not know the
ranking of their signals. Thus, for any level of stock w1 ∈ (0, w∗ − a) the probability
of sustainable fishing is one, and for any w1 ∈ (w∗ + a, 1) they would overfish with
probability one. If w1 ∈ (w∗ − a, w∗ + a), the probability of sustainable fishing belongs
to [0, 1]. Note that these probabilities are independent of the specification of upper-
bound and lower-bound thresholds, though their existence is important in deriving the
uniqueness result.
It is the dominance solvability of global games, which rules out any equilibrium
other than the monotone strategies. Intuitively, as explained, for country i which
obtains an assessment from the lower dominance region, i.e. if xi1 < w1 − a, overfishing
is strictly dominated. Knowing that the other country has the same strategy for such
a level of observation of habitat, if country i receives a signal slightly to the right
of this range, i.e. w1 − a < xi1 < w1 − a + η, for a small η, it believes in such a
situation the other country would be more likely to choose sustainable harvest as a
dominant action, so ∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1) will be positive and it leads to another round
of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. By continuity, the same argument goes
for w1 − a < xi1 < w1 − a + 2η and the iterated deletion goes on. The same argument
starts from the upper dominance region and both cease around the threshold. Indeed,
27Note that when the private information is extremely precise, the public signal (which was observed
before the biological shocks) is ignored.
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it is the existence of dominance regions which ignites this “contagious effect”, and
results in a unique prediction for any level of fish stock.
The fact that the equilibrium is the unique rationalisable strategy implies that the
harvesting agents need not have common expectations about each others’ strategies
in equilibrium, and it is sufficient to assume rationality and common knowledge of
rationality.28 Therefore, by assuming very precise private information, the rationality
of harvesting agents automatically enforces the unique rationalisable strategy of global
games.
Finally, the results are independent of the precision of public signal, c. In fact,
where the private assessments are extremely informative, the countries ignore their
prior beliefs and the public signal.
2.5.2 Selection of risk-dominant actions with imprecise pri-
vate information
The global-game threshold coincides with the risk-dominant threshold of the precise-
signal case29. Indeed, the predictions of both models are similar, although here it is the
private signal (rather than simply the state) which determines the unique equilibrium
action, and players on the global-game equilibrium will always coordinate on the
less-risky action. As explained by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), the rationality
leads to selection of the risk-dominance equilibrium, and it provides a justification for
the selection of less risky actions in equilibrium, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988).
Intuitively, under the biological and strategic uncertainties, the harvesting countries
prefer the risk-dominant action where their beliefs about the state of the fishery and
their inferred information about the other country are consistent with their beliefs in
the dominance regions. This (non-arbitrary) coincidence of thresholds is particularly
28In that regards, the model can be generalised to include the behaviour of harvesting firms in a
common-property fishery, which, in contrast to countries, may not benefit from sophisticated research
institutions.
29See the characterisation of equilibrium in Appendix 2.7.2.
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interesting for policy implications. Although the harvesters acquire private assessments
of the fishery, the manager of the stock, which can be an intergovernmental institution,
can simply compute the risk-dominant threshold of the precise-signal situation and
derive unique predictions about the rational behaviour of countries.
Lastly, as mentioned in section 2.4, without the overfishing cost, there would not
be any lower dominance region, but still relying on the single crossing of ∆RD(w1),
the game has a unique threshold-form PBNE. However, lack of the lower dominance
region implies that the unique monotone-strategy PBNE is not necessarily the unique
rationalisable equilibrium of the game, and therefore the game does not necessarily
have uniqueness of equilibrium.
2.5.3 Optimal policy
If the information is very precise, the comparative statics result of the risk-dominant
threshold can be applied to the case of biological and strategic uncertainty. In this
subsection, I focus on the contribution of the results to the policy-related parameters,
κ and r.
As discussed, the increase in the cost of illegal fishing increases the lower-bound,
the upper-bound, the risk-dominant and consequently, the global-game thresholds.
Therefore, according to the model, no matter whether the harvesting countries are
affected by biological or strategic uncertainties, undoubtedly, by increasing the over-
fishing cost, the fishery becomes less vulnerable to panic-based harvest, i.e. overfishing
where it is not a dominant action. This can be achieved by improving international
awareness by campaigns and NGOs, more cooperation by the international legislative
institutions and better intergovernmental monitoring of the transboundary fisheries.
In contrast to the overfishing cost, expected payoff differential is not monotone in
the harvest fraction. Again, as the information becomes extremely precise, the analysis
of the risk-dominance harvest fraction applies. The potential manager of the stock
may target the critical harvest fraction corresponding to the maximum threshold, rRD,
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and for example through intergovernmental negotiations about the harvest fraction,
can balance the conservative incentives and the overfishing temptation.
However, the overfishing cost or the harvest fraction which leads to the maximum
threshold level, w∗, may not necessarily be chosen. Different institutional frameworks
may determine the overfishing cost and the harvest fraction of sustainable yield, and it
is possible that the countries (and the potential manager of the stock) follow different
objectives30. If the net benefit is targeted31, then as the noise in the private information
and consequently the probability of mis-coordination converge to zero, lima→0 B(κ, r)
determines net benefit of a representative country on the equilibrium path, where
















In other words, knowing that for all levels of fish population below the PBNE threshold,
both countries harvest sustainably and above it, they both overfish, in the limit, it
is possible to uniquely define the net benefit of the countries, and if it is used in
determining the optimal policy, then ∂B(κ,r)
∂κ
= 0, and ∂B(κ,r)
∂r
= 0 are the necessary
conditions of the optimal overfishing cost and harvest fraction, respectively.
The way the harvesting countries agree on these parameters is a normative question.
In the model, the welfare is defined by the net benefit from yield of a representative
country in a resource which exhausts in the future. This model was to derive a
unique prediction of the behaviour of harvesting countries which face biological and
strategic uncertainties, the insight can be used in political economy settings and possible
institutional arrangements to answer questions related to the optimality.
30For example, for bargaining process in fisheries see Golubtsov and McKelvey (2007)
31Like the bank run model of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter studies the behaviour of two harvesting countries in a transboundary
fishery, by a two-period game with strategic complementarities in their payoffs. The
chapter in addition to investigating equilibrium refinement of a resource game where
biological and strategic uncertainties are embedded in the model, tries to explain
overfishing decisions of countries driven by pessimistic expectations about the other
harvester as a rational behaviour. In fact, private information acquisition results in
the risk of mis-coordination, and induces pessimism about the sustainability of the
resource, which can increase the temptation for overfishing.
First, I develop a setting where the countries can obtain precise information about
the population of the habitat, and the resulting multiplicity of equilibria reduces the
predictive power of the model about the level of harvest of countries to zero. Hence,
the risk-dominance equilibrium selection of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) is suggested
which leads to a monotone strategy.
In the second step, the model is analysed under the more realistic assumption
of noisy private information, which leads to the existence of strategic uncertainty
in addition to the biological uncertainty. It is shown that apart from very low and
very high levels of fish population, where the countries have dominant strategies,
the expectation of countries about each other’s assessments determines their fishing
decisions. Thus the fishery may be exhausted by a panic-based harvest, although it is
not dominant to deplete the resource and the true level of fish stock is still productive
and could be preserved for the next period. From the point of view of a central
authority or an intergovernmental manager of the fishery, overfishing in this region can
be explained by taking into account the pessimistic beliefs of the countries about each
other’s behaviour and the fear of mis-coordination.
In such a setting, without any equilibrium refinement, no prediction can be derived
about the outcome of interaction of the countries. The perturbed game provides a
suitable framework to apply the equilibrium-selection of Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) and Morris and Shin (1998). It is shown that in a setting where the state of
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the resource depends on its previous level, and all payoffs are state-dependant, the
extremely precise private information of harvesting countries leads to the unique global
game equilibrium as the unique rationalisable strategy. Accordingly, for any level of the
private assessment of countries, the theory is able to uniquely predict the equilibrium
outcome. The global game refinement results in a simple monotone strategy with a
threshold which coincides with the risk-dominant threshold. Therefore, although the
model with strategic uncertainty is a complicated setup, the risk-dominance equivalence
provides a tractable framework for the policy analysis. Therefore, I derive comparative-
static results on the threshold level, in addition to policy implications for the overfishing
cost and the harvest fraction of sustainable catch.
The refined self-fulfilling equilibrium prescribes sustainable harvest for all private
assessments below the risk-dominant threshold. In fact, sustainable fishing is risk
dominant where the expectation of a high reproduction rate of the fishery and relatively
high overfishing cost is reinforced by optimistic opinion about the assessment of the
other country. Conversely, above the critical level, the fear of mis-coordination by the
other country reinforces low expectations about the reproduction rate of the fishery
combined with low overfishing cost. This result provides a possible explanation for
the catastrophic situation of many fisheries around the world, where increasing the
common knowledge about the adverse state of the environment does not prevent its
collapse, because all harvesting agents, taking into account the strategic uncertainty,
have economically chosen to exhaust the resource.
Similar to the literature on threshold behaviour in resource economics, the resulting
monotone strategies explain the flipping behaviour of countries in transboundary
fisheries around the critical level of fish population, that a small change in the belief
about the state of the fishery may lead to a radical change of fishing activities. However,
the model with noisy information, is also able to explain the mis-coordiantion around
the critical level along the equilibrium path. Indeed, relative to a precise information
setting, the refined global game equilibrium, can justify the simultaneous overfishing
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and sustainable harvest of countries in one fishery, as their equilibrium behaviour where
their assessments are very close to the threshold.
Finally, given the significant role of equilibrium refinement in resource economics,
there are many possible extensions which could lead to a more interesting model to
explain the reality. Although for the case of transboundary fisheries, a two-player
game is not far from reality, the setup can be extended to a multiple-agent framework.
Furthermore, research in which the countries can harvest in multiple periods is another
possibility to generalise the model to a more realistic framework.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Conditional probability density functions with impre-
cise signals
Recall that wt = yt + ξt and xit = wt + εit. Furthermore, fν(.) refers to the
probability density function and Fν(.) is the cumulative distribution function of any
random variable ν. As the main ingredients for analysing the model, I derive the
conditional probability density function of the state of the fishery and the signal of the
other country for a general noise, i.e. out of the limit.
Since the fishing agents are Bayesian learners, their posterior belief about state of
the fishery can be obtained by a simple Bayes rule or the following formula,
fWt(wt | yt,xit) =
fΞ(wt − yt)fE(xit − wt)∫













if wt ∈ [yt − c, xit + a] and xit − a < yt − c < xit + a < yt + c
1
2a if wt ∈ [x
i
t − a, xit + a] and yt − c < xit − a < xit + a < yt + c
1
yt+c−xit+a
if wt ∈ [xit − a, yt + c] and yt − c < xit − a < yt + c < xit + a
(2.7.3)
In addition, from the point of view of player i, the conditional probability density




t | yt,xit) =
∫
fWt(x−it − p | yt,xit)fE(p)dp (2.7.4)
which depending on the support of Wt, admits three possible cases.
Case I : If wt ∈ [yt − c, xit + a] and xit − a < yt − c < xit + a < yt + c,
fX−it (x
−i
t | yt,xit) =
1




= 12a(xit + a − yt + c)

x−it − yt + c + a if x−it ∈ [yt − c − a, xit]
2a if x−it ∈ [xit, yt − c + a]
2a − x−it + xit if x−it ∈ [yt − c + a, xit + 2a]
(2.7.5)
Case II : If wt ∈ [xit − a, xit + a] and yt − c < xit − a < xit + a < yt + c,
fX−it (x
−i









t − xit + 2a if x−it ∈ [xit − 2a, xit]
xit − x−it + 2a if x−it ∈ [xit, xit + 2a]
(2.7.6)
2.7 Appendix 39
Case III : If wt ∈ [xit − a, yt + c] and yt − c < xit − a < yt + c < xit + a,
fX−it (x
−i
t | yt,xit) =
1




= 12a(yt + c − xit + a)

x−it − xit + 2a if x−it ∈ [xit − 2a, yt + c − a]
2a if x−it ∈ [yt + c − a, xit]
a − x−it + yt + c if x−it ∈ [xit, a + yt + c]
(2.7.7)
Clearly, case I and III of fX−it (x
−i
t | yt,xit) are trapezoidal distributions and case II
is a symmetric triangular distribution. All cases are possible, and they can be used in
the indifference condition of player i, defined in (2.5.1).
2.7.2 Global game analysis with Uniform biological shocks
and noise of private signals
In the limit that a → 0, I focus on case II of appendix 2.7.1, where wt ∈ [xit − a, xit + a]
and yt − c < xit − a < xit + a < yt + c. Clearly, its cumulative distribution at player i’s
signal will be FX−it (x
−i
t | xit) = 1 − FX−it (x
−i
t | xit) = 12 , which translates to holding the
Laplacian belief.
I first focus on threshold-type player, and characterise the equilibrium threshold. I
shown that there exists a unique threshold PBNE. Then, in order to preclude any other
type of equilibrium, I examine the sufficient conditions to show that threshold-type
PBNE is the only strategy surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategy.
In the limit that the information is extremely precise, i.e. as a → 0, the country
which observes the critical signal holds uniform belief about the state of the fishery
over [w∗ − a, w∗ + a]. Therefore, for the threshold-type country the expected payoff in
(2.5.1) will be reduced to






0(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗))dw1 (2.7.8)
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where ∆0(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗) is defined in (2.5.2).
Since, the two random variables X−i and W1 are highly correlated, in the limit
that a → 0, and consequently w1 → w∗, all uncertainty can be expressed in terms of
strategic uncertainty. Hence, in the limit,
∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗) = Ex−i1 ∆
0(w∗, x−i1 (.) | w∗) (2.7.9)
Furthermore, Laplacian belief about signal of the other country, implies
∆i(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗) =
1
2[2rw
∗ + β2 b(w





which by definition, must be equal to zero. In fact, the term inside the brackets is
∆RD(w∗) defined in (2.4.4). Thus, the indifference condition of the threshold-type
player in the limit is reduced to ∆RD(w∗) = 0, which as stated in proposition 1, admits
a unique real solution in (w1, w̄1).
Now I provide the sufficient conditions which are satisfied in the model to apply
proposition 2.2 of Morris and Shin (2003) to show that the characterised threshold-
type PBNE satisfies dominance solvability conditions, and therefore it is the unique
equilibrium of the game.
(1) State monotonicity: ∆RD(w1), which is sum of ∆0(w1) and ∆̄0(w1), is strictly
decreasing in the state of the fishery. (2) Action monotonicity: Game G is a coor-
dination game and therefore the harvesting levels of countries are strategic comple-
ments. (3) Strict Laplacian state monotonicity: For a country with Laplacian belief,
Ex−i1 ∆
0(w∗, x−i1 (.) | w∗) has a single crossing at w∗. (4) Uniform limit dominance:
There exists x = w1 − a such that for all xi1 < x, ∆RD > 0, also there exists x̄ = w̄1 + a
such that for all xi1 > x̄, ∆RD < 0.32 (5) Continuity: Ex−i1 ∆
0(w1, x−i1 (.) | xi1) is contin-
32This is stronger than existence of dominance regions, and it is sufficient to apply proposition 2.2
of Morris and Shin (2003).
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uous with respect to the signal and probability density of X−i. (6) Finite expectation
of signals: The distribution of noise is integrable.
2.7.3 Characterisation of global-game equilibrium with gen-
eral distributions of biological shocks and noise of pri-
vate signals
The global-game analysis in the limit is independent of distribution of noise and
prior, and indeed locally any distribution is uniform. These facts are helpful in applying
the theory to real-life issues, such as decision making in common-property fisheries.
Assume Ξ ∼ g on [−c, c], and E ∼ h on [−a, a], where g(.) and h(.) are continuous
probability density functions, also f(.) is integrable.
In contrast to the uniform case, here necessarily the countries in the limit do not
have uniform belief about the signal of the other country, but the threshold-type
country holds Laplacian belief33.
From the point of view of both countries or the manager of the stock, the country,
which would observe the threshold signal, would be the most uncertain country about
the action of the other country. Indeed, in the limit of vanishing noise, Pr(x−i1 < w∗ |
w∗) = 12 . Hence, the indifference condition of the threshold-type country, i.e.




0(w1, x−i1 (.) | w∗, y1))fw1(w1 | w∗, y1)dw1
(2.7.11)
in the limit that W1 and X−i1 are highly correlated, is simplified to Ex−i1 ∆
0(w∗, x−i1 (.) |
w∗) = 0, and given Laplacian belief, it is further reduced to ∆RD(w∗) = 0.
33See appendix B of Morris and Shin (2003) for the proof of Laplacian belief with finite number of
players.
Chapter 3
The Economics of Climate Change
and The Role of Public Information
Abstract
This chapter develops a theoretical framework to examine the role of public information
in dynamic self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) on climate
change. The countries choose self-enforcing emission abatement strategies in an infinite-
horizon repeated game. In a stochastic model, where the social cost of greenhouse
gasses (GHG) is a random variable, a central authority, as an information sender,
can control release of information about the unknown state to the countries. In the
literature on stochastic IEAs, it is shown that comparison of different scenarios of
learning by the countries, depends on ex-ante difference of true social cost of GHG from
the prior belief of countries. Here, I try to understand, in a signalling game between
the informed sender and the countries, whether the no-learning or imperfect-learning
scenarios, can be an equilibrium outcome. It is shown that the equilibrium strategy of
the sender, who is constrained to a specific randomisation device and tries to induce
an incentive-compatible abatement level which is Pareto superior, leads to full learning
of social cost of GHG of symmetric and asymmetric countries.
Key words: Climate change, International Environmental Agreements, Uncertainty,
Signalling, Self-enforcing agreements, Equilibrium selection
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3.1 Introduction
Consumption of fossil fuels increases stocks of GHG, and there is wide disagreement
among economists about the magnitude of the social cost of GHG. For example,
according to Pindyck (2013), the range of estimates varies from $10 to $200 per ton
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of CO2. In this chapter using a theoretical framework, I look into the behaviour of
countries in regards to a climate change model, and try to investigate how the incentives
of the countries in dynamic international agreements depend on their beliefs about the
social cost of GHG.
There are benevolent intergovernmental entities, like the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), which conduct research into climate change and communicate
their research results to the public. This chapter provides an IEA setting in which
the involved countries receive public information on social cost of GHG from a central
authority, as an information sender. In addition to studying the effect of learning
on the selected mitigation actions of countries and social welfare, the research aims
to derive the equilibrium learning outcome and precision of public information, in a
signalling game between the sender and the countries.
The chapter contributes two main analyses. First, I am interested in the effects of
the potential public information on selection of mitigation actions by the countries.
Hence, a stochastic dynamic model of transboundary pollution is presented, where the
countries are involved in a self-enforcing relationship to abate their emissions. In terms
of IEA literature, the current research is similar to Dutta and Radner (2006, 2009,
2012) and Polasky et al. (2006), because instead of focusing on the coalition formation,
an infinite-horizon renewable-resource game is studied and the range of sustainable
equilibria under threat of a punishment path are derived. However, in contrast to the
setup of this chapter, these models are deterministic.
Here, the set of self-enforceable abatement strategies given reversion to the business-
as-usual (BAU), upon any deviation, is derived, where the BAU abatement refers to
the history-independent strategy. It is shown that the countries are able to sustain
payoffs higher than the BAU level of abatement. The countries select an equilibrium
abatement which maximises their joint expected payoff, given the set of sustainable
abatements. In this respect, the contribution of this chapter is presentation of the
set of sustainable abatements in a metric space and examining how this set and the
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selected equilibrium change with respect to the social cost of GHG, which can be
affected in the learning process.
The second aspect of the analysis focuses on the interaction of the information
sender and the countries with regards to the information on social cost of GHG, as
the state variable. In a game framework, I examine a situation where the sender
tries to induce a particular mitigation action. The sender is benevolent, in the sense
that his objective is inducing an abatement action which is the closest to the social
optimal level, but this objective does not coincide with the constrained objective of
the countries, and I assume that the payoffs of both sides are common knowledge.
In the relatively small literature on stochastic IEAs, the welfare implications of
observing precise public signal (full learning), and no signal (no learning) are studied.
Their results depend on the comparison of the true social cost of GHG and its prior
expectation. Therefore, to implement the best learning scenario, ex-ante the true state
variable should be known. Hence, in this chapter, I assume that at the beginning of
the game, the sender privately observes the true social cost of GHG, and depending on
comparison of the true realisation with the prior of countries, he chooses precision of
public information to be communicated. Thus, relative to the literature, where the
focus is on comparative static of full-learning and no-learning scenarios in coalition
games, in this game, I derive the equilibrium learning outcome.
In this chapter, in order to examine whether full-learning and no-learning can be
equilibrium, a specific signalling structure is studied, where the information sender
is constrained to choose among certain signalling strategies. At the beginning of
period zero, and before choosing the level of abatement investments, the information
sender privately observes the state and decides between revealing the true social cost
of GHG or being silent. Alternatively, in another game, I assume that the sender
can randomise between sending the truthful signal or a meaningless signal (or noise),
thus, the choice of signalling strategy determines the precision of signal realisation.
The countries after observing the signalling choice of the sender, update their beliefs
about the social cost of GHG, and select a self-enforcing mitigation action. It is shown
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that the incomplete-information game does not have any pooling equilibrium where
the information structure can lead to no learning or imperfect learning. Instead, the
unique equilibrium strategy of the sender is full disclosure of the state34.
Furthermore, in the stochastic IEA literature, effects of delay in learning are
studied. Here in the signalling games, I examine possibility of delay in sending the
(fully-revealing) signal realisations to the countries. It is shown that after the sender
privately observes the state in the beginning of the game, the equilibrium time of
sending the fully-revealing signal is immediately after selection of the signalling choice.
In other words, in these games, any delay falls off the equilibrium path.
Finally, the results are generalised to a case of asymmetric countries, where the
countries differ with respect to the social cost of GHG, and the results of signalling
games are reinforced for the case of asymmetric countries.
The subsequent section reviews the related literature, then the general framework
is introduced in section 3.3, and the interaction of countries under assumption of a
precise-signal about the social cost of GHG, is analysed in section 3.4. Then, the
uncertainty and the signalling games for the symmetric and asymmetric countries are
studied in section 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. The chapter closes with conclusions, and
proofs are provided in the appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
First, the economics of climate change and IEAs are extensively studied, and
the literature is reviewed by Toman (1998), Wagner (2002), Kolstad and Toman
(2001), Aldy and Stavins (2009) and most recently by Benchekroun and Long (2012),
among others. Here I am interested in game theory and especially the non-cooperative
methodological approach to the IEAs. Almost all authors in the field believe that in the
34This chapter does not study the optimal information policy , and the mentioned information
structures clearly are not optimal. Designing the optimal public information structure is the topic of
the next chapter.
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absence of a supra-national authority and where individual actions are not verifiable
by a third party, the agreements should be self-enforcing.
There are a few instances in the existing literature, which assume observable
outputs and binding contracts. Kerr (1995) formalises the relationship of developed and
developing countries in a one-period principal-agent contract setup, and investigates the
optimal time for designing a contract. Harstad (2012) referring to the Kyoto Protocol
and Durban Platform, assumes the accountability of governments, and suggests writing
explicit incomplete contracts on emissions, where countries may invest in a substitute
green technology.
The main focus of self-enforcing climate change literature is coalition formation of
non-cooperative agents. This chapter, instead of coalition formation, studies implicit
contract of countries in a repeated game and focuses on the range of sustainable
mitigation strategies. Long (2011) reviews the literature on dynamic renewable games.
To name a few, Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) and Dockner and Long (1993) are seminal
papers which study dynamic transboundary games, and compare socially optimal
and non-cooperative outcomes. Thomas (1992), by examining an infinite-horizon
oligopolistic non-renewable resource game, derives the optimal punishment path to
sustain an implicit agreement such that the joint profit of a cartel is maximised. More
recently, Polasky et al. (2006) in a dynamic common property renewable resource
game, derive the set of sustainable equilibria given punishment by the worst perfect
equilibrium. Dutta and Radner (2009) in dynamic climate change models, characterise
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium emissions given BAU sanction also reversion to
a the worst equilibrium. Dutta and Radner (2006, 2012) derive the set of sustainable
equilibria given BAU reversion, in models which allow technological change and capital
accumulation, respectively. Relative to their models, instead of emissions, I focus
on the investment in abatement technologies, and I examine the properties of the
set of sustainable equilibria. Harstad et al. (2015) study a repeated game, where
in each period, the countries decide on investment in environmental technologies
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and subsequently on emission strategies, they also characterise the set of sustainable
equilibria where any deviation triggers reversion to the worst equilibrium.
The literature on IEAs mainly focuses on deterministic setups, and stochastic
IEAs is given relatively less attention. The literature on stochastic IEAs, generally
examines coalition formation, where uncertainty is resolved either after negotiation (no
learning) or before negotiation (full learning), and the maximum number of countries
in the stable coalition, the emissions and welfare under these scenarios of learning are
compared.
The literature deals with uncertainty in imperfect information setups. Indeed, the
scientific uncertainty is studied as a common, fundamental uncertainty, and is modelled
in two ways. Either there is uncertainty about the level of a payoff-relevant variable
or there is a common uncertainty about the distribution of the cost of damage. The
latter is known as distributional uncertainty, and refers to situations where countries
are ex-ante identical, but after that uncertainty is resolved (by perfect learning), they
may have different costs ex-post, which will be known by all.
The most cited paper in this strand is Na and Shin (1998) which proposes the
idea of distributional uncertainty and derives optimal time of negotiation for coalition
formation in a static model of three countries. Ulph (2004) studies the level uncertainty
and the effect of learning in a fixed and variable membership model of IEA. He has
a two-period model which allows for studying the dynamics of the stocks. Kolstad
(2007) adds the idea of partial (interim) learning to a one-period coalition formation
model, which refers to (perfect) learning of the state of the world after the membership
stage and before the emission stage. In all of these papers the fundamental variable is
either binary or admits three states; Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) generalise it to a
continuum action space in a model of both level and distributional uncertainty, and
they check full, no and partial (interim) learning scenarios, though they do not model
the stock accumulation.
Furthermore, in the literature on uncertainty, learning and climate change, Hammitt
et al. (1992), Kolstad (1996), Ulph and Ulph (1997), Na and Shin (1998), Scott et al.
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(1999), Keller et al. (2004), Ulph (2004) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008, 2011) generally
conclude that there is an adverse effect of learning on the emission level. For example,
in the case of distributional uncertainty, it is shown that ex-ante uncertainty about the
payoff-relevant parameter, facilitates the negotiation. Kolstad (2007) and Finus and
Pintassilgo (2013) who have more general models, show that this effect of learning is
not a general rule.
The chapter is also related to the broad literature on signalling by an informed
sender. Classic examples are Crawford and Sobel (1982) or Spence (1973). In this
strand of literature, the sender does not have any commitment power, and sending a
signal is either costless or there is a cost which restricts the sender. In this chapter,
it is not the cost of signalling, but it is preference and selection of the fully-revealing
signal of the state under some situations, which blocks the possibility of imperfect
transmission of information under other situations.
3.3 The Model
Countries, indexed i = 1, 2, ..., I, choose their emission abatement levels, qit, where
time index is t = 0, 1, 2, ... . Their abatements contribute to a reduction in the total
stock of GHG in the next period. The stock of GHG has the following equation of
motion,




where Qt is the GHG in period t, (1 − δ) is the rate of decay of GHG, and 0 < δ < 1.
Assume the initial level of GHG, Q0, is given. Furthermore, Ψ is the unabated emission
of GHG, and I assume it is a constant over time. By qt = (q1t, q2t, ..., qIt), where
qit ∈ IR+, I refer to the vector of pollution abatements undertaken by the countries,
and can be interpreted as investment in abatement technologies, green technologies, or
reforestation to reduce the emission of GHG. In fact, Ψ − ∑i qit is the actual emission
level, and qt can be targeted quantitatively by the countries as a climate change
mitigation policy. From this point on, I refer to qit as the abatement level.
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In the dynamic game, where the stock of GHG changes over time, the countries
minimise their expected discounted loss function, which is additive separable in the
total stock of GHG, and the private cost of abatement. The flow loss function is
Πit = C(qit) + γiQt (3.3.2)
where C(.) refers to the private cost of emission abatement, which is independent of i.
In addition, γi is the marginal social cost of GHG, in the literature it is also known
as the cost ratio parameter35. I assume that γi and the choice variable qi belong to
intervals in IR+. Furthermore, the common discount factor is 0 < β < 1.
It is assumed that C(.) is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function. In
other words, C ′(.) > 0, also C ′′(.) > 0. Therefore, C ′−1(.) is a function.36 Moreover, I
assume C(0) = 0.
Later I examine situations where the marginal social cost of GHG is a random
variable, about which the countries receive public information. However, I begin the
analysis with the assumption that the countries know the true value of marginal social
cost of GHG - equivalently they receive a precise public signal about it at the beginning
of the game.
Additive separability and linearity of the equation of motion of GHG and the loss
function are fairly standard in the climate change literature, and provide a specifically
tractable framework.37
I assume that the countries at the end of each period observe the individual actions,
so the deviations can be detected unambiguously, and it is a perfect-monitoring repeated
game. There is no private information, and public history includes all past actions
and the initial value of GHG. For simplicity, it is assumed that the countries take
35If the flow loss function is Π̂it = âiC(qit) + b̂iQt, then Πit ≡ Π̂it
âi




36Na and Shin(1998) and Finus and Pintassilgo (2013), assume C(qit) = q
2
it
2 . They study coalition
formation in static and two-period models, respectively.
37Because of the resulting certainty equivalence in the stochastic analysis, the model is similar to
the deterministic model of Dutta and Radner (2009).
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action simultaneously, hence I abstract from any social learning or any leader-follower
interactions within each period.
In the infinite-horizon game, the equilibrium concept is subgmae perfect equilibrium
(SPE).38 In the following sections, the model is analysed under different information
structures.
3.4 A precise public signal in period zero
Assume that at t = 0, the countries receive a precise public signal about the true
value of γ. This is known as full learning, and because of certainty equivalence, the
analysis of the stochastic model under this assumption is identical to a deterministic
setup.
In the next two subsections, I define the social optimum, and the BAU abatement
levels, and calculate each of them. Then the set of SPE abatements is verified. All
derivations and proofs are in the appendix.
3.4.1 The socially optimal abatement
A potential social planner or a country which internalises the stock externality







xi[C(qit) + γQt] (3.4.1)
such that the equation of motion in (3.3.1) holds. In addition, xi > 0 for every i, and
it signifies weight of country i in the social welfare, where the weights are normalised
such that ∑i xi = I, so I refer to xi as the Pareto share of country i. Furthermore,
recall that β is the common discount factor.
38In a finite-horizon model, using backward induction, and given the loss is increasing in the
abatement level, in the last period, zero abatement is the dominant action for all countries. So,
independent of whether one deviates in the previous period or not, they will choose zero abatement
in the last period. Therefore, there is no credible punishment available and non-interestingly no
history-dependent strategy can sustain a positive amount of abatement.
3.4 A precise public signal in period zero 52
The solution to this problem is referred as the socially optimal abatement, q∗. The
problem has a recursive structure and the standard dynamic programming tools can
be applied39. The socially optimal level of abatement, q∗i is








1−βδ , and if γi = γ, then B
∗ is reduced to γI1−βδ . Also, if xi = 1 for all i,
then there is a unique symmetric solution such that q∗i = q∗ for all i.
Given the assumptions about the private abatement cost function, q∗ is unique, for
any given Pareto share, xi. The policy is stationary, and independent of the stock of
GHG.40 Intuitively, the level of abatement today affects the stock of GHG tomorrow,
and the countries compute the geometric series of future losses. Indeed, given the
equation of motion of GHG in (3.3.1), there is a unique long-run equilibrium (steady




1−δ , where qi is the level of abatement in the long run, and
here it is the stationary socially optimal strategy. The general solution to the difference
equation of (3.3.1) is Qt = δtQ0 + (1 − δt)Q̃. Recall that 0 < δ < 1, thus the stock
of GHG converges smoothly to the long-run Q̃, and because limt→∞ Qt = Q̃ for any
Q0, the stock has a global stability. It is plausible to assume that Q0 < Q̃, thus Qt
over time increases smoothly and converges to Q̃. In order to choose the level of
abatement which minimises their joint loss, the countries compare the marginal cost
and benefit of abatement. Marginally, by abating less, the private cost of abating will
be smaller today, however, because of the additive separability of the loss function and
the difference equation of GHG, the marginal cost of abatement is constant for all
levels of abatement. Therefore, the solution of their marginal cost and benefit analysis
is independent of the level of GHG.
Given the strict convexity of private cost, C ′−1(.) is a strictly increasing function.
Hence, equation (3.4.2) implies that the socially optimal abatement is increasing in the
marginal social cost of GHG, γ, the discount factor, β, the persistence rate of GHG, δ,
39See the appendix for the proof.
40This is also seen by Dutta and Radner (2009).
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and the number of countries, I. In addition, a country of smaller Pareto share should
abate more.
Let us define the “Pareto frontier” as {q | q = q∗, for all xi > 0, for all i ∈
I, where ∑i xi = I}.41 In general and given any symmetric or asymmetric Pareto
share, the resultant Pareto frontier is a hypersurface of dimension I.
3.4.2 The BAU abatement
The BAU abatement, q, is the history-independent strategy of the game. Taking
the action of the others as constant and minimising their own loss, obtains the BAU
abatement, and choosing the BAU level in all periods is a SPE. Again the problem
can be solved as a dynamic programming problem. The resulting reaction function of
country i is C ′(qit) − βBi = 0, where Bi = γi1−βδ . Thus, again the solution is unique
and the BAU abatement level, qi is
qi = C ′−1(βBi) (3.4.3)
In addition, under the assumption of γi = γ, q is a symmetric equilibrium. Finally,
the stock-independency of the solutions is the result of linearity in the model, and
therefore, similar to the socially optimal, the BAU abatement is a constant.42
Moreover, by restricting attention to the history-independent strategies, the reaction
functions of the countries are independent of each other’s abatements. In other words,
the BAU solution, as a history-independent strategy, is a dominant strategy. Indeed,
the uniqueness of the BAU solution is a result of the orthogonality of reaction functions
at q.
In terms of comparison of the socially optimal, q∗i , and the BAU abatement, qi, as
explained, since C(.) is increasing and strictly convex, the inverse of its first derivative is
41Indeed, it is the set of abatements which correspond to the Pareto frontier in the loss space. An
example of the Pareto frontier of two countries with quadratic private cost is plotted in Figure 3.1.
42In the stochastic setup, the BAU abatement is equivalent to the Markov perfect equilibrium with
constant strategies.
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an increasing function as well. Therefore, q∗i is strictly larger than qi, for all parameter
values.
3.4.3 The set of sustainable abatement levels as SPE
The possibility of deviation and the subsequent punishment path is absent in the
whole strand of stochastic IEAs. Here, specifically, I derive the set of abatement levels
which survive as SPE when deviations are punished by reversion to the BAU abatement
from the next period. The reversion to the BAU seems to be a realistic assumption.43
In this section, I derive the incentive-compatibility constraint of adopting a general
stock-independent abatement level, q = (q1, q2, ..., qI), such that any deviation from
the constant targeted level of q will be punished by reverting to the BAU abatement
from the following period. As mentioned earlier, I check unilateral deviations and I
abstract from coalition formation.
Every country i, computes the resultant geometric series of GHG, and the short-run
and long-run losses of following the constant abatement, qi in every period. Let us
denote the total loss of this strategy by V (Qt). Country i compares V (Qt) with the
optimal loss of deviation path, where V (Qt+1) denotes the optimal continuation loss of
the BAU strategy.
If the following condition holds for every country i, then the corresponding loss of
abating according to q, can be sustained as a SPE loss, by the trigger-type stationary
strategy profile of playing qi at all subgames at which there has not been a deviation
from q in the past, and playing qi otherwise. The incentive compatibility constraint
(as a sufficient condition) for every i is44









43Dutta and Radner (2009) derive this set, and I examine its properties.
44Note that both sides of the inequality are the losses of one country.
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where qBRi is the best-response level of abatement to
∑
j ̸=i qj. In the appendix it is
shown that the level of abatement which is the best response to ∑j ̸=i qj, is also qi.
Indeed, as explained, because there is no interaction in the reaction functions, the
stationary strategies of other countries, i.e. qj for all j ̸= i, only affect the level of GHG,
but best responses are independent. Moreover, the minimum sustainable abatement
level as a SPE is clearly, the BAU abatement.
Again the linearity of the short-run loss and the equation of motion of GHG leads
to a linear optimal loss of the stationary strategy, say V (Qt) = Ai + BtQt, which in
turn implies a constant marginal cost. Thus, Bi = γi1−βδ for all i. In other words,
dV (Qt)
dQt
is constant for any stationary strategy. Since the BAU abatement is also a stationary





qj + qi) ≤ C(qi) − βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) (3.4.5)
and this condition should hold for all countries.
In order to verify the set of sustainable abatement levels as SPE abatements, let us
define ICi as the combination of abatement levels which are incentive-compatible for
country i, given the trigger strategy specified above,
ICi ≡ {q | C(qi) − βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) − C(qi) + βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) ≤ 0} (3.4.6)
Because of the strict convexity of C(qi), ICi is strictly quasi-convex. In addition, I
define set IC0i for every i as
IC0i ≡ {q | C(qi) − βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) − C(qi) + βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) = 0} (3.4.7)
Indeed IC0i is a level set such that (3.4.5) binds for country i, and it is strictly
convex. For any country i, any combination of abatements q ≥ q, which are on the
lower contour sets inside IC0i satisfy the incentive-compatibility of country i. Let us
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call these combinations of abatements Di for i, and the intersection of all Di sets D.
Indeed, adoption of any abatement level q in the closure of D is a SPE abatement
strategy and the resulting loss sustains a SPE loss under the threat of BAU reversion.
Let us call the derivative of dqi
dqj
along IC0i the marginal rate of compliance of country
i with country j, MRCij for any j ̸= i. In fact, MRCij is the amount of increase in qi
which is incentive-compatible for country i, following an infinitesimal increase in the
abatement of country j, where other coordinates are constant. By total differentiation









C ′ − βBi
(3.4.8)
Therefore, MRCij is increasing in the discount factor, β, the marginal social cost












Since Bi = B̄i, the reaction function of country i, C ′ − βBi = 0, implies that at
q = q, MRCij is infinite, while MRCji is zero at this point. Hence MRCij = 1MRCji ,
for any j ̸= i, which implies that at q = q, IC0i is orthogonal to IC0j . Furthermore, let
us define hyperplane of qi = q̄i, as {q | C ′ − βBi = 0}. Therefore, given the definition
of MRCij in 3.4.8, at q = q, the vector of partial derivative of MRCij is orthogonal
to the hyperplane of qi = q̄i. In addition, because the reaction function of the BAU
problems of all i are orthogonal to each other at q = q, the vector of partial derivative
of MRCij is tangent to the hyperplane of qj = q̄j at this point.45
45As an example, see figure 3.1 for I = 2.
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It has already been discussed that D is non-empty, because q is the minimum
abatement level and always sustains a SPE by threat of BAU reversion. The following
proposition shows that for all parameter values of the model, the countries are able to
sustain levels of abatement which are strictly larger than the BAU.
Proposition 3. Set D is non-singleton, for any β > 0.
Proof. At q = q, IC0i is orthogonal to IC0j for any j ̸= i. In addition, because the
level sets of IC0i for all i, are strictly convex, there is another unique fixed point, where
the symmetric level hypersurfaces IC0i for all i cross each other. Hence, D, as the
intersection of strictly convex sets, is itself a convex and non-singleton set.
Intuitively, orthogonality of IC0i for all i at the BAU level of abatements, implies
that at the least incentive-compatible policy level, i.e. at q = q, for any j ̸= i, when
country j increases its abatement level, the amount which country i can increase its
abatement and is incentive compatible for i itself is more than the increase in qi in
order to keep country j incentive compatible, i.e. MRCij > MRCji. This guarantees
the existence of some larger levels of abatement which are incentive-compatible for all
countries.
I am not restricting the equilibrium of the symmetric game to necessarily be
symmetric, but symmetric countries are able to sustain asymmetric levels of abatement
in set D.
3.4.4 Equilibrium selection from the set of sustainable SPE
under the threat of BAU
Given proposition 3, at two levels of abatement the incentive compatibility con-
straints of all countries bind. One is the BAU abatement (the minimum sustainable
point) and the other one is the maximum sustainable abatement, say q̂. In fact, beyond
some certain level of abatements, the gains and losses of abating according to q̂i, versus
the BAU level, will be equal for all i. To find this point, it is sufficient to solve for q̂ in
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q̂j + q̂i) = C(qi) − βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) (3.4.10)
The RHS of the equality is a constant, and for the symmetric game a unique non-trivial
q̂, which is strictly greater than the BAU level, solves the system. Again, although I
am not imposing any symmetry restriction on the equilibrium abatements, with the
assumption of γi = γ, q̂ is symmetric. An explicit solution for q̂ is derived for the
quadratic cost function, in section 3.4.4.
Lemma 1. q̂ is finite.
This is already shown in the proof of proposition 3, and it is a direct result of the
strict convexity of private cost, C(qi) for all i.
Any abatement in set D can be an equilibrium and if the countries agree on it,
they will not deviate from it. Among the range of incentive-compatible abatements,
the countries choose an equilibrium which minimises their joint long-run loss function.
Assuming that for the joint loss function, the countries use the same weights as the
social planner, i.e. the Pareto shares, then the countries minimise 3.4.1 over the set
D.46 It is already shown that the minimum of 3.4.1 is q∗. As explained, by varying
the Pareto shares, xi, for all i ∈ I, where
∑
i xi = I, the corresponding Pareto frontier
in the abatement space is obtained. Given the fact that the chosen SPE abatement
level, qc, must be incentive compatible for all countries, if the Pareto frontier crosses
set D, and q∗ ∈ D, then qc = q∗.
However, if for a given Pareto share, q∗ /∈ D (where the Pareto frontier may or may
not have intersection with D), then the countries choose an abatement level on the
boundary of D, where the incentive-compatibility constraint of some countries bind (as
a corner solution). Recall that set D is formed by the intersection of strictly convex
level sets of IC0i , which have two common crossings at q and q̂. Therefore, if q∗ is not
incentive compatible for i, but it is for some j ≠ i, then qc ∈ IC0i while still qc ∈ Dj,
46Dutta and Randner (2009) refer to this equilibrium as the third-best equilibrium.
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such that 3.4.1 is minimised. Let us call such an equilibrium abatement qB, referring
to the boundary solution47. Note that qB includes q̂, for example if the Pareto frontier
does not have any intersection with set D, and q∗ > q̂.
Thus, in general, qc ∈ {q∗, qB}. If the game is symmetric, i.e. if γi = γ, and xi = 1
for all i, then qc is symmetric as well.
An example of two countries with quadratic private cost function
Assume C(qi) = q
2
i
2φ , where φ is an exogenous parameter affecting the private
abatement cost and 0 < φ ≤ 1. If I = 2, and γi = γ for both i, then q∗i = 2βγφxi(1−βδ) ,
qi = βγφ(1−βδ) and q̂i =
βγφ(2β+1)
(1−βδ) . Note that all abatement levels are increasing in the




. In other words, if through the
increase of φ, the private cost of both countries exogenously increases, then the increase
in the maximum sustainable abatement is greater than the increase in the minimum
sustainable abatement.
If xi = 1 for both i, then q∗i = 2βγφ(1−βδ) . By replacing this stationary strategy of q
∗
i
in the condition (3.4.5), it can be verified that the countries are able to sustain the
social optimum, if β ≥ 12 . Also this condition can be found by comparison of q̂i and
q∗i . Specifically, if β ≥ 12 , then the socially optimal level is uniquely chosen by the
countries as a SPE abatement. Although the condition of sustainability of q∗ here
is independent of γ, φ and δ, the equilibrium abatements are all functions of these
parameters. Therefore, a change of the underlying parameters shifts ICi, so the of set
D and the selected equilibrium are affected by them. This is discussed in more detail
in the next subsection.
Contrarily, Figure 3.1 illustrates an example for two countries, 1 and 2, where
q∗ /∈ D. Let x1 << x2. First, note that in the two-dimensional space of abatements,
the hypersurfaces of IC0 are reduced to curves and the hyperplanes of BAU are two
47This implies that it may happen that country j should abate more than q∗j , however as long as
it is incentive compatible for j, they agree on an abatement which minimises the joint loss. This
is because of the strict quasi-convexity of the optimal loss function of the social optimum problem,
defined in the appendix as V ∗(Qt). See Figure 3.1 for an example of this case.
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orthogonal lines. The shaded area is set D, formed by the intersection of two sets of D1
and D2. Also, it is clear that at q, the IC0 of two countries are tangential to the line
of the BAU abatement of the other country, where MRC1,2 → ∞ and MRC2,1 = 0.
Thus, strictly convex IC0 of the two countries have two intersections, q and q̂. In
addition, the Pareto frontier (P.F in the figure), which is different combinations of q∗
as Pareto shares vary, is here a hyperbola above the BAU lines. Because it is assumed
that x1 << x2, q∗1 >> q∗2, and as drawn q∗1 /∈ D1. In other words, it is assumed that
country 1 cannon sustain the social optimum. Therefore, the chosen equilibrium, qc, is
a boundary policy, i.e. qc = qB, and it belongs to IC01 , where here qc2 > q∗2.
Fig. 3.1 Equilibrium selection of two countries with asymmetric Pareto shares
3.4.5 Comparative statics and dynamics with respect to the
cost-ratio parameter
According to the model, levels of abatements depend on the functional form of
private cost, the discount factor, the decay rate of GHG, and the marginal social cost of
GHG. In fact, all policy levels are increasing in β, δ and γ. Furthermore, as discussed
before, MRCs of any two countries depend on these parameters as well. Thus, the set
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D, which depends on MRCs in addition to the distance of the minimum and maximum
sustainable abatements, is positively related to these parameters.
Among all these factors, in the literature of IEA in climate change, the social cost
of carbon or GHG has received most attention. It can be argued that the persistence
rate of GHG may have a similar importance for policy implications, but, at least in this
model, the marginal effect of γ on abatement levels is larger than δ. Indeed, as stated
before, the focus of this chapter is on information and learning about the marginal
social cost of GHG.
In this section, first I provide some comparative static results specifically for the



























which is always positive. In other words, as the marginal cost of GHG increases, the
Pareto frontier shifts upward and the countries are required to abate more in order to
sustain the socially optimal level. This implies that q∗ after the increase in γi is not





















. Indeed, when γi is increased, the larger the level of abatement, the larger
the increase in abatement is.48
48For the quadratic example of C(qi) = q
2
i
2 , actions are linearly increasing in γi.
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Finally, here I examine the comparative dynamics of the stock of GHG with respect
to the cost-ratio parameter. Recall that the equation of motion of GHG in (3.3.1),




1−δ , as the unique long-run equilibrium (steady state) of GHG, where
qi is the level of abatement in the long run. Therefore, given the assumption of Q0 < Q̃,
the stock of GHG, Qt, over time increases smoothly and converges to Q̃. To check
the comparative dynamics of the GHG with respect to γ, assume that the countries
select a level of abatement which is increasing in the marginal social cost of GHG.
Because the abatement levels affect the steady state of GHG, after the increase in γ,
and therefore the abatement levels, the long-run steady state, Q̃(γ), decreases. Hence,
if the current level of stock, Qt, is above the new steady state, then the stock along
a decreasing convergence path converges to its long-run level. Conversely, the stock
increases over time, if it is below the new steady state.
3.5 Level uncertainty about the marginal social cost
of GHG
Similar to most stochastic IEA literature, I focus on uncertainty about the marginal
social cost of GHG, representing the uncertainty about the costs of catastrophic events
and global warming consequences.
The analysis begins with the assumption that γi = γ for all i, which is known as
level uncertainty in the literature. Later I will relax this assumption by allowing for
distributional uncertainty, where the countries may be asymmetric with respect to the
marginal social cost of GHG. Under the level uncertainty, assume in period zero, nature
draws a random γ ∈ Γ for all countries from one commonly-known uniform distribution.
Furthermore, Γ is a finite set on IR+. The countries know that the stochastic state
variable is constant, but they do not observe its true realisation. The prior belief
is common knowledge. Finally, under level uncertainty, the game is not necessarily
symmetric, i.e. xi may be different from one.
3.5 Level uncertainty about the marginal social cost of GHG 63
3.5.1 Ex-ante uncertainty and no-learning scenarios versus
full learning
Before observing the precise public signal, one can compute the ex-ante payoffs of
different problems. For example, to find the ex-ante socially optimal abatement level,
a possible social planner or a country which internalises the social cost of GHG, would







xi[C(qit) + γQt]} (3.5.1)
subject to the equation of motion of (3.3.1). Since the model is linear in the random






xi[C(qit) + E(γ)Qt] (3.5.2)
In fact, because of the linearity and the constant γ assumption, certainty equivalence
holds. E(γ) is the public prior about γ, which is simply its mean. Hence, the Bellman
equation can be written as









and it is obtained that for all t,




In the same way, it is possible to derive set D, by replacing γ with the common
prior belief E(γ), in all previous calculations.
The other possible case would be a situation, where countries never observe the true
realisation of the social cost parameter. This is in fact the no-learning scenario in the
literature, where all the countries will have a common prior about γ, which is its mean,
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E(γ). Again, because of the certainty equivalence, the problem will be similar to what
I discussed as the ex-ante uncertainty before full learning, where E(V (γ)) = V (E(γ)).
Assume that the countries, by receiving a public signal, can learn about the state
variable. By learning, I mean that the countries receive a public signal and update
their prior belief according to the Bayes rule. I have already discussed how the
set of sustainable equilibria, D, changes as γ varies. The effect of learning can be
investigated as the effect of change in the belief about γ on the set D, and therefore,
the corresponding selected equilibrium, and indeed the value of V ∗(Q). Therefore, the
comparison of full-learning and no-learning scenarios is in fact a comparative-static
exercise which depends on comparison of E(γ) and γ. Indeed, there will be three
possible cases:
First, E(γ) = γ. Then, there is neither a gain nor a loss from learning. For a γ
belonging to a continuum, this situation is a zero-probability event.
Second, E(γ) < γ. If the countries are more optimistic about the marginal social cost
of GHG, then necessarily learning improves the social welfare. This result is independent
of whether q∗(γ) belongs to neither D(E(γ)) nor D(γ). In fact, if q∗(γ) ∈ D(γ), then
clearly by learning the countries will be able to sustain the true social optimum. If
q∗(γ) /∈ D(γ), then D(γ) is larger than D(E(γ)), and includes some high levels of
abatement which are incentive compatible under full learning, are not sustainable
under the no-signal case, and vice versa for low levels of abatement. In addition, since
q∗(γ) > q∗(E(γ)) and V ∗(Q) is strictly quasi-convex, learning improves the welfare.
Third, E(γ) > γ. In this case, if q∗(γ) ∈ D(γ), then necessarily learning improves
the social welfare. However, if q∗(γ) /∈ D(γ), then it depends. For example, if
q∗(γ) > q̂(E(γ)), then no-learning scenario is Pareto-superior.
3.5.2 A binary signal by an informed sender at the beginning
of the game
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Given the results in the last subsection, if it could be determined whether E(γ)
is smaller or greater than γ, then ex-ante it were clear whether learning may benefit
the countries. Therefore, a potential information central authority, as an information
sender, which privately observes the true state realisation, could rank (and possibly
choose between) the two scenarios of full learning and no learning for the countries.
As explained, the literature on stochastic IEAs studies the welfare, and emission
or abatement policies under two scenarios of full-learning and no learning. Instead of
taking the learning possibility as given and studying the comparative statics or dynamics
with respect to that, in the rest of this chapter, I examine signalling games between
an informed sender and the countries, where the learning outcome is endogenous, and
specially I investigate whether the no-learning can be an equilibrium outcome of the
game.
Assume that at the beginning of the game, an information sender privately observes
the true social cost of GHG, γ. But the countries do not learn about the true state,
in the absence of any information from the sender. In other words, the only source
of information is the sender. Furthermore, the sender knows the common prior. The
(degenerate) belief of the informed sender is not known by the countries.
Given the focus of literature on the two learning scenarios, I assume the sender is
constrained to a certain set of strategies to induce either full learning or no learning. In
other words, the sender does not design an information structure, but given a specific
information structure, he chooses a signalling strategy49. In this subsection, I focus
on a binary information strategy, where at the beginning of the game, the informed
sender decides whether to reveal the state or not. Let α(γ) denote the probability of
sending a fully revealing signal, given knowing the true state, γ. So the information
strategy of the sender is a map, α : Γ → {0, 1}, where α(γ) = 1 refers to revealing
the true state, and α(γ) = 0 denotes being silent (equivalently the sender can send a
meaningless signal). The sender, conditional on choosing the strategy of revelation of
49In the next chapter, I consider a situation where the information sender, at the stage of communi-
cation of the information strategy, does not know the state of the world, and he designs an optimal
information structure.
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the true state, sends a precise public signal y = γ. Let y ∈ Y , where the set of public
signals, Y , is a finite set, and Y = Γ. Furthermore, the set of signals is also given to
the sender and it is not a choice variable.
The timeline is as follows. At the beginning of period t = 0, the sender privately
observes the true realisation of the state, and decides whether to reveal the state
or not. The countries given the information action of the sender and (possibly) the
fully-revealing signal realisation, update their common prior to a posterior, µ(γ | α(γ)),
and choose their abatement actions in period zero.
As shown in section 3.4, the abatement solutions of the countries are stationary.
Thus, after the update of their beliefs in period zero, the countries work out their
constant self-enforceable level of abatements for all future periods. I assume that
the information sender tries to affect the beliefs of the countries in order to induce
a particular action, i.e. an abatement level which has the minimum distance from
the true socially optimal level. Specifically, assume that the flow loss of the sender
is ν(qc(E(γ | α(γ))), γ) = ∥qc(E(γ | α(γ))) − q∗(γ)∥. In fact, ν(.) indirectly depends
on the posterior beliefs of the countries about the state of the world, through their
chosen abatement levels. Since the sender observes the true γ, and the beliefs of
the sender and the countries do not necessarily coincide, the social optimum as the
bliss point of the sender is not a function of the countries’ beliefs. Because the
abatement levels are constant over time, the objective function of the sender is simply∑∞
t=0 β
t∥qc(E(γ | α(γ))) − q∗(γ)∥ = 11−β ∥q
c(E(γ | α(γ))) − q∗(γ)∥.
Payoffs of both parts are common-knowledge. In addition, I assume that gathering
information and communication are costless for the sender, also once the information
is provided publicly, acquiring it is free for the countries.
It can be directly concluded that
Lemma 2. For any γ ∈ Γ, if q∗(γ) ∈ D(γ), then full disclosure is the equilibrium
strategy of the sender.
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In other words, if the countries, knowing the true state, can sustain the socially
optimal payoff, then by full revelation of the state, the sender can obtain his bliss point.
I restrict attention to the cases where,
Assumption 3. For any γ ∈ Γ, q∗(E(γ)) > q̂(E(γ)), q∗(γ) > q̂(γ), and q∗(γ) >
q̂(E(γ)).
The first two conditions of Assumption 3 imply that under both full-learning and
no-learning scenarios, qc = q̂. The last two conditions indicate that under both
learning scenarios, the sender strictly prefers the maximum level of abatement, q̂, over
any other abatement.
Therefore, given that the abatement strategies are increasing in the social cost of
GHG, if the sender knows that E(γ) ≤ γ, he chooses to reveal the state, and sends
the precise public signal y = γ. Since q̂(γ) is strictly increasing in γ, there is a
one-to-one relationship between the selected-action space and Γ. Therefore, following
the information action of α(γ) = 1, the sender by revealing y = γ, is recommending
an action to the countries. Accordingly, the countries update their prior belief to
a common posterior belief, denoted by µ(γ | α(γ) = 1, y = γ) = 1, which leads to
selection of q̂(γ). While, if the sender was informed that E(γ) > γ, then he would
prefer to completely hide his awareness of the state, and leave the countries with
their prior belief. However, if he chooses to be silent, then the countries obtain more
information relative to their prior belief. In fact, the countries learn (at least more
than the no-learning case), as they know that the sender prefers a higher level of
abatement which is closer to the social optimum. So, to the countries, which prefer
the fully revealing strategy, the silence of the sender can be strategic. Let us denote
the posterior belief of the countries upon the silence of the sender by µ(γ | α(γ) = 0).
In other words, the silence of the sender reveals to the countries that E(γ) > γ. Hence,
the countries truncate the uniform distribution of social cost from above, which gives
rise to E(γ | α(γ) = 0) < E(γ).
Obviously, it is an incomplete information game, and the solution concept that is
used here, is perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium (PBNE). I am interested to check whether
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the game can have any pooling equilibrium, where different types of senders choose
the action of being silent and lead to no learning or partial learning by the countries.
The PBNE strategies consist of functions µ(γ | α(γ) = 0), µ(γ | α(γ) = 1, y = γ),
qc, and α(γ) such that (1) µ(γ | α(γ) = 0), and µ(γ | α(γ) = 1, y = γ) are consistent
with the Bayes rule, (2) qc ∈ D is the incentive-compatible level of abatement of the
countries, and given the corresponding updated beliefs, qc is best response to α(γ),
and minimises the sum of joint expected loss of the countries (with weights of xi for
all i), and (3) α(γ) minimises the loss of sender and is best response to qc.
Characterisation of the equilibrium is provided in the next proposition, and the
proof is in the appendix:
Proposition 4. The posterior belief of µ(γ | α(γ) = 1, y = γ) = 1, and strategies of
qc = q̂(γ) ∈ D(γ) and α(γ) = 1 constitute the unique PBNE of the game with binary
signals.
Because the difference of expected loss of the sender from the two strategies is
monotone in the true social cost of GHG, the equilibrium strategy of the sender has a
threshold form with respect to γ, and as stated in the proposition, the threshold is
equal to the minimum element of Γ. In other words, if ex-ante an informed sender
has two choices, revealing the true state or being silent, in equilibrium he must fully
disclose the true state, and this is independent of whether the prior public belief is
more optimistic or pessimistic about the true social cost of GHG.
The objectives of the sender and the receivers do not necessarily match, and the
countries optimisation problem is constrained to the set of sustainable abatements.
Because full revelation exists in the sender’s choice set, and it is optimal for the sender
under some conditions, he loses the possibility of using the unrevealing information
action in other situations. Put differently, if he reveals the state for some values of
γ, he has to do so for all other realisations, and the full-revelation of the state is the
equilibrium in any case. In the next subsection, I check the robustness of the result to
the possibility of using an information strategy where α(γ) ∈ [0, 1].
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3.5.3 A noisy signal by an informed sender at the beginning
of the game
In this subsection, I examine a similar game, but here I assume that α(γ) is not
necessarily degenerate, and can admit any value between [0, 1]. I adjust the choices
of the sender such that he is constrained to sending a signal which is equal to the
true value with probability α(γ) ∈ [0, 1]. Such an information structure allows me to
investigate whether an informed sender can induce imperfect learning (in addition to
the no-learning).
After the sender privately observes the true state, he chooses an information strategy
which specifies with probability α(γ) he reveals the true state of the world, γ, and with
probability 1 − α(γ) the sender sends a random draw from Γ, which is indeed sending
a meaningless signal (or noise). In fact, α(γ) is the precision of the public signal. I
refer to this strategy as the noisy signalling strategy. Then the sender send a signal
y ∈ Y , according to the chosen strategy. Given the information strategy, α(γ), and the
observed signal, y, the countries update their common prior belief. Subsequently, the
countries choose an abatement level.
The objective functions of the sender and countries, are the same as in the last
subsection. As before, what matters for the countries is the conditional expected value
of the social cost parameter, E(γ | α(γ), y). Hence, the continuation losses of the
countries and the resulting abatement levels all depend on the precision of the public
signal. Furthermore, let assumption 3 be satisfied here as well.
The sender, chooses an optimal precision which minimises its long-run loss function
and is the best response to the strategy of the countries. The PBNE is also the same
as was specified in subsection 3.5.2, except the posterior beliefs, and here they are
µ(γ | α(γ), y) for any α(γ) ∈ [0, 1]. But the equilibrium outcome is similar to the
binary-signal case:
Proposition 5. The posterior belief of µ(γ | α(γ) = 1, y = γ) = 1, and strategies of
q̂(γ) ∈ D(γ) and α(γ) = 1 constitute the unique PBNE of the game with noisy signals.
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For the proof see appendix. Intuitively, if an informed sender has access to a
randomisation device to select between either revealing the true social cost of GHG
or sending noise (a meaningless signal) and induce agents to adjust their profile of
abatements such that the sum of sender’s discounted loss is minimised, in equilibrium,
he reduces the noise of public information to zero, and provides the countries with as
precise as possible information.
3.5.4 Delay in communicating with the countries
In the last two subsections, it was shown that the informed sender in equilibrium,
as soon as he observes the state, announces the fully-revealing information strategy, i.e.
α(γ) = 1, and immediately sends the public signal of the true level of social cost of
GHG. In this section, I check whether the sender can postpone sending signal y.
Specifically, in either binary or noisy signalling games, assume the sender, after
observing the state γ, sets α(γ) = 1 in t = 0, but has the option of delaying sending
signal y = γ, from period t = 0 to t = T , where T is a positive integer.
Although the expected loss of countries is a function of the total level of GHG in
each period, Qt, in this linear model, the level of abatements are independent of the
stock, and after learning the state, the chosen abatement is independent of Qt in both
scenarios of learning in period 0 and T . As explained, the countries select a level of
abatement in the set of incentive-compatible abatements, D, given their belief about
the social cost of GHG, such that V ∗(Qt) is minimised. Hence, the countries prefer to
immediately update their beliefs and adjust their abatement to q̂(γ).
From the expected loss of the sender, it is clear that if E(γ) ≤ γ, then the sender
prefers to send out the signal in t = 0, as well. In other words, if initially the countries
are more optimistic about the social cost of GHG, the sooner the countries receive the
signal and increase their level of abatements, the better.
Conversely, assume that E(γ) > γ, where the sender prefers to delay the commu-
nication of true social cost of GHG. But the countries, as soon as they experience
delay in receiving the signal, will realise that ex-ante they are abating more than
3.6 Distribution and level uncertainty about the marginal social cost of GHG 71
necessary. Although the long-run level of GHG is lower under the prior belief, i.e.
Q̃(γ) > Q̃(E(γ)), and in each period t < T , the lower Qt under no learning leads
to a lower level of loss, V ∗(Qt), delay reveals that E(γ) > γ, thus for the countries
q̂(E(γ)) is not incentive compatible any more. Therefore, the countries truncate the
distribution of beliefs to say γ∗, and as a best response to delay, they decrease their
selected abatement to q̂(γ∗2 ). Assuming that q̂(
γ∗
2 ) < q̂(γ), the sender will send the
signal in t = 0. The result of the equilibrium time of communication is provided in the
next proposition.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium the informed sender sends the precise public signal at
the beginning of the game, immediately after observing the social cost of GHG.
3.6 Distribution and level uncertainty about the
marginal social cost of GHG
In this section, I study a situation, where the countries are not symmetric in terms
of their marginal cost of GHG. Distributional uncertainty in the literature of stochastic
IEAs refers to a situation where the realised values of state for different countries do
not coincide, and each country has a different unknown cost-ratio parameter γi drawn
from one commonly-known distribution. Distribution and level uncertainty means
that there exists a distribution Γi for every country i, and the marginal social costs
of GHG are random draws from these known independent distributions (the level of
cost-ratio parameters of different countries may coincide, though they are from different
distributions). For both situations, as long as the signals are publicly observed by all
countries and the (expected value of) distribution(s) is (are) known, the analysis of
level and distributional uncertainty will be similar to distributional uncertainty. Here
I look into the more general case of distribution and level uncertainty, and again I
assume that the distributions of the countries are uniform.
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In this section I assume I = 2.50 At the beginning of the game, nature draws two
independent values for the two countries from the two commonly known distributions
of Γi for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
For the precise public signals, by replacing γ with γi, all derivations are generalised to
the case of level and distributional uncertainty. Furthermore, the incentive-compatibility
constraints for sustaining abatements greater than BAU levels as a SPE by threat of
BAU reversion, are the same as (3.4.5). The definitions such as IC0i , D, MRCij, are
the same here. Proposition 3 is also applied directly, as its proof is independent of
asymmetry of marginal social cost of GHG. In addition, still qc = {q∗, qB}. Note that
here q and q̂ are not necessarily symmetric, although if x1 = x2, the social optimum,




































. In other words, the social-optimal
level of abatement of country 1 is relatively more sensitive to the marginal social cost
of GHG in country 2, which has a greater weight in the social loss function.
Now let us consider the games between an informed information sender and the
countries, with level and distributional uncertainty. Assume that in period t = 0,
the sender observes the states, and announces the chosen αi(γ1, γ2) of each country
publicly. Therefore, both countries receive α1(γ1, γ2), and α2(γ1, γ2), and if specified
by the information strategy, afterwards they both observe the two signal realisations
of y1 and y2. The sender’s problem is minimising
∥qc(E(γ1 | α1(γ1, γ2), y1),E(γ2 | α2(γ1, γ2), y2)) − q∗(γ1, γ2)∥ (3.6.2)
50This assumption guarantees the uniqueness of q̂, and therefore qc.
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where the choice variables are α1(γ1, γ2), and α2(γ1, γ2). Also assume that Assumption
3 is generalised to this case. Thus, qc = q̂ under any belief, furthermore, the sender
strictly prefers higher levels of abatement. The following proposition is directly
generalised from proposition 4, 5 and 6.
Proposition 7. The posterior beliefs of µ(γ1 | α1(γ1, γ2) = 1, y1 = γ1) = 1, and
µ(γ2 | α2(γ1, γ2) = 1, y2 = γ2) = 1 and strategies of q̂(γ1, γ2) ∈ D(γ1, γ2), α1(γ1, γ2) = 1
and α2(γ1, γ2) = 1 constitute the unique PBNE of the game with either binary or noisy
signals. Furthermore, in equilibrium public signals of y1 and y2 are sent in t = 0.
In other words, given the assumed information structures, an informed sender always
fully reveals the true state to asymmetric countries. Again the result is independent
of whether one or both countries are more optimistic or pessimistic about the true
marginal social cost of GHG. Furthermore, it can be deduced that the sender cannot
choose the country with which to communicate the information strategy, as any strategy
other than the full revelation of the state is off the equilibrium path.
3.7 Conclusion
An IEA model is presented, where in an infinite-horizon climate-change setup, the
countries are involved in self-enforcing agreements and decide about their investments
in emission abatement technologies. The equilibrium selection of the countries from
the set of sustainable abatements is discussed and the sensitivity of this set and the
selected abatement to the social cost of GHG is examined.
In another step, the uncertainty about the social cost of GHG is introduced, and the
chapter investigates the possibility of affecting the equilibrium behaviour of countries
through the public information released by a central authority in the field. In the
literature on stochastic IEAs, the conditions under which learning may contribute to
increasing or decreasing social welfare are verified, and most literature, by comparison
of scenarios of full learning and no learning, suggest that no learning on the social cost
of GHG, or delay in the learning process, is Pareto superior.
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This chapter introduces an information sender into the stochastic IEA model, who
has access to a specific signalling structure, which can lead to full-learning, no-learning
or imperfect-learning outcomes. The sender adjusts the likelihood of noise in the
given public information structure, and tries to induce Pareto-superior actions by the
countries.
It is shown that the equilibrium learning outcome is always full learning and the
optimal time of communication of true signal realisation is right at the beginning of the
game. In fact, if the countries are ex-ante more optimistic about the social cost, and
hence they are abating less than they could do under the full learning of the state, the
sender’s best response is full revelation. Therefore, in the other case that the countries
prior belief is more pessimistic about the social cost of GHG, where the sender’s
preferred abatement level (which is closer to the true socially-optimal abatement) is no
learning, any signalling choice other than full revelation by the informed sender, implies
that the countries ex-ante are abating more than is sustainable, and the countries
can block the choice of any signalling action which provides less than fully-revealing
information.
Therefore, if the research central authorities are supposed to announce results of
their research on the social cost of carbon, given the model, the countries are provided
with full information. In other words, the no-learning outcome is not on the equilibrium
path, and this is independent of whether the public prior belief is more pessimistic or
optimistic about the social cost of GHGs.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 The socially optimal abatement level- the precise-signal
case
The Bellman equation of the social planner problem is





xi[C(qit) + γQt] + βV ∗[Qt+1]} (3.8.1)
where Qt+1 is given by equation (3.3.1), and V ∗(Qt) is the optimal loss function of the
social-optimal abatements.
Because the flow loss, ∏it, is a continuous and strictly convex function, also the
set {(Qt, Qt+1) : Qt+1 = δQt + Ψ −
∑
i qit, qit ∈ IR+} is convex and compact, V ∗(Qt) is
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex. Hence, the set of optimal controls
is non-empty and single-valued.
Using the guess and verify method, it can be guessed that the optimal loss function
has a form of V ∗(Qt) = A∗it + B∗itQt.51 Hence, from the first-order condition of the
abatement level, the solution in equation (3.4.2) is obtained. To verify the coefficients,
by plugging the guess into the Bellman equation, it turns out to be





xi[C(qit) + γiQt] + βA∗it + βB∗itQt+1} (3.8.2)




1−βδ . Hence the socially optimal









1 − β (3.8.3)
3.8.2 The BAU abatement level- the precise-signal case
The Bellman equation of the BAU problem of country i is
51The guess can be obtained by iteration of the loss function for a few times.
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V i(Qt) = min
qit




where V i(Qt) is the optimal loss function of BAU policy. If the optimal loss function
has a form of V i(Qt) = Ait + BitQt, from the first-order condition of abatement level,
the BAU abatement in equation (3.4.3) is obtained. Again, in order to verify the
coefficients, after substituting the guess in the Bellman equation, it turns out to be
V i(Qt) = min
qt




Verification of the coefficients gives Bi = γi1−βδ , so the BAU solution of various
countries differ only with respect to γi. Hence, by substituting Bi and qi for all i in
equation (3.8.5), one can verify Ait as
Ai =
C(qi) + βBi(Ψ −
∑
i qi)
1 − β (3.8.6)
3.8.3 The incentive-compatibility constraint for following a
constant level of abatement in every period under the
punishment of BAU reversion- the precise-signal case
The total loss of following the stationary strategy of qi, for every i, is denoted by
V (Qt). As an optimal loss, qi is the solution to the following Bellman equation:
Vi(Qt) = min
qit




The iteration of the loss function shows that it is linear in the level of GHG. In
subsection 3.4.3, I denoted it as V (Qt) = Ai + BiQt. It can be verified that Bi = γi1−βδ
for all i, also
Ai =
C(qi) + βBi(Ψ −
∑
i qi)
1 − β (3.8.8)
Therefore, the sufficient condition of (3.4.4) can be simplified to
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Furthermore, qBRi is the level of abatement which is the best response to
∑
j ̸=i qj.
In order to find qBRi , it is sufficient to take the derivative with respect to qi from the
right-hand side of the inequality in (3.8.9), which is the short-run and long-run payoff
of deviation, and by equating it to zero, it will be obtained that qBRi = qi.
Given this result, the IC constraint in (3.8.9) can be further simplified to
C(qi) + βAi − βBiqi ≤ C(qi) + βAi − βBiqi (3.8.10)




qj + qi) ≤ C(qi) − βBi(β
∑
j ̸=i
qj + qi) (3.8.11)
3.8.4 Proof of proposition 4
Starting from the last subgame of t = 0, and given the results of equilibrium
selection of the countries in subsection 3.4.4, and assumption 3, the countries choose q̂
given their updated belief.
By contradiction, assume that by selection of being silent, the sender could block
the transmission of information. So, let α′(γ) denote such a strategy. Then the
sender compares the expected losses of α′(γ) = 1, and α′(γ) = 0. Let us denote
the difference of expected losses by Dif(γ) ≡ ∥q̂(γ) − q∗(γ)∥ − ∥q̂(E(γ)) − q∗(γ)∥.
Because E(γ) is constant, Dif(γ) is strictly monotone in γ. Furthermore, Dif(γ) ≤ 0
iff q̂(γ) ≥ q̂(E(γ)) iff γ ≥ E(γ). This leads to the threshold-form strategy of
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α′(γ) =
 1 if γ ≥ E(γ)0 if γ < E(γ) (3.8.12)
Therefore, if α′(γ) = 1, then the strategies specified in the proposition are all
best response. While if α′(γ) = 0, the countries realise that E(γ) > γ, and optimally
truncate the distribution of random variable γ to γ∗, and the best response of the
countries implies E(γ | α′(γ) = 0) < E(γ). Indeed, given the uniform assumption,
E(γ | α′(γ) = 0) = γ∗2 . Thus, the sender’s strategy of α
′(γ) is not a best response to
the countries’ strategy. The same reasoning applies to a situation where the sender
chooses a strategy with threshold γ∗2 , etc. Therefore, the unique PBNE threshold of
the sender coincides with the minimum element of Γ, implying that in equilibrium for
all γ ∈ Γ, the sender chooses α(γ) = 1. 
3.8.5 Proof of proposition 5
The countries choose q̂ ∈ D given their updated belief. By contradiction, assume
that the sender can use a noisy signalling strategy, α′′(γ) < 1. Let us assume that it is
possible to exactly by probability 1 − α′′(γ) leave the countries with their prior belief
to achieve the best outcome as if the sender was not informed about the state. This
implies that E(γ | α′′(γ), y) = α′′(γ)y + (1 − α′′(γ))E(γ). Hence, the posterior belief
of the countries is a convex combination of the true state and the prior expectation.
Because the optimal abatements are strictly increasing in beliefs, any induced solution
q̂(E(γ | α′′(γ), y)) is also a convex combination of q̂(γ) and q̂(E(γ)). Then the best
response of the sender is as follows. If E(γ) ≤ γ, then the separating PBNE specified
in the proposition, constitutes best response for all players, as no one has any incentive
to deviate. However, if E(γ) > γ, the sender optimally, chooses α′′(γ) = 0 to minimise
his loss function. But this is similar to proposition 4, where the sender has a threshold
strategy and knowing that the sender is biased to higher levels of abatement (given
assumption 3), if the countries observe α′′(γ) = 0, they truncate the distribution of
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social cost of GHG from above. So, they will have a posterior expectation which is
strictly less than E(γ | α′′(γ), y) = E(γ), and they select an abatement q̂, which is
strictly less than q̂(E(γ)). Therefore, α′′(γ) = 0 is not a best response to the selected
q̂. Similarly, no other α(γ) < 1 can be a best response to the countries’ strategy. The
only best-response abatements and signalling strategy are where the posterior beliefs
of the countries lead to E(γ | α′′(γ), y) = γ. Hence, the sender has no choice other
than setting α(γ) = 1, and countries choose q̂(γ) ∈ D(γ). 
Chapter 4
Optimal Communication of
Climate Change With The Public
Abstract
I examine a setting, where a central authority, as an information sender, conducts
research on the true social cost of climate change, and releases information to the
countries. The sender, who has commitment power, by designing an information
mechanism (a set of signals and a probability distribution over them), maximises his
payoff, which depends on the mitigation action of countries and the social cost of
green-house gases(GHG). The countries, given the information policy (the probability
distribution over signals) and the public signal, update their beliefs about the social
cost of GHG and take a mitigation action. I derive the optimal information mechanism
from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games. I
show that the coalition size, as a function of beliefs, is an endogenous variable, induced
by the information sender. If the sender maximises the expected payoff of either of
non-signatories or signatories of the climate treaty, then full revelation is the optimal
information policy, while if the sender attempts to reduce the global level of GHG, then
optimal information policy leads to imperfect disclosure of the social cost. Furthermore,
given any of the specifications of the sender’s payoff, the optimal information policy
leads to the socially optimal mitigation and membership outcomes.
Key words: Climate Change; International Environmental Agreements; Coalition
Formation; Learning; Information Persuasion
JEL Classification: Q54; D81; D83; C72; D62
4.1 Introduction 82
4.1 Introduction
The historic climate change agreement, which was adopted in Paris in December
2015, led to the formation of a grand coalition of over 190 countries with the objective
of reducing the level of GHG emissions, with the consequent hope to limit the rise
in the average global temperature. The success in obtaining full participation in the
international environmental agreement (IEA) was undoubtedly indebted to the role
of international research institutes on climate change (the IPCC and other partners
of the UN), which had conducted research on climate change, and communicated
the results to the countries. In this chapter, a theoretical framework is constructed
to understand the significance of communication of the research central authorities
(information sender) with the countries (receivers) about the information on climate
change.
More specifically, I consider a model in which the sender maximises its payoff which
depends on the mitigation action undertaken by the countries and a payoff-relevant
state variable, which here is the social cost of GHG emissions. Before any decision
making by the countries, the sender initiates the research by choosing an optimal
information mechanism (a set of signals, as recommended actions, and an information
policy, which is a probability distribution over signals) to maximise his expected payoff.
Indeed, choosing a research strategy is modelled as choosing a probability distribution
over a signal. In contrast to the third chapter, before choosing the information policy,
the sender is uninformed about the state. Furthermore, the sender is assumed to have
commitment power. So, after conducting the research on the state variable, he commits
to the information mechanism and sends a public signal. Payoffs of both sender and
receivers are common knowledge.
Finding the optimal information mechanism is studied in the recent but growing
literature on information design, introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). This
chapter applies the information design to a climate change context, and generalises
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to coalition formation games, where there are multiple
receivers who are either non-signatories or signatories of a climate treaty, and the
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information sender can achieve formation of a desired environmental coalition by
designing an optimal information mechanism.
Indeed, the interaction of the countries is modelled as a coalition game, which has
two stages: the membership stage and then the mitigation (abatement or emission)
stage. The timeline is as follows. The sender announces an information policy, and sends
a public signal to the countries. Given the information mechanism the countries update
their (common) prior belief, and in the membership stage, they decide whether to join
a coalition or become non-signatories. Finally, the non-signatories and signatories of
the coalition choose their mitigation actions.
Subgame perfection implies that given their posterior belief, the countries decide
about their mitigation and subsequently their membership strategies. Finally, given
the best responses of the countries in the emission and membership subgames, the
sender chooses an optimal information mechanism.
The information mechanism leads to a probability distribution over posterior beliefs
of the countries, which in turn determines the mitigation and membership outcomes.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) use terminology of “persuasion” to refer to affecting
the receiver’s action by inducing a certain distribution over her posterior beliefs. Here,
it reflects the fact that the sender’s choice of information policy influences the coalition
formation choices of the countries. In other words, the sender can persuade the countries
as to what mitigation and membership choices to make.
Therefore, beliefs are endogenous variables, and in contrast to the literature on
IEAs, posterior beliefs are not fixed parameters. Indeed, in our analysis, the beliefs
about the state variable are the critical variables in determining the profitability and
stability (self-enforceability for signatories and non-signatories) of a coalition, and in
this chapter, the threshold behaviour of the signatories and non-signatories of a climate
treaty are dissected with respect to their beliefs with regard to the social cost of GHG.
It is shown that the number of signatories of a coalition, depends on the beliefs, and
therefore, it is an endogenous variable induced by the information sender. I consider a
simple and tractable model, where the state space and the mitigation choices are binary.
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Therefore, strategies take a threshold form with respect to beliefs about the social cost.
Let the state space be either high or low social cost of GHG, and the action space be
either emitting or abating. Then, for example, the support of common belief about
high social cost of GHG, has three distinct ranges, divided by the stability thresholds
of different coalitions. The lowest threshold belief is the threshold of grand coalition,
below which all countries choose emitting. The largest threshold is the threshold of
singleton coalition structure (coalitions formed by one country only), above which
all countries coordinate on abating their emissions. The range of beliefs between the
thresholds of grand coalition and coalition of singletons, is where signatories of stable
coalitions choose abating, while non-signatories emit. This range itself is divided into
sub-partitions, where in each sub-partition of beliefs, a unique coalition of a size, which
varies between two to full participation, is stable.
I examine two different payoff specifications for the sender, where either his expected
payoff coincides with the expected payoff of a group of countries, or he minimises
the global stock of GHG. First, the cases are investigated where the expected payoff
of the sender coincides with the expected payoff of signatories, non-signatories, or
a combination of both groups, and it is shown that the unique optimal information
mechanism takes the form of full learning by the countries. The fact that alignment of
the payoffs of the sender and receiver leads to full revelation, is a known result in the
literature on information design. But here, the sender faces a problem where the two
groups of signatories and non-signatories of the IEA have different threshold behaviours.
Moreover, given any of the mentioned expected payoffs of the sender, the induced
equilibrium action of the countries, coincides with the socially optimal mitigation
outcome, as if the expected payoff of a potential grand coalition were maximised.
In addition, the problem of a sender whose target is reducing the global level of
GHG is examined, and the model suggests that the optimal information mechanism is
imperfect learning of the social cost of GHG. The analysis provides a simple setup to
understand the underlying logic behind the observed behaviour of the countries and
the involved research authorities in the Paris communications; the alignment of our
4.2 Related Literature 85
results with the adopted information policy of the international research institutes is
discussed in more detail in the conclusion section. More interestingly, it is shown that
the optimal information persuasion given the objective of minimising the total level of
GHG, also leads to the selection of the socially optimal mitigation and membership
strategies.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The related literature is
reviewed in the next section, and the general framework is presented in section 4.3.
Section 4.4 introduces an example of persuasion of a single country. The persuasion in
a coalition game is investigated in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 concludes and the
appendix contains all proofs.
4.2 Related Literature
The literature on IEAs is reviewed by Toman (1998), Wagner (2002), Kolstad and
Toman (2001), Aldy and Stavins (2009) and Benchekroun and Long (2012), among
others. This chapter contributes to the literature on non-cooperative coalition formation
and self-enforcing IEAs.
In general, self-enforcing coalition formation IEAs are modelled to include two
stages. The first stage is the membership stage, where the players decide whether to
join a coalition, and the second stage is the emission stage, where non-members and
coalition members interact. In some models, both coalition members and non-members
act simultaneously, in other models, the coalition is a Stackelburg leader. Seminal
papers about coalition formation in IEAs include Carrao and Siniscalco (1993) and
Barrett (1994). Most of the literature studies static emission models, and focuses on
issues such as asymmetric countries, open and exclusive membership, network formation
and R&D, multiplicity of coexisting IEAs, adaptation and mitigation, renegotiation
and so on.
Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2011) assume that the emission stage of a
coalition formation is an infinite-horizon game. In the dynamic coalition game of Rubio
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and Ulph (2002), the countries may revise their membership decisions in any period
(variable membership). Therefore there are both stock and membership dynamics.
Furthermore, Breton et al. (2010) assume that membership may evolve exogenously
over time.
The dominant part of the literature of coalition formation in IEAs examine the
largest number of countries under d’Aspremont stability criterion from the cartel
literature, i.e. internal and external stability under the assumption that if any member
of the coalition deviates, other members will continue to cooperate. This myopic
stability criterion has been criticised for the fact that it justifies free riding. Ecchia and
Mariotti (1998) and Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) apply the farsighted stability
of Chwe (1994) in the IEAs. So, in their models agents take into account the reaction
of others in case of deviation.
A relatively small subset of the literature investigates the role of uncertainty and
learning in IEAs. In stochastic IEAs, the uncertainty is basically modelled as uncertainty
about an unknown parameter in the payoff function of the involved countries, which
is mainly the social cost of GHG (known as the cost-benefit ratio). As mentioned in
the third chapter, a seminal paper in this strand of literature, is Na and Shin (1998),
which introduces asymmetric uncertainty (distributional uncertainty) in a coalition
game of three countries. Ulph (2004) extends the idea of variable membership to
stochastic IEAs, and Kolstad (2007) suggests learning after the membership stage
and before the emission stage, known as partial learning52. Kolstad and Ulph (2011)
investigate the case of ex-post asymmetry of social cost of GHG among countries. In
addition, Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) assume a continuum choice variable, and by
comparing effect of learning in different stages of a coalition game for a symmetric and
asymmetric state variable derive more general conclusions. Moreover, Barrett (2013)
introduces uncertainty about a catastrophic threshold in a climate change coalition
game, where if the threshold is met the countries suffer a catastrophic cost in addition
to the conventional social cost of GHG.
52Term “partial” learning in the literature, refers to uncertainty with respect to time of learning,
where there is no noisy information and learning is perfect.
4.2 Related Literature 87
This chapter considers as a stochastic IEA model, and in order to elaborate with
respect to the stochastic dimension, a simple coalition setup is adopted. Ulph (2004),
Finus (2008) and Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) have called for models with richer
learning structures in IEAs. Here, the coalition game is solved with respect to the
beliefs about the social cost of GHG, where information may be noisy and learning can
be imperfect. Hence, the full-learning and no-learning cases studied in the literature
on stochastic IEAs, are considered as specific cases.
In addition to the literature on stochastic IEAs and coalition formation, the chapter
also relates to the literature on information design. The seminal paper in this area
is Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), which introduces information persuasion of one
agent by a sender. The literature is growing extensively in various dimensions, such as
dynamic information design with public and private signals (Ely, 2015), persuasion of
an informed receiver (Kolotilin et al. 2015), private persuasion by the sender (Taneva,
2015), costly persuasion for the sender (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2014), and multiple
senders and one receiver (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2012).
This chapter contributes to the strand of public persuasion. The existing litera-
ture mostly relates to the literature on media communication in a political economy
environment. Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) use information design, where they model a
government as a strategic player, which controls the media output to a mass of citizens.
In a binary model (binary state and binary action choices for the citizens) the sender
tries to influence the belief of citizens by sending public signals, and they derive the
equilibrium level of media bias.
Shapiro and Gentzkow (2015) have applied the idea of persuasion by multiple
senders to climate change. Referring to the fact that media balances both scientific and
political views on climate change, and the public does not reach a consensus on global
warming, they suggest a political economy model, where the receiver is a voter and has
binary choices, and seeks information about a binary state variable. There are a mass of
experts, which are divided to two groups of informed and “wrongly” informed experts,
who belong to the “opposition party”. The voter receives messages indirectly through
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a media journalist, who may combine messages of two experts, who can be from both
parties. The opposition party is indeed the sender, which is maximising its payoff
by allocating its own expert in the media to influence the journalists’ report. They
examine the effect of cost of opposition party for hiring expert on the informativeness
of signals in equilibrium.
As a public persuasion model, instead of the effect of media on voters, this chapter
focuses on coalition formation. Furthermore, in contrast to the mentioned papers,
there is no cost of information distortion, and the communication strategies of the
sender in equilibrium lead to a socially optimal outcome. Moreover, the receivers of
the public signal are heterogeneous with respect to being signatories or non-signatories
of the coalition.
The current research also contributes to the literature on “nudges”, or affecting
individuals decision-making by provision of information. This literature, which is
inspired by psychology experiments, includes quantitative and empirical studies, which
are mainly applied to energy economics. For example, see Ferraro and Price (2013),
Costa and Kahn (2013) Galle (2013) and Ayres et al. (2013). However, as they
do not model the sender, their focus is not on the optimal information structure,
but on evaluating the effect of intervention through information transmission and its
comparison with other available policy instruments.
4.3 The Model
A sender releases public information to the countries about an (uncertain) payoff-
relevant state variable, in order to induce some specific environmental action. Let I refer
to the set of countries. Country i ∈ I has payoff of ui(q, γ), where q = (q1, q2, ..., qN)
refers to the vector of mitigation actions chosen by the N countries, and assume that
the mitigation action space is binary. Furthermore, γ ∈ Γ is the state variable about
which the countries receive information, where Γ is also taken to be a binary set. The
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sender has payoff of ν(q, γ), which depends on the action chosen by the countries and
the state variable. The payoffs of both sides are common knowledge.
Before the countries choose any action, in order to affect their beliefs about the
state variable, the sender, who has commitment power, can initiate research about
the unknown state variable. Choosing a research strategy is modelled as choosing an
information mechanism, which consists of the set of signals, S, and the information
policy which is a map from the state, γ, to the probability distribution over signals
when the true state is γ, i.e. γ → π(. | γ) ∈ ∆(S). In other words, if the observed state
by the sender is γ, the information policy specifies that the sender chooses a signal
according to the rule of π(. | γ). There is no need to specify the details of research,
as it all reduces to the information mechanism. The sender commits to the chosen
information policy. Furthermore, it is assumed that the research is costless for the
sender.
The sender selects a binary signal space, which implies that there is a one-to-one
relationship between the signal space and the countries’ action space. Hence, the sender
by sending a signal, recommends a certain action, and the countries accordingly take
the corresponding action. This is known as “direct” information mechanism, and in
fact the sender could not do better than that.
The timeline is as follows. At the beginning of the game, and before observing the
true state, the sender announces the information mechanism, and commits to it. By
conducting the research, he observes the state53. The results of research are presented
as a public signal, s ∈ S, according to the information policy. The countries, interpret
the information policy and the signal, using Bayes rule. So, given the information
policy and the observed signal realisation, the countries update their belief about the
state, and choose an action to maximise their payoffs. We refer to this process as
“persuasion”.
53If the sender does not observe the state realisation, he has access to a limited set of policies, for
example, the truthful policy is not available. But given that limited set, it is still possible to derive
the optimal policy. Hence, observation of the state is not a crucial assumption in the analysis. As
I do not restrict the set of public mechanisms, and any probability distribution is available to the
sender, it is assumed that he observes the state after setting the information policy.
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The countries and the sender share a common prior, p(γ). In addition, every piece
of information that the countries ever get, comes from the sender. So, sending signal
s ∈ S, the information sender knows the countries’ updated belief, µs(γ) ∈ ∆(Γ). The
solution concept is sender’s preferred subgame perfect equilibrium. In other words, if
the countries are indifferent between two actions, they choose the sender’s preferred
action.54
Therefore, for any state, each signal realisation, s, induces a posterior belief,
µs(γ).55 The probability of a given signal s is τ(s) =
∑
γ p(γ)π(s | γ), which is the
sum of conditional probability distributions of the signal, given all states, weighted
by the prior belief. Hence, we can think of any mechanism as inducing a probability
distribution over updated beliefs. In other words, an element τ ∈ ∆(∆Γ) represents a
distribution over posteriors. Since the action of the countries depend on their beliefs,
all that matters is the probability distributions about beliefs, which is summarised by
τ . From this, we can focus on τ ; in other words, the problem of finding the optimal
information policy reduces to directly choosing the optimal τ .
Here, as the first step, we adapt the single-agent information design model of
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to the context of climate change, and we explain the
main elements of their analysis. Then we extend the model to the case of multiple
countries, where we examine a coalition model from the perspective of induced beliefs
and information persuasion, and we derive the optimal information policies given
different payoffs of the sender.
54The tie-breaking rule is a standard trick, and as the the problem is well-defined and the solution
exists, the tie is broken in this way.
55Using the Bayes rule, µs(γ) = p(γ)π(s|γ)∑
γ′∈Γ
p(γ′)π(s|γ′)
for all γ and s.
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4.4 Introductory example: persuasion of a single
country
To explain the model in its simplest context, we first consider the case of a single
country. Assume there are binary states and binary choices. Let Γ = {0, 1}, where
0 refers to no catastrophe and 1 refers to catastrophe. The one country can choose
between two levels of abatement, q = {q, q}, where q < q. If the state of the world is
catastrophic, the country wants to choose the higher level of abatement, q, and vice
versa. In other words, u(q, 1) = u(q, 0) = 1. Otherwise, the country receives zero payoff,
i.e. u(q, 0) = u(q, 1) = 0. We examine the problem of finding the optimal information
mechanism under two different preference specifications for the sender: a biased sender
and a benevolent sender. We examine each case in turn.
4.4.1 A biased sender
Suppose the information sender only cares about the high abatement level, and his
payoff is
ν̂(q∗) =
 1 if q
∗ = q
0 if q∗ = q
(4.4.1)
where q∗ refers to the equilibrium action chosen by the country, which is the best
response to its belief, and the sender takes q∗ as given. This model is directly equivalent
to the jury example of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where a biased prosecutor
persuades a judge to convict a suspect, instead of serving justice, which is in favour of
the judge.
In this binary model, let us simplify the notation, so µ denote the potential posterior
probability of catastrophic state, and p be the prior belief of the state. The information
sender can compute the belief at which the country is indifferent between the two
actions. Since, Eµu(q, .) = µ and Eµu(q, .) = 1 − µ, the country chooses q if µ ≥ 12 ,
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and q if µ < 12 .
56 Upon the fact that the country’s belief is µ, the expected value
of sender’s payoff for a given belief, can be written directly as a function of µ. Let
ν(µ) = Eµν̂(.).57 Therefore, here the expected payoff of the biased sender, given belief
µ, can be rewritten as
ν(µ) =
 1 if µ ≥
1
2
0 if µ < 12
(4.4.2)
The basic idea is that the information sender can use a signal space, which is just
equal to the set of states, so here S = {0, 1}. The notation µ1 refers to the probability
that the state is catastrophic conditional on a catastrophic signal. In this binary world,
let τ represents the probability of catastrophic signal (the probability of µ1). Because
each belief is associated with a payoff, and as the sender by choosing an information
policy is going to choose a distribution τ , every policy yields the expected payoff of
τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0) for the sender. So any information policy can be represented by
τ and we can write the expected payoff of the sender as a function of τ .
To derive the feasible subset of policies, a necessary condition is that the expected
value of the posteriors over τ , must be equal to the prior, i.e. Eτ µ = p, which is the law
of total probability. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) refer to it as the Bayes-plausibility
condition, and they show that this is the only restriction. In other words, this canonical
subset of policies captures all possibilities. Indeed a distribution τ over posterior beliefs
can be generated by an information mechanism if and only if it satisfies the law of
total probability. So here the problem of sender will maximise
τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0)
subject to τµ1 + (1 − τ)µ0 = p
(4.4.3)
56Recall that the country chooses the sender’s preferred action, when it is indifferent.
57In this example, ν̂(.) is not a function of state variable, but even if it were, because the belief of
the countries is µ, the expected payoff of ν(.) is just a function of µ and the state variable would be
irrelevant.
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by choice of τ . The solution can be illustrated in (µ, ν)−space. Let us denote
V (µ) ≡ maxτ [τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0) | τµ1 + (1 − τ)µ0 = p], which given any lottery
over beliefs, represents the maximum expected payoff over the beliefs. The function
V (µ) is the supremum of convex hull of the hypergraph of ν(µ), or the smallest concave
function that is no smaller than ν(µ) at every belief. This determines the optimal policy
for a given support of the beliefs. In addition, given the constraint of the optimisation,
the lottery over beliefs should be on average equal to the prior, p. So, it is possible to
read off the optimised value of the information policy as V (p). Panel (a) of Figure 4.1
depicts ν(µ) for the biased sender and its concave closure, V (µ).
Before, deriving the optimal policy, let us consider two other possibilities. Assume
that the sender can construct arbitrary research to achieve an ambitious policy, such
that a catastrophic signal will always be sent to the country to choose the higher level
of abatement, i.e. no matter what the state is, π(1 | 0) = 1 and π(1 | 1) = 1. This
is not Bayes-plausible and knowing this the signal is uninformative for the country.
Thus, µ1 = p. In other words, the ambitious policy will be ignored and the country
will behave according to its prior.
As another possibility, consider the truthful policy which leads to two possible beliefs
for the country; either the country should be certain that the state is catastrophic,
i.e. µ1 = 1, or it should be certain that it is not, i.e. 1 − µ0 = 1. Because this is a
Bayes-plausible policy, the country chooses q whenever it receives a signal s = 0, and
chooses q, whenever a signal s = 1 is observed. But, the Bayes-plausible constraint
leads to τ = p. In other words, the sender sends the catastrophic signal with probability
p, which is the prior probability of catastrophic event, and the biased sender obtains
expected payoff of τ . Thus, depending on the prior, the sender might be able to do
better.
If p ≥ 12 , then the country is choosing q, which is the preferred action of the sender.
In fact, in this range, V (µ) coincides with ν(.), and the optimal policy is not unique. It
either prescribes leaving the country with its prior (sending no signal at all is optimal),
or choosing a degenerate lottery which is equal to the prior, p, with probability one.
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But suppose p < 12 . By setting both µ1 and µ0 more than
1
2 , the sender obtains
payoff of one, but such posteriors do not satisfy the law of total probability. On the
other hand, choosing both µ1 and µ0 less than 12 , leads to payoff of zero. Hence, one of
µ1 and µ0 should be above 12 and one below it. If µ1 ≥
1
2 and µ0 <
1
2 , then the expected
payoff of the sender is increasing in τ . Since, µ1 ≥ 12 , the law of total probability,
τ = p−µ0
µ1−µ0 , implies the expected payoff is decreasing in both µ1 and µ0. Therefore,
setting µ1 = 12 and µ0 = 0 maximises the expected payoff of the sender.
As shown in panel (a) of Figure 4.1 in this range, V (µ) is above ν(.), and the
optimal mechanism is a non-degenerate lottery over beliefs. As explained, the truthful
mechanism is not optimal, as when the state is catastrophic the sender is wasting its
persuading power by sending signal s = 1 too often (or with too high a probability).
Knowing the threshold at which the country is indifferent, instead of µ1 = 1, the biased
sender optimally can choose µ1 = 12 . On the other hand, signal s = 0 only happens
when the state is not catastrophic. So, it should be that 1 − µ0 = 1 or µ0 = 0. A
Bayes-plausible randomisation over µ1 = 12 and µ0 = 0, means τ = 2p, which is the
expected payoff of the sender as well.
Using the Bayes rule, µ1 = π(1|1)pτ , implies that on the equilibrium path, the sender
should use π(1 | 1) = 1. Similarly, 1 − µ1 = π(1|0)(1−p)τ leads to π(1 | 0) =
p
1−p .
Hence, despite the fact that the payoffs are common knowledge, and the country
knows that the sender is biased, the sender can send a catastrophic signal with
probability τ = 2p, and the country chooses the high level of abatement, whenever it
receives such a signal.
4.4.2 A benevolent sender
Now assume the payoffs of the country and the information sender coincide. In
other words, given the fact that the country holds belief µ about the catastrophic state,
the expected payoff of sender for a belief µ is,
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4.1 Panel (a) The biased sender. Panel (b) The benevolent sender.
ν(µ) = Eµu(q∗, γ) =
 µ if µ ≥
1
2
1 − µ if µ < 12
(4.4.4)
Panel (b) of Figure 4.1 shows ν(µ) and V (µ) for such a sender.
Lemma 1. The optimal policy of the benevolent sender to a single country is full
revelation of the realised state.
Since, V (µ) is a straight line over the whole support of beliefs, the optimal policy
is a randomisation of µ0 = 0 and µ1 = 1. The Bayes-plausibility implies τ = p for all
p ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, Bayes rule determines that the conditional probabilities of signals
should be π(1 | 1) = 1 and π(0 | 0) = 1.
Given the insight from persuasion of a single agent, in the next subsection, we
generalise a coalition model to a setting where an information sender can affect decision
making of multiple countries, by designing an optimal information policy.
4.5 Persuasion of N countries in a coalition game
Consider a coalition formation model, where every country i ∈ I decides about
joining a coalition. Let the number of countries, N , be a finite Natural number
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and N ≥ 2. In addition, let us label the set of coalition members by M , where
M ⊆ I. The game consists of two stages: the membership stage and the stage of the
emission or abatement decision. The membership is open (voluntary), but in contrast
to the model in the third chapter, here the membership is fixed (i.e. joining implies
ratifying the treaty, which makes compliance compulsory, and signatories cannot leave
the agreement). Furthermore, it is a single-coalition game. In other words, it is
assumed that along an equilibrium path, only one coalition forms, and we do not study
simultaneous formation of more than one coalition. This is of course in addition to the
coalition of singletons, which is always a Nash equilibrium, and hence self-enforceable.
We build on the binary model specification of Kolstad (2007). However, here we
analyse the model from the perspective of information design, so we are interested
in finding the optimal action of the countries for any belief. Indeed, in contrast to
the literature on IEAs, where beliefs are given parameters, and the profitability and
stability of a coalition are studied with respect to the number of signatories of a treaty,
in this chapter, the threshold behaviour of the signatories and non-signatories of the
IEA are examined with respect to their beliefs about the social cost of GHG. Hence,
the stable number of signatories is a function of the endogenous beliefs.
Furthermore, I extend the model to have an information sender, in order to
derive the optimal information mechanism. Assume that before the membership
stage, the sender announces the information policy, conducts the research and sends
a public signal. The model is solved according to the sender’s-preferred subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE). Specifically, given their beliefs, in the emission stage, the
countries choose their optimal emission (or abatement) strategies, which construct a
vector of Nash equilibrium emission (or abatement) actions. This forms the expected
payoff of (potential) signatories of the IEA and non-signatories, which determines
the profitability of joining a coalition, and its stability in the membership stage.
Conventionally, we check unilateral deviations, so the membership strategies also form
a Nash equilibrium. Then upon the optimal behaviour of the countries in emission
and membership stages, the sender designs an optimal information mechanism, which
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results in his most preferred outcome. Recall that even if the countries can predict
the optimal information mechanism, the signal is a random draw according to the
information policy. The problems of the information receivers and the sender are
respectively investigated in the next two subsections.
4.5.1 Coalition formation
Let ui(q, γ) = qi − γQ denote the payoff of country i ∈ I. Assume qi ∈ {0, 1}, and
we label qi = 0 as abating and qi = 1 as emitting.58 Furthermore, Q is the aggregate
emission, i.e. Q = ∑i qi. Assume γ ∈ Γ = {γl, γh} is the random state variable which
is the marginal social cost of emission, or the cost-ratio parameter. Here, it is either
low or high, γl < γh. At the beginning of the game, nature draws one parameter from
set Γ for all countries. This is known as level uncertainty in the literature. Hence, γQ
captures the damage from the aggregate emission to country i, and clearly we focus on
risk-neutral countries. Let µ refer to the probability of γ = γh, which is potentially an
updated posterior belief after observation of the signal of sender, also p is the prior
belief about such a state. Given the public belief, all signatories will have the same
expected payoff, also all non-signatories share their common expected payoff. For
simplicity, let us assume γl = 0, which implies that if the social cost of GHG is γl,
emitting is not harmful. Furthermore, let γh be a finite real number, also assume that
γh > 1. As it becomes clear in the next two subsections, the latter assumption ensures
existence of a possible large social cost of GHG, which leads to structure of singleton
coalitions, such that all countries choose abating. This is in contrast to the literature
where the focus is on situations where γh < 1, and abstract from the possibility of
coordination of all countries on abating. Hence, we do not restrict Eµ(γ) to be less
than one.
58 The functional form is commonly used in the literature, for example see binary models of Ulph
(2004), Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2011). At the end of this section, robustness of the
results with respect to the functional form and the assumption of binary action space is discussed.
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Non-signatories’ emission decision
Consider a coalition of n members, where n ≤ N . In the emission stage, a non-
signatory takes the number of coalition members, and the action chosen by signatories
and other non-signatories as given and individually maximises its expected payoff of
Eµufni (q, γ) = q
f




i ], where superscript f is for the
non-signatories or fringe countries and m for the coalition members, also superscript n
shows the dependence of the payoff (or in future, other variables) to the number of
coalition members. Thus superscript fn refers to fringe where the number of coalition
members is n. Furthermore, subscript −i is the index for the other country in the
group (of non-signatories here).
By choosing qfi = 0, the expected payoff of the fringe country is −Eµ(γ)[nqmi +
(N − n − 1)qf−i], and choosing q
f
i = 1 leads to expected payoff of 1 −Eµ(γ)[nqmi + (N −
n − 1)qf−i + 1]. Therefore, independent of the decision of coalition and other fringe
countries, if a fringe country believes that µ ≥ µf ≡ 1
γh
, then it chooses q∗fi = 0, and if
µ < µf , then q∗fi = 1 is chosen. Thus, the non-signatories have a dominant strategy
which only depends on their belief about the social cost of emission, and not the action
undertaken by other countries, or number of coalition members. Hence, in studying
the underlying coalition formation game, both assumptions of Stackelberg and Cournot
lead to the same result.
The threshold µf is positive and strictly less than one, i.e. 0 < µf < 1. Furthermore,
it is clear that the larger is γh, the smaller is the threshold belief of a fringe country,
which leads to an abatement decision for a larger range of support of µ. Finally, µf is
independent of the number of coalition members, and given the parameter value of γh,
it is fixed.
Signatories’ emission decision
The coalition members in the emission stage, act as a singleton, given the action
chosen by fringe countries. In fact, they compare expected payoff of −nEµ(γ)(N −n)qfi
by choosing qmi = 0 each, and n−nEµ(γ)[n+(N −n)q
f
i ] by choosing qmi = 1. Therefore,
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independent of the action of non-signatories, they will have a common threshold of
belief, µmn ≡ 1
γhn
, above which they abate and below which they choose to emit.
Specifically, if µ ≥ µmn, they abate and if µ < µmn, the signatories choose emitting.59
Their threshold is decreasing in γh and the number of coalition members. Furthermore,
0 < µmn ≤ µf , where the equality of two thresholds occur if and only if n = 1.
Hence, the coalition of singletons chooses abating above µf , and below it, all individual
countries choose emitting. Thus, we may refer to µf as the threshold of coalition of
singletons.
Socially optimal emission
Before proceeding to the membership stage, let us verify the emission (or abate-
ment) actions corresponding to the social optimum. The social-optimal mitigation is
a profile of emission (or abatement) strategies that maximises the sum of countries’
expected payoffs. This is a benchmark, and later the equilibrium outcome of the model
is compared with the social optimum. The next lemma verifies the social-optimal
vector of emissions or abatements, qso, which includes both imperfect (non-degenerate
µ) and perfect-learning (degenerate µ) situations.
Lemma 2. Given a common belief µ ∈ [0, 1], the social optimum for all i ∈ I, implies
selection of qsoi = 1 for all posterior beliefs 0 ≤ µ < µN ≡ 1γhN , and selection of q
so
i = 0
for all beliefs µN ≤ µ ≤ 1.
Proof. Examining the sum of expected payoffs under the two actions, implies a country
obtains expected payoff of 1 − Nγhµ, if all countries choose to emit, and expected
payoff of zero, if they all cooperate on abating. This leads to the threshold behaviour
specified in the lemma.
In addition, 0 < µN ≤ µmn, where these two thresholds are equal if and only
if n = N . In fact, the socially optimal mitigation strategies are equivalent to the
59In future, we examine different payoffs for the sender, and the equilibrium is always the sender’s
preferred SPE. Given the expected payoff of the sender, the tie-breaking rule of signatories and
non-signatories may be revised, if necessary.
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mitigation strategy of a potential grand coalition (n = N) at each level of beliefs. In
other words, if a grand coalition can be formed for all levels of beliefs, then µN is
the abating threshold of such a coalition. Furthermore, as the number of countries
increases, the socially optimal threshold, µN , decreases, implying that achieving the
social optimum requires cooperation on abatement for a larger range of beliefs.
Membership stage
In the membership subgame, given the optimal decision and expected payoffs of
the two groups of signatories and non-signatories in the emission stage, the countries
consider joining an IEA. This analysis consists of examining the profitability and
self-enforceability (stability) of a coalition.
A coalition is stable if the strategies in the membership stage construct a Nash
equilibrium. Sufficient conditions for stability are the internal and external stability
conditions, which are the Nash equilibrium conditions for signatories and non-signatories
in the membership subgame. Recall that M is the set of coalition members, also let
n∗(µ) be the expected number of signatories of the stable coalition, which depends on
belief. The internal stability condition implies that no signatory has an incentive to leave
the coalition, i.e. Eµun
∗
i (M) ≥ Eµun
∗
i (M\{i}), for all i ∈ M . The external stability
refers to the condition that no non-signatory has an incentive to join the coalition,
i.e. Eµun
∗
i (M) > Eµun
∗
i (M ∪ {i}), for all i /∈ M . Given the common beliefs, and the
fact that all signatories have the same expected payoff, as well as all non-signatories,
the internal stability implies that the size of coalition cannot be smaller than n∗(µ),
otherwise the coalition becomes ineffective, i.e. Eµumn
∗
i (n∗(µ)) ≥ Eµu
fn∗
i (n∗(µ) − 1).
Furthermore, the external stability is reduced to the condition that the size of coalition
cannot be greater than n∗(µ), otherwise unilateral deviation (free-riding) becomes
profitable, i.e. Eµufn
∗
i (n∗(µ)) > Eµumn
∗
i (n∗(µ) + 1).
To derive the stable number of countries in the coalition formation subgame, the
mitigation strategies, and hence the expected payoffs of signatories and non-signatories
for each level of beliefs must be examined. Given the ranking of thresholds of coalition
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of singletons and the grand coalition, 0 < µN < µf < 1, the support of belief admits
three distinct ranges.
First, if µ ≥ µf , then both groups optimally choose to abate, i.e. q∗i = 0 for all
i ∈ I, and each country gets expected payoff of zero. So in that range of posterior
beliefs, no coalition is as good as full cooperation, or grand coalition, which corresponds
to the socially optimal level of abatements60. Hence, in this range of beliefs the stable
coalition is either the coalition of singletons or the grand coalition.
Second, for any belief µ < µN , signatories of the grand coalition choose to emit, or
q∗i = 1 for all i ∈ I. As explained, µN is the abating threshold of the grand coalition,
and indeed, formation of the grand coalition is a stable membership strategy for this
range of beliefs and each country receives expected payoff of Eµumn
∗
i = 1 − µγhN . In
addition, the coalition of singletons that emits in this range of beliefs is clearly another
stable coalition.
The final range of posterior beliefs is µN ≤ µ < µf . The threshold of signatories
is between these two thresholds, i.e. for any 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N , the thresholds are
µN ≤ µmn∗ < µf .61 Given any n∗(µ), it may be profitable for the n∗(µ) members of
the stable coalition to sign a treaty which specifies abatement for all members, while
the fringe countries can be emitting (if n∗(µ) < N). Hence, the payoffs of signatories
and non-signatories are Eµumn
∗
i = −µγh(N − n∗(µ)) and Eµu
fn∗
i = 1 − µγh(N − n∗(µ)),
respectively. The stability of a coalition with size n∗(µ) is examined in the appendix,
and the results of the membership stage are summarised in the next proposition. First,
let us zoom deeper into the range of beliefs where µN ≤ µ < µf .
Two facts can be directly verified: (i) the condition µmn∗ ≤ µ implies that a stable
coalition of size I( 1
µγh
) can be formed, where I(.) is the smallest integer which is no
smaller than its argument. (ii) for any 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N , the threshold µmn∗ depends
60As mentioned, in the existing binary IEA models, the attention is restricted to E(γ) < 1, hence,
the threshold behaviour of the non-signatories is not taken into account. However, here it is assumed
that γh > 1, so we do not abstract from the possibility of obtaining the social optimum by countries
coordination, and necessarily they do not need cooperation.
61It has already been discussed that if n∗(µ) = 1, then µmn∗ = µf , which implies that the threshold
of coalition of singletons is fixed at µf .
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on n∗(µ). So, every n∗(µ) leads to a different threshold for the signatories. Facts (i)
and (ii) imply that the coalition formation is endogenous, and there exists a mapping
from the beliefs to the set of size of stable coalitions. Given that n∗(µ) is an integer, it
is not a one-to-one mapping, but every range of beliefs between every two successive
thresholds corresponds to a unique n∗(µ). Hence, the size of stable coalition can be
uniquely pinned down by choosing the posterior beliefs.
For any belief between the thresholds of grand coalition and coalition of singletons,
i.e. µN ≤ µ < µf , the model admits (possibly) finitely many thresholds for the
signatories of different coalitions. Therefore, the intermediate partition of posterior
beliefs is itself partitioned by smaller ranges, say sub-partitions, where in each sub-
partition, the stable abating coalition has a unique size. For any generic 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N ,
if µmn∗ ≤ µ < 1
γh(n∗(µ)−1)
, the stable coalition has n∗(µ) members. If µ < µmn∗ , by the
internal stability condition, the coalition of size n∗(µ) is not stable, and the incentive
for cooperation is cancelled out by the incentive to free ride, and the signatories leave
such a coalition and make it worthless, i.e. −µγh(N − n∗(µ)) < 1 − µγhN . Similarly,
if n∗(µ) > 2, for any belief 1
γh(n∗(µ)−1)
≤ µ < 1
γh(n∗(µ)−2)
, the abating coalition of size
n∗(µ) − 1 is stable, and so on.
Accordingly, the minimum threshold of signatories is µN , thus if µN ≤ µ < 1
γh(N−1)
,
then the abating grand coalition is stable. Also, the maximum threshold is 12γh , implying
that for any belief 12γh ≤ µ < µ
f , abating coalition of size n∗(µ) = 2 is stable. Clearly,
for N = 2, the minimum and maximum signatories’ thresholds coincide, implying that
for any µ ≥ µN , the coalition with n∗(µ) = 2 is stable, where both countries cooperate
on abating.
Hence, in the range of µN ≤ µ < µf , the expected number of members of the stable
coalition, n∗(µ), is a (weakly) decreasing function of posterior belief µ. The negative
relationship of the social cost of GHG and the number of members of stable coalition
is known from Ulph (2004), but in contrast to the literature, where belief is a constant
parameter, and a model admits one n∗, here if µN ≤ µ < µf , the endogenous size of
stable coalitions, n∗(µ), varies from one sub-partition to the other.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4.2 Panel (a) The membership equilibrium expected payoffs of a representative
signatory, Eµumn
∗
i (µ), for N > 4. Panel (b) The membership equilibrium expected
payoffs of a representative non-signatory, Eµufn
∗
i (µ), for N > 4.
Figure 4.2 depicts the membership equilibrium expected payoffs of a representative
signatory and non-signatory for N > 4. The two panels are different only in the
range of beliefs µN ≤ µ < µf . It can be verified that for each n∗(µ), the difference of
corresponding expected payoff of the two groups, are constant, as they have dominant
strategies. The tie-breaking rule in the figure is as specified in this section, and in future
depending on the sender’s expected payoff, it may be different. Furthermore, note that
if µN ≤ µ < µf , as belief about high state decreases, and the number of signatories of
the stable coalition increases, for each n∗(µ), the expected payoffs of both signatories
and non-signatories increase, as does the total payoff of n∗(µ)Eµu∗mi +(N −n∗(µ))Eµu
∗f
i .
This property is known as “global efficiency”.
The following proposition specifies the equilibrium strategies of the membership
subgame.
Proposition 8. (i) If µ < µN , the grand coalition and coalition of singletons are
stable, where q∗i = 1 for i ∈ I.
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(ii) If µN ≤ µ < µf , there are N − 1 thresholds of signatories, µmn∗, and for any
2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N , the beliefs in between every two successive thresholds, µmn∗ ≤ µ <
1
γh(n∗(µ)−1)
, map to the unique n∗(µ), where q∗mi = 0 and (if n∗(µ) < N) q
∗f
i = 1. In
this range of beliefs, emitting coalition of singletons is also stable.
(iii) If µ ≥ µf , then grand coalition and coalition of singletons are stable, where q∗i = 0
for all i ∈ I.
For the proof see Appendix 4.7.1.
In terms of comparison of equilibrium outcome of the membership subgames with
the socially optimal outcome, as explained in section 4.5.1, the equilibrium outcome of
a potential grand coalition corresponds to the social optimum. Therefore, based on
proposition 8, if beliefs are 0 ≤ µ ≤ µN , where the grand coalition chooses emitting,
and if beliefs are µN ≤ µ < 1
γh(N−1)
and µf ≤ µ ≤ 1, where the grand coalition
for abatement is stable, the mitigation outcomes coincide with the social optimum.
However, the actions undertaken by the countries do not satisfy the social optimum if
1
γh(N−1)
< µ < µf . In fact, in this range of beliefs the grand coalition is not stable, and
a group of countries abate, while other(s) free ride. Furthermore, note if N = 2, where
the minimum and maximum thresholds of signatories coincide, there would not be
any difference between the equilibrium mitigation strategies and the socially optimal
strategies for any belief.
Finally, the assumptions of binary state variable and binary action space lead to
the threshold behaviour of signatories and non-signatories with respect to their beliefs.
In terms of robustness of the results to these assumptions and the functional form,
it should be noted that although the results depend on the single-crossing property
of the expected payoffs, the linearity of the payoff function is for simplicity. In other
words, as long as the single-crossing property holds, an alternative functional form,
such as a quadratic payoff function, can also be assumed.
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Comparison with a perfect-learning model
As mentioned, in the literature on stochastic IEAs, two cases of full learning, i.e.
µ = 0 or µ = 1, and no learning µ = p are studied. According to Kolstad (2007), the
stable coalition has a unique size between two and N , depending on the parameter
values, and under full learning of the state, it is either I( 1
γl
) or I( 1
γh
). Accordingly, in
his model, the minimum number of coalition members (two) corresponds to µ = 1,
where n∗ = I( 1
γh
). Our model, includes these two cases of full learning. However, the
two models are different with respect to the parameter value assumptions. In order to
see the similarities, some modification of parameter values are required. For the case of
µ = 1, to make the comparison possible, if similar to the literature, in our model, (only
in this subsection) we assume γh < 1, as if µf is increased to one (and excluded), then
the stable coalition with the minimum number signatories (two) forms at supremum
of set [0, µf), which is the same as Kolstad (2007). However, abstracting from the
possibility of abating grand coalition in the existing literature, i.e. the assumption of
γh < 1, implies ruling out the non-monotonic relationship of n∗(µ) and the belief.
In addition, in Kolstad (2007), the maximum number of members of the stable
abating coalition is I( 1
γl
) which corresponds to µ = 0. In our model, at µ = 0, a
grand coalition is stable, where all countries choose emitting, and the minimum belief
corresponding to the maximum number of abating coalition members is µN , which is
non-degenerate. Again the difference of the two models is a result of parameter value
assumptions. In order to compare the two models, if (in this subsection) we relax the
assumption of γl = 0, then µN = 1−NγlN(γh−γl) . So in our model, µ
N = 0 if and only if
1 − Nγl = 0, which implies N = I( 1γl ), and it is the same as Kolstad (2007). However,
µN = 0 suggests that a model with perfect learning, does not include the range of
beliefs 0 ≤ µ < µN , where n∗(µ) is constant at N (or one), and all countries choose
the emitting strategy.
Therefore, given the assumptions of existing literature about the parameter values,
our model will be restricted to the posterior beliefs µN ≤ µ < µf , where the lower-
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bound and the maximum beliefs map into to the maximum and minimum number of
stable coalition members, respectively.
4.5.2 Sender’s persuasion
The sender, given the best response of the countries in the mitigation and mem-
bership stages, chooses a lottery over posterior beliefs such that it results in his most
preferred stable coalition sizes and mitigation strategies. To fix ideas, in this section,
by “equilibrium”, we refer to the sender’s-preferred SPE, and “stable” coalition, as
explained above, refers to any coalition which satisfies the internal and external stability
conditions, and it may or may not be the “equilibrium” outcome.
Before the membership stage, the sender can communicate an information policy
and conduct research, which leads to sending a signal, before any decision about the
membership is made by the countries. The sender and the countries share a common
prior. However, the sender does not know yet which country is going to be a signatory
and which one will be a fringe. Hence, we focus on public signals. Since, each group of
signatories and non-signatories have different thresholds, the sender faces a problem
where the receivers of the public signal (may) have different payoffs, and accordingly
different best-response actions.
First, in the next two subsections, we consider cases where the preferences of the
sender coincide with the signatories and non-signatories, respectively. However, it is
shown that no matter whether the sender has the same preferences as the signatories or
non-signatories of the coalition, for any p ∈ [0, 1], the unique optimal public information
policy, is full revelation of the state of the world.
Then, the results are generalised to a case where the expected payoff of sender is a
combination of the expected payoffs of the two groups of coalition members and fringe
countries, and it is shown that the unique information policy is again perfect learning.
Finally, a case is studied, where the sender’s objective is minimising the total level
of GHG. If the main concerns of sender are the global consequences of the emission
and abatement of countries, for example if the incentives of sender are driven from
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the affect of increase of GHG on the average temperature of the planet, e.g. meeting
the two-degree threshold, or if the preferences of sender reflect the wide difference of
social and private discount factors, then it is reasonable to assume that ν̂(q, γ) = −Q.
In such a situation, the expected payoff of sender, as a globally benevolent sender,
does not coincide with the payoff of the countries, and it is shown that the optimal
information policy leads to imperfect learning by the countries.
Optimally, given any of the mentioned payoff specifications for the sender, he
chooses a binary signal space, say S = {0, 1}, where s = 0 refers to state γl, and s = 1
corresponds to state γh. Indeed, as before, on the equilibrium path, the sender chooses
a mechanism which leads to a one-to-one relationship between the actions space and
the signal space. Hence, here for example signal s = 1, which refers to state γh, leads to
action qi = 0. Because of the Bayes-plausibility of the signals, the countries follow the
recommendation of the sender. Furthermore, given our payoff structure, this implies
that on the equilibrium path, µ0 ≤ µ1.
Furthermore, let τ represent the probability of signal s = 1. Recall that the law




= µ0−p(µ1−µ0)2 , which is always
non-positive, as µ0 ≤ p. In addition, ∂τ∂µ0 =
p−µ1
(µ1−µ0)2 , this is also non-positive, as p ≤ µ1.
The corner solution, which is found in most of the following problems, relies on these
properties.
Sender with the same preference as the signatories
Suppose the expected payoff of sender coincides with the expected payoff of a




i (q∗, γ) =

0 if µf ≤ µ ≤ 1
−µγh(N − n∗(µ)) if µmn
∗
< µ ≤ 1(n∗(µ)−1)γh
1 − µγhN if 0 ≤ µ ≤ µN
(4.5.1)
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where 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N , and for the case of n∗(µ) = 2, the range of beliefs does not
include any thresholds, i.e 12γh < µ < µ
f , to ensure existence of the sender’s-preferred
equilibrium.
As explained, the sender chooses an optimal distribution of signals, τ , which satisfies
the law of total probability and maximises his payoff as described in (4.5.1). This in
turn reduces the problem to finding a lottery over the common belief µ. The problem
is analysed formally in Appendix 4.7.2.62 Furthermore, from panel (a) of Figure 4.2, it
can be verified that the unique smallest concave function, which is no smaller than
ν(µ) is a straight line connecting µ = 0 and µ = 1, which implies that for any interior
prior, the full revelation is the unique optimal mechanism.63
Lemma 3. If the payoff of sender is ν(µ) = Eµumn
∗
i (q∗, γ), then for any prior belief
p ∈ (0, 1), the unique optimal conditional probability of signals are π(1 | γh) = 1 and
π(0 | γl) = 1.
In addition, the convexity in Eµumn
∗
i (µ) implies that for any p ∈ (0, 1), V (p), which
is the value of optimal mechanism, is greater than ν(p), which is the sender’s expected
payoff in the absence of any persuasion. In other words,
Corollary 1. If the payoff of sender is ν(µ) = Eµumn
∗
i (q∗, γ), then for any prior belief
p ∈ (0, 1), the sender strictly benefits from the persuasion.
Sender with the same preference as the potential non-signatories
In this section, we check the sensitivity of our results to the preference of sender
over non-signatories and signatories. Assume before the membership decision, the
sender chooses an information policy to maximise the expected payoff of a potential
representative non-signatory, in other words,
62The proofs of the following lemmas and propositions are provided for the general case of N > 3,
where there are at least three sub-partitions between the thresholds of grand coalition and coalition of
singletons. Clearly, the proofs for cases of N = 2 and N = 3 include subsets of the proofs for case
N > 3.
63If the prior is degenerate, i.e p = 1, when γ = γh, and p = 0 when γ = γl, then in fact the sender
need not do anything. But formally the optimal mechanism is not unique is such cases, as choosing
the full-revelation policy is still optimal, although the sender does not benefit from it.
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ν(µ) = Eµufn
∗
i (q∗, γ) =

0 if µf ≤ µ ≤ 1 or if µN < µ < 1(N−1)γh
1 − µγh(N − n∗(µ)) if µmn
∗
< µ ≤ 1(n∗(µ)−1)γh
1 − µγhN if 0 ≤ µ ≤ µN
(4.5.2)
where in this equation by n∗(µ) we refer to any 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N −1. Furthermore, the tie-
breaking rule is such that for the case of n∗(µ) = 2, the range of beliefs are 12γh < µ < µ
f ,




It turns out that the optimal information mechanism is the same as if the expected
payoff of signatories was chosen. In fact, the following lemma and corollary are parallel
to the results in the previous subsection.
Lemma 4. If the payoff of sender is ν(µ) = Eµufn
∗
i (q∗, γ), then for any prior belief
p ∈ (0, 1), the unique optimal conditional probability of signals are π(1 | γh) = 1 and
π(0 | γl) = 1.
See Appendix 4.7.3 for the proof of lemma 4. Panel(b) of Figure 4.2 also confirms
the results. From the figure, it can also be verified that for all parameter values of the
model, and all interior posterior beliefs, Eµufn
∗
i (µ) is below V (µ). In other words,
Corollary 2. If the payoff of sender is ν(µ) = Eµufn
∗
i (q∗, γ), then for any prior belief
p ∈ (0, 1), the sender strictly benefits from the persuasion.
Given the last two lemmas, for both cases that the sender maximises the expected
payoff of signatories or non-signatories, the optimal information mechanism is full
revelation of the state of the world. Accordingly, any non-degenerate µ is out of the
equilibrium path, and the mitigation equilibrium outcome will be reduced to selection
of qi = 0, for all i ∈ I if µ1 = 1, also qi = 1, for all i ∈ I, where µ0 = 0. Thus, the
action vectors in the emission stage coincide with the social optimum, defined in lemma
2, even though the sender maximises the expected payoff of one group.
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Proposition 9. If ν(µ) = Eµufn
∗
i (q∗, γ), or if ν(µ) = Eµumn
∗
i (q∗, γ), the optimal
information mechanism of full revelation leads to the socially optimal mitigation
outcome.
Finally, in both cases, the equilibrium (mitigation strategies, membership strategies,
and the information mechanism) is independent of the level of γh, and the prior p.





i (q∗, γ) + (N − n∗(µ))Eµu
fn∗
i (q∗, γ) (4.5.3)
where α is a constant and let α ≥ 1. In other words, assume that the sender maximises
the summation of expected payoffs of both groups of signatories and non-signatories,
and it may weight signatories’ preferences more, knowing that n∗(µ) varies over different
partitions of beliefs.
Proposition 10. If the expected payoff of sender is ν(µ) = αn∗(µ)Eµumn
∗
i (q∗, γ) +
(N − n∗(µ))Eµufn
∗
i (q∗, γ), then for any α ≥ 1, and any prior p ∈ (0, 1), the unique
optimal information mechanism is full revelation of the state, and the equilibrium
mitigation strategies coincide with the socially optimal outcome.
Formal proof is in Appendix 4.7.4. Intuitively, if 0 ≤ µ < 1(N−1)γh ,
64 or if µf ≤ µ ≤ 1,
then n∗(µ) = N , and the sender maximises the summation of expected payoffs of
the grand coalition, or equivalently, the expected payoff of a representative country.
While, (for the case of N > 2) if beliefs belong to, 1(N−1)γh ≤ µ < µ
f , then the expected
payoffs of signatories and non-signatories are different. Indeed, the expected payoff of
signatories in range of beliefs 1(N−1)γh ≤ µ < µ
f , is negative, and the maximum possible
expected payoff of non-signatories is 1 − µγh, where n∗(µ) = N − 1. Given that the
posterior beliefs on average should be equal to the prior, in lemma 4, it was shown
64The tie-breaking rule is for N > 2.
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that the maximum value of expected payoff of a representative non-signatory, 1 − pγh,
is below 1 − p for interior prior beliefs, specifically, 1 − pγh < 1 − p. In this problem,
perfect learning prescribed by the optimal information mechanism, i.e. µ0 = 0 and
µ1 = 1, suggests that V (p) = N(1 − p). Thus, in the current problem, the summation
of maximum value of expected payoffs of non-signatories is clearly below V (p) of the
optimal mechanism, i.e. 1 − pγh < N(1 − p). Accordingly, the maximum value of
expected payoff of both signatories and non-signatories is below V (p) = N(1 − p),
ensuring that for no prior, the sender could benefit from a partially uninformative
policy, also, the sender gains from the optimal policy of full revelation for all interior
prior beliefs.
Sender and minimising the total level of GHG
In this section, we consider a situation, where the sender’s objective is minimising
the total level of GHG, or maximising ν̂(q, γ) = −Q. Therefore, given the best-response
strategies of the countries in the emission and membership stages, the expected payoff
of the sender can be written as
ν(µ) =

0 if µf ≤ µ ≤ 1
n∗(µ) − N if µmn∗ < µ ≤ 1(n∗(µ)−1)γh
−N if 0 ≤ µ < µN
(4.5.4)
where in this equation by n∗(µ) we refer to any 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N . Furthermore, the
tie-breaking rule is such that for the case of n∗(µ) = 2, the range of beliefs are
1
2γh
< µ < µf , and for the case of n∗(µ) = N , the range of beliefs are µN ≤ µ ≤ 1(N−1)γh .
The supremum of convex hull of graph of ν(µ) suggests that the optimal information
policy is not globally unique, and depending on p, it takes a form of partial learning,
either by selection of a non-degenerate lottery over posteriors, or leaving the countries
at their prior beliefs.
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Proposition 11. IF ν̂(q, γ) = −Q, the optimal information mechanism prescribes
imperfect learning for p ∈ (0, 1), where
(i) if µf ≤ p < 1, or if µN ≤ p ≤ 1(N−1)γh , then a degenerate lottery over posteriors
which is equal to the prior with probability one, i.e. µ1 = p and τ = 1, is optimal. This
is equivalent to communication of no signal.
(ii) if 0 < µ < µN , then the unique optimal policy consists of a Bayes-plausible
randomisation over µ0 = 0 and µ1 = µN .
(iii) for any µN ≤ p < 1, the information policy of a Bayes-plausible randomisation
over µ0 ∈ [µN , 1(N−1)γh ] and µ1 ∈ [µ
f , 1], is one of the optimal information policies.
The proof is in Appendix 4.7.5, and it includes all possible optimal information
policies for different prior beliefs. In contrast to other expected payoffs of the sender,
which were examined, here the optimal information policy leads to imperfect learning.
If µf ≤ p < 1, or if µN ≤ p ≤ 1(N−1)γh , the countries in the absence of any persuasion,
choose the sender’s preferred action, which is formation of the abating grand coalition.
Hence, in such cases, sending no signal is an optimal information policy. In situations
where non-signatorie(s) emit, i.e. if 1(N−1)γh < p < µ
f , all possible optimal policies
include selection of a Bayes-plausible lottery over posteriors corresponding to the
formation of the abating grand coalition, i.e. µ0 ∈ [µN , 1(N−1)γh ] and µ1 ∈ [µ
f , 1].
Furthermore, if 0 < p < µN , by selection of a randomisation over the minimum
posterior associated with the abating grand coalition, i.e. µN , and the posterior of
µ0 = 0, the sender strictly gains. More specifically,
Corollary 3. For any 0 < p < µN and 1(N−1)γh < p < µ
f , the sender strictly benefits
from the persuasion. Furthermore, for all p ∈ [0, 1], the sender’s-preferred mitigation
and membership SPE coincides with the socially optimal outcome.
Hence, in cases where sending no signal is an optimal information policy, the sender
does not benefit from persuasion. While for all other interior prior beliefs, the sender
strictly gains from persuasion. In terms of equivalence of the equilibrium outcome with
the social optimum, here although the sender’s expected payoff does not coincide with
the preferences of (any or all of) the countries, and leads to partial learning, minimising
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the total level of GHG by the sender, results in formation of the grand coalition with
the threshold belief of µN for all interior prior beliefs, which indeed implies the socially
optimal mitigation outcome, as specified in lemma 2.
4.6 Conclusions
The chapter examines a coalition formation and IEA from the perspective of
information design. A theoretical model is developed, where a research central authority
in climate change, as an information sender, communicates an information policy and
signals about a payoff-relevant state variable (social cost of GHG) to the countries, in
order to affect their decision about joining a coalition. This information, through the
updated beliefs of the countries, determines the mitigation action of signatories and
non-signatories of an IEA, which in turn forms a certain stable coalition.
More specifically, in a coalition formation model that the beliefs are not exogenous
variables, it is shown that the induced beliefs map to a unique coalition size. Hence,
the size of stable coalition, as an endogenous variable, can be uniquely pinned down by
choosing the posterior beliefs. Knowing this, the research central authority in climate
change designs an information policy to persuade the countries to form the coalition
which maximises its expected payoff.
Most literature on the stochastic IEA concludes that the “veil of uncertainty” helps
the formation of climate coalitions. Our analysis suggests that if the payoff of the
sender and (a group of) countries coincide, the optimal information policy takes the
form of perfect learning. On the other hand, if the objective of the research central
authority is minimising the global GHG, then optimal information policy results in
partial learning of the state by the countries. However, for all of the assumed expected
payoffs which were examined for the sender, it turned out that the optimal information
mechanisms lead to the formation of grand coalition, which implies that the equilibrium
mitigation and membership outcome coincide with the social optimum. This is in fact
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because in all cases, the assumed expected payoffs of the sender are increasing in the
expected number of signatories of the coalition.
According to our model, formation of the grand coalition in Paris, with the focus on
minimising the total level of GHG, could be the result of adoption of two communication
strategies by the IPCC and other partners of the UN. Given the fact that in contrast to
previous meetings, from the beginning of the Paris conference, the leaders of many of
participating states were optimistic about achieving an agreement, it can be said that
the countries’ prior belief about the social cost of GHG had already implied believing
in a high (or catastrophic) level of the state65. If this was the case, then our simple
model suggests that one of the possible optimal information policies is sending no
signal. In fact, the strategy of IPCC from months prior to the conference, was not
communicating the social cost of GHG, and instead the focus was given to the level of
GHG and the average global temperature, although prominent research was carried
out by the IPCC on the social cost of carbon.66 Another possible communication
policy could be that the involved international research authorities referring to the
wide uncertainty about the state variable, optimally used a randomisation of signals,
which correspond to the posterior beliefs which lead to formation of the abating grand
coalition.
Finally, in terms of future research, the analysis of optimal communication by
central authorities in climate change can be generalised in various ways such as gradual
learning by receiving multiple signals over time and deriving the optimal time of
communication and delay, private information acquisition by the countries, private
persuasion versus public persuasion by the sender, and costly research for the sender.
65The high prior belief of the countries could be a result of private pre-communication with many
individual countries from months before the conference.
66 This is according to a public lecture at the University of Edinburgh by professor Ottmar Edenhofer,
co-chair of Working Group III of the IPCC, in May 2015.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of proposition 8
First, the coalition of singletons is always stable, as no unilateral deviation can
make anyone better off. Accordingly, the resulted equilibrium mitigation outcome of
the coalition of singletons is the same as was derived for the fringe countries, i.e. q∗i = 1
for any µ < µf , and q∗i = 0 for any µ ≥ µf . Now we continue the proof for n∗(µ) ≥ 2
and the three different ranges of beliefs.
I) Consider the case where µN ≤ µ < µf . Fix n∗(µ), also assume µmn∗ ≤ µ <
1
(n∗(µ)−1)γh
. We claim that in this range of beliefs, there is a stable coalition of unique
size n∗(µ) = I( 1
µγh
), where q∗mi = 0, and q
∗f
i = 1. Then if n ≥ n∗(µ), Eµumn
∗
i =
−µγh(N − n), and Eµufn
∗
i = 1 − µγh(N − n). While if n < n∗(µ), Eµu
fn∗
i = 1 − µγhN .
As explained in section 4.5.1, the Nash equilibrium condition for the coalition members
(the internal stability condition) implies that the equilibrium number of signatories
cannot be less than n∗(µ), i.e.
Eµumn
∗
i (n∗(µ)) ≥ Eµu
fn∗
i (n∗(µ) − 1) (4.7.1)
Condition (4.7.1) is satisfied if and only if −µγh(N − n∗(µ)) ≥ 1 − µγhN . This is
always satisfied as in this range, µ ≥ 1
n∗(µ)γh
≡ µmn∗ . Therefore, no coalition member
has incentive to leave the coalition of size n∗(µ).
In addition, the Nash equilibrium condition for the non-signatories (the external




i (n∗(µ) + 1) < Eµu
fn∗
i (n∗(µ)) (4.7.2)
This is satisfied if and only if −µγh(N − n∗(µ) − 1) < 1 − µγh(N − n∗(µ)), which is the
case as in this range µ < 1
γh
≡ µf . In other words, it does not pay any non-signatory
to change its decision.
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If µ < µmn∗ , then coalition of n∗(µ) with decision of q∗mi = 0 is not internally stable
and signatories have incentive to leave the coalition as −µγh(N − n∗(µ)) < 1 − µγhN .
Similarly, (in case that n∗(µ) > 2), if 1(n∗(µ)−1)γh ≤ µ <
1
(n∗(µ)−2)γh
, then abating coalition
of size n∗−1 is stable, which results in expected payoff of Eµumn
∗
i = −µγh(N −n∗(µ)+1)
for the signatories of coalition.
Therefore, in the range µN ≤ µ < µf , given that the minimum threshold of
signatories is µN , and (in the case that N > 2,) the maximum threshold is 12γh , there
exists N − 1 thresholds for signatories, µmn∗ , and accordingly N − 1 sub-partitions of
beliefs, µmn∗ ≤ µ < 1(n∗(µ)−1)γh . Thus, the size of stable coalition varies between two
and N , i.e. 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N .
II) Now suppose µ ≥ µf . Given condition (4.7.1), the grand coalition is internally
stable, as in this range of beliefs, 1 − µγhN < 0. External stability cannot be checked
for the grand coalition, since there exists no non-signatory country to be considered.
III) Similarly, if µ < µN , no coalition for abatement in this range is profitable, and
the emitting grand coalition is stable, where for all countries it is profitable to choose
q∗i = 1, and the expected payoff of country i is Eµu∗i = 1 − µγhN . Indeed, no unilateral
deviation can make anyone better off, i.e. 1 − µγhN > −µγh(N − 1), for any µ < µN ,
which implies the internal stability of grand coalition.
4.7.2 Proof of lemma 3
Given proposition 8 and the corresponding equilibrium payoff of signatories in (4.5.1),




0 if µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1
−µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1)) if µmn
∗
< µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
1 − µ1γhN if 0 ≤ µ1 ≤ µN
+ (1 − τ)

0 if µf ≤ µ0 ≤ 1
−µ0γh(N − n∗(µ0)) if µmn
∗
< µ0 ≤ 1(n∗(µ0)−1)γh
1 − µ0γhN if 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN
(4.7.3)
with respect to µ1 and µ0, subject to τµ1 + (1 − τ)µ0 = p. Also, as mentioned,
2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N , and for the case of n∗(µ) = 2, the range of beliefs is 12γh < µ < µ
f .
Moreover, the expected payoff in (4.7.3) can be further decoded to
τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0) = [(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]1µf ≤µ1≤1
0≤µ0≤µN






+ [(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN) − τµ1γh(N − n∗(µ1))]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
0≤µ0≤µN




− [τµ1γh(N − n∗(µ1))]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
µf ≤µ0≤1
+ [τ(1 − µ1γhN) + (1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]10≤µ1≤µN
0≤µ0≤µN




+ [τ(1 − µ1γhN)]10≤µ1≤µN
µf ≤µ0≤1
(4.7.4)
In order to prove the lemma, and find the unique optimal mechanism, it is required
to compare the maximised expected payoff of all of the above nine partitions of posterior
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beliefs with each other, and select the policy corresponding to the maximum expected
payoff.
Let us label each term of the above expected payoff by ascending numbers, e.g.
case 1 refers to the first term where µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN .
It is easy to verify that selection of posterior beliefs corresponding to cases 6, 8,
and 9, where µ0 > µ1, are dominated as the persuasion would be worthless. For
example, in case 9, where 0 ≤ µ1 ≤ µN and µf ≤ µ0 ≤ 1. The resulted expected payoff
of τ(1 − µ1γhN) is maximised if µ1 = 0, to obtain expected payoff of τ . Then, the
constraint of law of total probability implies 1 − p
µ0
= τ . So the maximum τ is achieved
by setting µ0 = 1. Hence π(1 | γh) = 0 and π(0 | γl) = 0, which is absolute lying and
such a policy will be ignored by the countries.
In addition, in cases that the corresponding expected payoff depends on n∗(µ), it
is an increasing function of n∗(µ). Therefore, selection of posteriors which lead to
n∗(µ) = N maximises the sender’s payoff. Furthermore, the expected payoffs of cases
2, 3, and 5 are inferior relative to cases 1, 4, and 7, which lead to positive expected
payoffs. Now we compare the maximum possible values of these positive candidates.
Case 1: µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 < µN . Then, the expected payoff of (1 − τ)(1 −
µ0γhN) is maximised if µ0 = 0. Thus, the law of total probability implies τ = pµ1 .
Therefore, the resulted expected payoff of (1 − τ) is maximised if τ is minimised, which
is achieved by choosing µ1 = 1. Hence, V (p) = 1 − p is a potential value of the optimal
mechanism.
Case 4: µmn∗ < µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh and 0 ≤ µ0 < µ
N . To maximise the associated
expected payoff, it should be that µ0 = 0. Also, ideally, µ1 should be such that
n∗(µ1) = N . In other words, µN < µ1 ≤ 1(N−1)γh . Hence, the resulted expected payoff,
which is decreasing in τ , so increasing in µ1, is maximised if µ1 = 1(N−1)γh . However,




expected payoff which is less than case 1, where µ1 = 1.
Case 7: 0 ≤ µ1 ≤ µN and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN . Then, the expected payoff of τ(1−µ1γhN)+
(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN) is maximised if µ0 = µ1 = 0, but this is not Bayes-plausible, for an
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interior p. If we search for a pair of Bayes-plausible (µ0, µ1), and let µ0 = 0, then given
the law of total probability, τ = p
µ1
, and the expected payoff of τ(1 − µ1γhN) + (1 − τ),
is reduced to 1 − pγhN . But for any p > 0, this is less than the maximised expected
payoff of case 1, which is 1 − p. Moreover, as the expected payoff is linear in µ0 and µ1,
any other combination of the two variables in this range leads to an expected payoff
which is less than 1 − p.
Therefore, case 1 has the unique maximum expected payoff of 1−p, by choosing the
corner solution of µ0 = 0 and µ1 = 1. Hence, optimally π(1 | γh) = 1 and π(0 | γl) = 1.
4.7.3 Proof of lemma 4
Based on the expected payoff of non-signatories for any belief in equation (4.5.2), the
problem of sender can be formalised as maximising
τ

0 if µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 or if µN < µ1 < 1(N−1)γh
1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1)) if µmn
∗
< µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
1 − µ1γhN if 0 ≤ µ1 ≤ µN
+ (1 − τ)

0 if µf ≤ µ0 ≤ 1 or if µN < µ0 < 1(N−1)γh
1 − µ0γh(N − n∗(µ0)) if µmn
∗
< µ0 ≤ 1(n∗(µ0)−1)γh
1 − µ0γhN if 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN
(4.7.5)
with respect to µ1 and µ0, subject to τµ1 + (1 − τ)µ0 = p. Also, as mentioned, in this
equation by n∗(µ) we refer to any 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N − 1. In addition, for the case of
n∗(µ) = 2, the range of beliefs are 12γh < µ < µ
f , and for the case of n∗(µ) = N − 1,
the range of beliefs are 1(N−1)γh ≤ µ ≤
1
(N−2)γh
. The expected payoff in (4.7.5) can be
rewritten as
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τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0) = [(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]1µf ≤µ1≤1
0≤µ0≤µN










+ [(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN) + τ(1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1)))]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
0≤µ0≤µN








+ [τ(1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1))]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
µf ≤µ0≤1
+ [(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]1µN <µ1< 1(N−1)γh
0≤µ0≤µN








+ [0]1µN <µ1< 1γh(N−1)
µf ≤µ0≤1
+ [τ(1 − µ1γhN) + (1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]10≤µ1≤µN
0≤µ0≤µN








+ [τ(1 − µ1γhN)]10≤µ1≤µN
µf ≤µ0≤1
(4.7.6)
Again we label each term of the above expected payoff by ascending numbers, e.g.
case 1 refers to the first term where µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN . So, there are 16
cases, where cases 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16 cannot be equilibrium because in these
cases µ0 > µ1.
The cases with potential positive payoffs are as follows:
Case 1: µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN . This can be a candidate, as by setting
µ0 = 0, the Bayes-plausibility implies τ = pµ1 . Hence, the expected payoff of 1 − τ is
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maximised by setting µ1 = 1. Thus the full-revelation policy leads to the expected
payoff of 1 − p.
Case 3: µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and µmn
∗
< µ0 ≤ 1(n∗(µ0)−1)γh . Ideally, choosing µ0 in the
range that 1(N−1)γh < µ0 ≤
1
(N−2)γh
, leads to n∗(µ0) = N − 1, and expected payoff of
(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γh), which is increasing in µ1, as µ0 ≤ p. Therefore, setting µ1 = 1 leads
to expected payoff of 1−p1−µ0 (1−µ0γh), which is strictly less than the maximised expected
payoff of case 1, 1 − p, for any µ0 in this range.
Case 5: µmn∗ < µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µ
N . The expected payoff is
maximised if µ0 = 0, and Bayes-plausibility implies τ = pµ1 . So, the resulted expected
payoff of τ(1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1))) + (1 − τ) can be simplified to 1 − pγh(N − n∗(µ1)).




n∗(µ1) = N − 1, and the expected payoff is reduced to 1 − pγh, but this is always less
than V (p) = (1 − p) in case 1, for any p > 0.
Case 6: µmn∗ < µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh and µ
N ≤ µ0 ≤ 1(N−1)γh . The corresponding




payoff of τ(1 − µ1γh). The law of total probability for µ0 and µ1, restricts the resulted
expected payoff to p−µ0
µ1−µ0 (1 − µ1γh), which is decreasing in µ1. The minimum possible
value of µ1 is p, but it leads to expected payoff of 1 − µ1γh, which is less than 1 − p for
any p > 0.
Case 7: µmn∗ < µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh and µ
mn∗ < µ0 ≤ 1(n∗(µ0)−1)γh . The associated
expected payoff is maximised if 1(N−1)γh < µ1 ≤
1
(N−2)γh




The resulted expected payoff of τ(1 − µ1γh) + (1 − τ)(1 − µ0γh), given a pair of Bayes-
plausible (µ0, µ1), and replacing µ1 = pτ −
1−τ
τ
µ0, can be simplified to 1 − pγh, which
for any p > 0, is less than the payoff of case 1.
Case 9: µN < µ1 ≤ 1(N−1)γh and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µ
N . Similar to case 1, it is possible to set
µ0 = 0 and obtain expected payoff of 1 − τ . This is increasing in µ1, but in this range
of beliefs, it cannot be as maximised as case 1, where it was possible to select µ1 = 1.
Case 13: 0 ≤ µ1 < µN and 0 ≤ µ0 < µN . This case is ruled out as it is identical to
case 7 of the signatories problem in the proof of lemma 3.
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Therefore, case 1 provides the unique maximum expected payoff of V (p) = 1 − p,
and the optimal policy is full revelation of the state.
4.7.4 Proof of proposition 10
Given equations (4.7.3) and (4.7.5), and adjusting the tie-breaking rule (for N > 2),
the expected payoff of sender specified in (4.5.3) is
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τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0) = [αN(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]1µf ≤µ1≤1
0≤µ0≤µN




+ [(1 − τ)(N − n∗(µ0))(1 − µ0γh(N − n∗(µ0)))






+ [αN(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)
− ατn∗(µ1)µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1)) + τ(N − n∗(µ1))(1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1))]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
0≤µ0≤µN




+ [(1 − τ)(N − n∗(µ0))(1 − µ0γh(N − n∗(µ0))) + τ(N − n∗(µ1))(1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1)))




+ [τ(N − n∗(µ1))(1 − µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1)))
− ταn∗(µ1)µ1γh(N − n∗(µ1))]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
µf ≤µ0≤1
+ [αN(1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN)]1µN <µ1< 1(N−1)γh
0≤µ0≤µN




+ [(1 − τ)(N − n∗(µ0))(1 − µ0γh(N − n∗(µ0)))




+ [0]1µN <µ1< 1γh(N−1)
µf ≤µ0≤1
+ [αN(τ(1 − µ1γhN) + (1 − τ)(1 − µ0γhN))]10≤µ1≤µN
0≤µ0≤µN




+ [αNτ(1 − µ1γhN) − α(1 − τ)n∗(µ0)µ0γh(N − n∗(µ0))








where in this equation, n∗(µ) refers to 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N − 1.
Again by labelling each term of the above expected payoff by ascending numbers,
(e.g. case 1 refers to the first term where µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN) and ruling
out cases where µ0 > µ1 from the analysis, i.e., cases 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16, we
compare potential positive payoffs:
Case 1: µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 < µN . Selecting µ0 = 0, and µ1 = 1, leads to
expected payoff of αN(1 − p).
Case 3: µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and µmn
∗ ≤ µ0 < 1γh(n∗(µ0)−1) . Given that the maximum
possible expected payoff in this range is obtained by selecting n∗(µ0) = N − 1. So, the
corresponding expected payoff can be written as (1−τ)(1−µ0γh)−(1−τ)(N −1)αµ0γh.
For any α ≥ 1 and N > 2, the last term is non-positive. For any positive µ0, this is
less that the expected payoff of case 1.
Case 5: µmn∗ ≤ µ1 < 1γh(n∗(µ1)−1) and 0 ≤ µ0 < µ
N . Undoubtedly, it is optimal to




µ1γh) + αN(1 − pµ1 ) + (1−α)(N − 1)pγh. This expected payoff can be further simplified
to Nα − pγh(α(N − 1) + 1) + N pµ1 (1 − α), where the last two terms are non-positive
for any α ≥ 1. So, this is always less than the expected payoff of case 1, Nα − Nαp.
Case 6: µmn∗ ≤ µ1 < 1γh(n∗(µ1)−1) and µ
N < µ0 <
1
(N−1)γh
. Selection of µ1 such that
n∗(µ1) = N − 1 leads to expected payoff of τ(1 − µ1γg[1 + α(N − 1)]). It is decreasing
in both µ0 and µ1, but relative to case 1, the corner solutions where either of these
could be zero is not available in this range of beliefs. Also since α ≥ 1 and N − 1 > 1,
this expected payoff is less than case 1.
Case 7: µmn∗ ≤ µ1 < 1γh(n∗(µ1)−1) and µ
mn∗ ≤ µ0 < 1γh(n∗(µ0)−1) . The last two terms
of the expected payoff are negative. Given the fact that the in this range of beliefs, the
expected payoffs of signatories and non-signatories are maximised if n∗(µ) = N − 1, the
first two terms are identical to case 7 in the proof of lemma 4, where a Bayes-plausible
pair of beliefs leads to expected payoff of 1 − pγh, which is inferior to the case 1, for
any α ≥ 1.
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Case 9: µN < µ1 < 1(N−1)γh and 0 ≤ µ0 < µ
N . The corresponding expected payoff
is similar to case 1 if µ0 = 0. However, here it is not possible to set µ1 = 1 and achieve
the maximised value of expected payoff of case 1.
Case 13: 0 ≤ µ1 ≤ µN and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µN . This case is also ruled out, as it is similar
to case 7 in proof of lemma 3.
Hence, the expected payoff of case 1, given µ0 = 0 and µ1 = 1, provides a unique
maximum expected payoff. Furthermore, selection of µ0 = 0 leads to formation of the
emitting grand coalition, while selection of µ1 = 1 implies formation of the abating
grand coalition. This in turn coincides with the socially optimal mitigation outcome
specified in 2.
4.7.5 Proof of proposition 11




0 if µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1
n∗(µ1) − N if µmn
∗
< µ1 ≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh




0 if µf ≤ µ0 ≤ 1
n∗(µ0) − N if µmn
∗
< µ0 ≤ 1(n∗(µ0)−1)γh
−N if 0 ≤ µ0 < µN
with respect to µ1 and µ0, such that τµ1 + (1 − τ)µ0 = p. In addition, in this equation
by n∗(µ) we refer to any 2 ≤ n∗(µ) ≤ N . Furthermore, the tie-breaking rule is such
that for the case of n∗(µ) = 2, the range of beliefs are 12γh < µ < µ
f , and for the case of
n∗(µ) = N , the range of beliefs are µN ≤ µ ≤ 1(N−1)γh . The expected payoff in (4.7.8)
can be rewritten as
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τν(µ1) + (1 − τ)ν(µ0) = −[(1 − τ)N)]1µf ≤µ1≤1
0≤µ0<µN






− [τ(N − n∗(µ1)) + (1 − τ)N)]1µmn∗ <µ1≤ 1(n∗(µ1)−1)γh
0≤µ0<µN















Let us first label each term of the above expected payoff by ascending numbers, e.g.
case 1 refers to the first term where µf ≤ µ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ0 < µN . Furthermore, note
that cases 6, 8, and 9 are ruled out as in these case µ0 > µ1.
In order to prove the proposition, let us fix p, and consider three possibilities for
the prior belief.
First, µf ≤ p < 1. A Bayes-plausible lottery over posteriors should satisfy the order
of µ0 ≤ p ≤ µ1. Thus, the corresponding expected payoffs of cases 1, 2, and 3 must be
compared. As in this range of prior beliefs, µf ≤ p ≤ 1, the countries in the absence of
any persuasion, take the sender’s-preferred action, the optimal policy can be sending
no signal at all. This is not a unique optimal information policy, and it is equivalent to
a degenerate randomisation of posteriors, which is equal to the prior with probability
one, i.e. µ1 = p and τ = 1. This can be obtained by a degenerate randomisation in
either of cases 1, 2, or 3, leading to the expected payoff of zero. Another optimal policy
is available in case 3, by selecting a Bayes-plausible randomisation over µ0 = µf and
µ1 = 1.
Second, µmn∗ ≤ p < 1(n∗(µ)−1)γh . Searching for a maximum payoff should include
expected payoffs of cases 2, 4, and 5. The expected payoff of case 2 is maximised if
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µ0 = µN , which implies n∗(µ0) = N , and expected payoff of zero. Therefore, for any
prior belief in µN ≤ p ≤ 1, a Bayes-plausible randomisation of µ0 = µN and µ1 = 1
is optimal. If µN ≤ p ≤ µf , another optimal policy is randomisation of µ0 = µN and
µ1 = µf . Similarly if 1(N−1)γh ≤ p ≤ µ
f , then a randomisation of µ0 = 1(N−1)γh and
µ1 = µf (or µ1 = 1), which satisfies the law of total probability is also optimal. In
short, for any µN ≤ p < 1, a Bayes-plausible randomisation over µ0 ∈ [µN , 1(N−1)γh ]
and µ1 ∈ [µf , 1] is an optimal information policy. In case 5, it is possible to obtain
V (p) = 0, if and only if µN ≤ p ≤ 1(N−1)γh . In such a case, that the countries choose
the sender’s preferred action in the absence of any persuasion, the optimal policy is
not unique, and there can be no persuasion, or a degenerate lottery of µ1 = p and
τ = 1, or the policy of selection of a Bayes-plausible randomisation over µ0 = µN
and µ1 = 1(N−1)γh . All of these policies lead to expected payoff of zero for the sender.
Finally, in case 4, if and only if µN ≤ p ≤ 1(N−1)γh , the optimal policy of µ1 = p and
τ = 1 leads to V (p) = 0.
Third, 0 < p < µN . This implies comparison of expected payoffs of cases 1, 4, and
7. Let us start the analysis with comparison of expected payoffs of cases 1 and 4. In
both cases the expected payoffs are increasing in τ , and therefore decreasing in both
µ0 and µ1. Hence, for case 1, choosing µ0 = 0 and µ1 = µf obtains maximum expected
payoff of p
µf
N − N . While for case 4, choosing the minimum possible posteriors of
µ0 = 0 and µ1 = µN , leads to maximum expected payoff of pµN N − N . The expected
payoff of 4 is more than 1 if N > 2, and the two cases lead to the same expected payoff.
In addition, for any non-degenerate randomisation over posteriors, case 7 has the least
expected payoff. Therefore, the unique optimal information policy is a Bayes-plausible




The previous three chapters explored three topics in transboundary environmental
and resource economics from the perspective of game theory and information eco-
nomics. This chapter reviews the contributions and the main findings of each chapter.
Furthermore, the limitations of the study are discussed and some possible pathways
for future research are suggested.
5.2 Second Chapter: Panic-Based Overfishing In
Transboundary Fisheries
The second chapter of the thesis set out to find a possible reason for over extrac-
tion in transboundary fisheries. The chapter explores whether acquisition of private
information about the assessment of the resource by the countries can be a possible
answer. In fact the private information of the harvesting agents may lead to strategic
uncertainty about each other’s assessment. The chapter examines a coordination game,
where two countries in addition to biological uncertainty face strategic uncertainty and
5.2 Second Chapter: Panic-Based Overfishing In Transboundary Fisheries 129
the results of the chapter converge to derive a unique prediction about the harvesting
action of the countries.
Although the biological uncertainty is extensively studied in the literature on
resource games, there is no study with analytical solutions, where all agents acquire
private information about the resource. Similarly, although there are a number of
studies with a focus on multiplicity of equilibria in resource games, the equilibrium
refinement of resource coordination games has never been examined in the literature.
Given the assumptions on the payoff structure, the size of the stock admits low
and high regions, where respectively sustainable fishing and overfishing are dominant
harvesting strategies, and the size of this regions is determined by parameters of the
model, i.e. the discount factor, the reproduction rate, the share of sustainable yield,
and the overfishing cost parameter. Between these two regions, there is an intermediate
region of fish population, where there is no dominant harvesting strategy and the
resulting coordination game here leads to multiplicity of equilibria. Hence, a researcher
or manger of the stock, in the absence of any equilibrium refinement, cannot make any
prediction about the harvesting action of the countries.
In terms of equilibrium refinement, in the first step, where the model is analysed
under the assumption of precise signals, the risk-dominance equilibrium-selection
criterion of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) is suggested. It is shown that the unique
equilibrium admits a threshold form with respect to the stock, above which the
countries overfish and below which they coordinate on sustainable harvesting as the
less risky action.
In the next step, the model with noisy private information is considered and the
analysis starts by solving the game for any general uniform noise (out of the limit).
From the perspective of information economics, the chapter suggests two possible
reasons for overfishing, either the countries’ information implies that the fishery’s size
is in the upper dominance region, where overfishing is the dominant strategy, or it is
possible that although a country acquires private information corresponding to the
intermediate region, where it is not dominant to overfish, the negative belief about the
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private information of the other country may lead to a rational choice of over fishing,
“panic-based” overfishing.
Finally, the global-game equilibrium refinement of Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and Morris and Shin (1998) is applied, and it is shown that, for all sufficiently small
levels of noise of private information, there is a unique threshold-form PBNE. It is also
noted that the symmetric equilibrium of the global games is the unique rationalisable
strategy of the game.
Furthermore, the coincidence of the global-game threshold and the risk-dominance
threshold of the complete information game provides considerable tractability for policy
implications. Specifically, as a practice pathway, the study focuses on the overfishing
cost and the share of sustainable catch. It is discussed that if the private information
is sufficiently precise, given the unique derived equilibrium outcomes, it is possible
to write down the unique equilibrium payoffs corresponding to each level of stock
and consequently find an optimal level of the policy parameters, which for example
maximises the payoff of a representative country.
As a future research direction in the context of policy implications, it is worthwhile
investigating the effect of endogenising information acquisition. In the second chapter,
the precision of private information is exogenous and identical across the countries.
However, in line with the theoretical study on costly information acquisition in global
games by Szkup and Trevino (2015), these assumptions can be relaxed. Szkup and
Trevino derive the socially efficient amount of private information to be acquired
and check whether there are strategic complementarities in information acquisition.
Furthermore, in our context, such a study can help to explain how the value of the
private information can change the probability of sustainable harvest.
Another limitation of the study is its two-period assumption, but it should be recalled
that this simplicity provides tractability, as the study does not only apply equilibrium
refinement techniques, but more generally the model is solved and the corresponding
distributions are derived for situations where the noise of private information does not
necessarily vanish.
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5.3 Third Chapter: The Economics of Climate Change
and The Role of Public Information
The focus of the third and fourth chapters is communication of public information
on climate change by research central authorities with the countries which are involved
in abating or emission decisions. A key objective of the third chapter is to explore
the effect of public learning about the social cost of carbon on the investment of the
countries on emission abatement technologies.
Currently, empirical studies suggest a wide range of uncertainty around the magni-
tude of the social cost of carbon. Furthermore, the theoretical literature on stochastic
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), mainly converge to pessimism about
learning on this cost, which is modelled as a payoff-relevant parameter in various
models.
The chapter is built on the deterministic infinite-horizon model of Dutta and
Radner (2009), and the chapter examines the properties of the set of self-enforceable
abatements, the equilibrium selection, and the sensitivity of the equilibrium abatements
to learning about the social cost of green-house gasses (GHG).
It is shown that if the prior public belief is more optimistic about the social cost
of GHG, then learning the true value necessarily enhances social welfare. However, if
the prior belief is more than the true realisation of the state variable, the conclusion
depends on whether the socially optimum level of abatement is achievable through
self-enforceable agreements.
In addition to addressing the question of equilibrium selection and welfare under
the learning scenario, as another research question, the third chapter investigates,
in a strategic communication setting, whether full-learning, no-learning or imperfect
learning are equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, instead of taking the learning as given,
the chapter examines signalling games between an informed research central authority,
as information sender, and the countries as receivers, where the induced learning
outcome is endogenously determined by the interaction of the two groups.
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It is assumed that the sender, by choosing a signalling strategy, tries to minimise
the gap between the socially-optimum and the selected abatement levels. In the binary
signalling game, where the sender chooses between two strategies of full revelation
and being silent (no learning), it is shown that the unique PBNE learning outcome
is full learning by the countries. In order to check whether the sender can induce
imperfect learning, the signalling game is generalised to a setting where the sender
chooses the precision of his truthful signal from a continuum. The unique fully revealing
equilibrium of this game also reinforces the results of the binary-signal game.
The results are also robust in the case of distribution uncertainty, where the
countries are not symmetric with respect to the social cost of GHG. In addition, by
endogenising the time of communication, it is concluded that in a signalling setup, the
countries in equilibrium block the possibility of any delay in revelation of the state by
the sender.
As discussed in the chapter, the findings of the study depend on the simplifying
linearity assumptions in the payoff functions and equation of motion of GHG. As a
future extension, it would be interesting to investigate whether the results are robust
to non-linear payoff functions where the abatement strategies may depend on the stock
of global GHG.
In summary, the chapter from a signalling-game perspective concludes that, in-
dependently of the gap between the public prior belief and the true realisation, the
research central authority fully and immediately reveals the information about the
social cost of carbon.
5.4 Fourth Chapter: Optimal Communication of
Climate Change With The Public
Similarly to the third chapter, the fourth chapter studies the interaction of
the research central authorities and the countries in IEAs, where the sender sends
information regarding the social cost of carbon. But in contrast to the third chapter,
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where an implicit agreement in an infinite-horizon model is studied, the fourth chapter
models a coalition-formation game with fixed membership. Furthermore, instead
of restricting the information sender to specific information strategies, an optimal
information structure within the class of public information structures is derived. Lastly,
in contrast to the third chapter, the sender has commitment power and at the stage of
choosing the information strategies, he is uninformed about the state.
The main research questions of the study are: Is it possible to induce a specific
membership outcome in a coalition formation game? In an IEA context, can a sender
achieve a specific emission or abatement outcome? Furthermore, if the answer to
these questions is positive, then what is the optimal information structure in coalition-
formation games?
The question of the possibility of achieving the grand coalition or social optimum
has been investigated extensively in the literature on IEAs. This chapter addresses
the research questions using the new approach of information design, introduced by
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and relative to the strand of public information design,
the study generalises the theory to coalition formation, where the receivers of the
public information are two groups of signatories and non-signatories, who may have
conflicts of interests.
The study develops a model where payoffs of both sender and receivers depend
on the social cost of GHG and the emission decision of the countries. Furthermore,
the payoffs of both sides are common knowledge. The sender, before observing the
state variable, initiates research which is modelled as announcing the information
mechanism (a set of signals and the probability distribution over them which is labelled
information policy), and commits to it. After conducting the research, the sender
sends a public signal according to the committed policy. The countries, after updating
their beliefs, decide about membership of the coalition and subsequently about their
emission actions.
It is shown that the equilibrium strategies of signatories and non-signatories take a
threshold form with respect to their belief about the social cost of GHG, and it results
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in partitioning of the support of beliefs such that every partition of beliefs maps to a
unique coalition size. Hence, in contrast to the literature on stochastic IEAs, where the
beliefs about the state variable are exogenously given, here the beliefs and therefore
the size of the stable coalition are induced by the information sender.
The optimal information structure is derived under various assumptions regarding
the payoff of the sender, and it is verified that, if the payoff of the sender and either or
both signatories and non-signatories coincide, the optimal information policy is full
revelation of the state. However, if the sender seeks to minimise the global level of
GHG, then imperfect learning may be induced as an optimal information policy. It is
also shown that in all of these cases, the optimal information structure leads to the
formation of a grand coalition, also the induced mitigation outcome coincide with the
social optimum.
As a future extension to the model, it is worth examining the model if the information
persuasion occurs after the membership stage. Such a question can be important in
the practice pathway of the study, and can provide a robustness check of the results.
Even if the results would be different, it still would be an interesting investigation.
Furthermore, the current coalition model is simplified in various dimensions, and a
possible generalisation could be extension of the model to a dynamic setting, where
the coalition formation can incorporate variable membership. Again, this has been
proved to be an important issue in practice of IEAs, and has been given attention in
the theoretical literature.
As a final remark, one of the most noteworthy contributions of the study is the
suggestion of a new perspective affecting the membership decision of agents in coalition
formation, which has been a central question in the literature on IEAs.
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